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While a substantial body of research has documented how consumers’ levels of 
progress, in general, influence their motivation in goal pursuit, the changes in the 
determinants of motivation in different stages of goal pursuit and their impact on 
consumers’ self-regulation remain largely unexplored. Specifically, what are the factors 
consumers focus on when they first start to pursue a goal versus when they are 
approaching the end point of the pursuit? My dissertation explores this important 
question from three different angles: the perceived velocity, the mental representation of 
progress level, and the perceived closeness with others who are pursuing the same goal.  
Through three essays, we found that when people first begin to pursue a goal and 
the attainability of the goal is a concern, they are motivated by a fast speed of 
progressing, tend to exaggerate the progress they have made so far, and seek 
companionship from others who are pursuing the same goal, to enhance the belief that the 
goal is indeed attainable. However, once they reach the advanced stage of the pursuit and 
the attainability of the goal is relatively secured, they switch to focus on the remaining 
discrepancy and seek to reduce this gap in a timely manner; therefore, in this advanced 
stage of the pursuit they are conversely motivated by a slow speed of progressing, tend to 
 vii 
downplay the progress they have made to exaggerate the remaining discrepancy that still 
needs to be completed, and such intense progress monitoring also leads to 
competitiveness against others who are pursuing the same goal as them. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For a person who is trying to pay off his debts and has just started working on this 
goal, telling him that he is paying off debts at a fast speed can boost his confidence and 
motivate him to allocate more money towards debt repayment; however, after paying off 
the majority of his debts and getting close to his financial goal, this person may be 
tempted to reduce his debt repayment allotments if he continues to receive the same 
feedback that he is paying off his debts at a fast speed, and infer that there is no need to 
invest as much effort as before. That is, the same factor that motivates consumers in early 
stages of the pursuit may conversely de-motivate them when they are approaching the 
end point. 
While a large body of research has documented how consumers' levels of 
progress, in general, influence their motivation in goal pursuit (e.g., Kivetz, Urminsky, 
and Zheng 2006; Liberman and Förster 2008), little research has asked the question of 
how different factors change their motivational impact as people accumulate progress 
throughout the course of goal pursuit. Specifically, what factors do people focus on when 
they first start to pursue a goal, and what factors are motivating when they approach the 
end point of the pursuit? To answer this question, we draw from the literature of the 
dynamics of self-regulation that proposed two different sources of motivation: one’s 
commitment to the goal and the lack of progress on the goal (Fishbach, Zhang, & Koo, 
2009; Koo & Fishbach, 2008). Because it is unlikely that individuals would be concerned 
about both goal commitment and the lack of progress to the same extent at all times, we 
 xiv 
propose that the dominant concern people have about goal pursuit would depend on the 
stage they are in.  
Specifically, when people first start to pursue a goal, they are less certain about 
their commitment to the goal and will question whether they should continue to work 
toward goal attainment; hence, their commitment level would be the main source of 
motivation at this early stage. In addition, because goal commitment represents a person’s 
definitive decision to pursue a goal with the expectation of eventually attaining it, the 
commitment to a goal should be contingent on the perception that the goal is attainable. 
For example, both the value-expectancy models (e.g., Atkinson 1957; Tolman 1955; 
Vroom 1964) and goal-setting theory (Locke and Latham 1990) emphasize that the 
cognitive assessment of one’s chances of attaining a goal is an important factor in 
people’s decisions to adopt this goal. Therefore, whenever consumers are uncertain about 
the attainability of a goal, such as when their progress level is still low, they focus on the 
question of goal attainability and seek information to confirm that they can indeed attain 
the goal. Their motivation in this stage, therefore, should depend on their answer to the 
question of goal attainability. 
The concern over goal attainability, however, is unlikely to dominate for long. 
Once consumers accumulate sufficient progress toward the goal and are reaching the 
advanced stage of the pursuit, they feel relatively more confident that they can attain the 
goal (Wood and Bandura 1989). With this certainty in mind, consumers shift their focus 
to whether they are reducing the remaining discrepancy effectively, and it is the 
remaining discrepancy (i.e., lack of progress) that drives their motivation in this advanced 
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stage of goal pursuit. That is, when people feel that their effort is not effective in reducing 
the remaining discrepancy, they would be motivated to increase their effort to ensure that 
the goal can be successfully attained within the desired timeframe (e.g., Brunstein and 
Gollwitzer 1996; Carver and Scheier 1998; Wicklund and Gollwitzer 1982). Therefore, 
whenever consumers are focusing on reducing the remaining discrepancy effectively, 
such as when they have reached the advanced stage of goal pursuit, they would focus in 
turn on the question of discrepancy reduction, and allocate effort based on how much is 
required to reduce the remaining discrepancy to reach the end point of the pursuit.  
Because of this shift from focusing on goal attainability in the early stage, and 
conversely focusing on discrepancy reduction in the advanced stage of goal pursuit, the 
same factor would have a completely different impact on consumers’ motivation, 
depending on the stage they are in and their dominant concern at the moment. Based on 
this framework, I have developed three essays to explore the dynamic impact of 
perceived velocity, mental representation of progress, and social interactions, 
respectively. 
In the first section, “Motivational Consequences of Perceived Velocity in 
Consumer Goal Pursuit (pp. 1 – 35),” we explore the factor of perceived velocity, i.e., the 
rate of progress, in initial versus advanced stages of goal pursuit. We propose that when 
progress toward attaining a goal is low, a high (vs. a low) perceived velocity in 
attainment suggests higher goal attainability, resulting in greater motivation. However, 
when consumers are approaching the end point, they focus more on whether they are 
effectively reducing the remaining discrepancy to attain the goal quickly. In this case, a 
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low (vs. a high) perceived velocity of progress elicits greater motivation; because, it 
suggests that continued effort is needed to ensure a more expeditious attainment.  
In one of the studies, we collaborated with a coffee shop on campus and launched 
a loyalty program to motivate repeated coffee purchases. We found that a point structure 
that allowed customers to accumulate loyalty points faster when they first started the 
program, and conversely allowed them to accumulate points slower when they were 
approaching the total points required for the reward was more motivating than the 
standard loyalty program that allowed customers to accumulate points at a uniform speed. 
This finding is not only counter-intuitive, but also has important implications for real-
world business practices. 
In the second section, “So Near and Yet So Far: The Mental Representation of 
Goal Progress (pp. 36 – 88),” we investigate how people mentally represent their 
progress level in initial versus advanced stages of goal pursuit. We propose that the 
mental representation of progress level serves as a self-regulatory mechanism to ensure 
goal attainment: Specifically, when individuals just start the pursuit, they exaggerate their 
progress level to signal higher goal attainability and elicit greater effort; in contrast, when 
people are approaching the end point, they downplay their progress to create greater 
perceived discrepancy, and thus elicit greater effort.  
In one of the studies, we organized a t-shirt donation campaign, in which we 
invited students to donate their used t-shirts to help us reach the goal of collecting 1,000 
t-shirts for the refugees in Haiti. We manipulated the importance of the goal by changing 
the cause for the campaign. In addition, we showed participants a picture of either two 
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(initial stage) or ten (advanced stage) full boxes of used t-shirts – presumably the 
donations we have taken so far for the campaign. We found that when the cause of 
donation was deemed more important (vs. less important), people exaggerated the 
number of used t-shirts in the picture to signal higher goal attainability when there were 
only two full boxes, but downplayed the number of used t-shirts when they saw ten boxes 
of t-shirts; this alternation of how people mentally represented the progress level of the 
campaign, interestingly, led to greater motivation – more t-shirts students donated to help 
ensure the attainment of this collective goal. 
In the third section, “Friend or Foe? The Dynamics of Interpersonal Relationships 
in Goal Pursuit (pp. 89 – 152),” we explore the factor of social interactions in initial 
versus advanced stages of goal pursuit. We propose that when people first start pursuing 
a goal, they are more likely to treat others pursuing the same goal as “friends,” to seek 
companionship from them and thus enhance the perceived attainability of the goal. 
However, when people approach the end point of the pursuit, they begin to monitor their 
progress more intensely, and thus conversely treat others pursuing the same goal as 
“foes,” and seek to win the alleged “competition” by attaining the goal sooner than 
others. Such shift of closeness is also manifested through people’s information-sharing 
behaviors. 
In one of the studies, we tracked how students’ perceived closeness with others 
who were pursuing the same academic goals as them evolved throughout the semester. 
We found that students drew their same-pursuit peers closer when they were in the early 
stage of their academic goal pursuit, but began to distance these same-pursuit peers as 
 xviii 
they got closer to the end-point of the semester. Such shift of closeness from being 
friends to becoming foes was unique among the group of same-pursuit peers and did not 
manifest in other types of interpersonal relationships, such as how students treated their 
significant others, or friends who were pursuing different academic goals. This research 
shed important light on the “black box” of social interaction in goal pursuit processes, 
and has important real-world implications for organizations and government institutions 
that aim to implement infrastructures to facilitate cooperative behaviors among people 
who are pursuing the same, important goals in their lives.  
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SECTION 1: MOTIVATIONAL CONSEQUENCES OF PERCEIVED 
VELOCITY IN CONSUMER GOAL PURSUIT 
 
Introduction 
Consumers often actively monitor their progress in goal pursuit, and these 
processes generate two pieces of distinctive information: On the one hand, they signal 
one’s relative position in the pursuit—that is, their level of progress toward goal 
attainment. On the other hand, they also provide information on the rate of progress, 
telling consumers how fast they are moving toward the end point.  
While abundant literature has investigated how the level of progress may affect 
individuals’ motivation in goal pursuit (e.g., Hull 1932; Liberman and Förster 2008), 
relatively less research has explored how the rate of progress may influence motivation. 
For example, how does information about their rate of stamp collection influence the 
purchase decisions of consumers who are trying to accumulate enough stamps for a free 
coffee in a loyalty program? Similarly, should companies that try to encourage repeated 
use of products allow consumers to experience a fast or a slow rate of progress toward 
desirable end states, such as beauty and health? We also ask whether the impact of 
perceived velocity in progressing remains the same throughout the entire course of goal 
pursuit, or whether it changes as people move from one stage to another.  
To address these questions, we build on the research of dynamics of self-
regulation (Fishbach, Zhang, and Koo 2009; Koo and Fishbach 2008) and propose that 
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knowledge of the velocity rate (high vs. low) in progressing toward a goal can either 
increase or decrease consumers’ motivation in goal pursuit, depending on their achieved 
level of progress toward goal attainment. Specifically, when consumers have just started 
pursuing a goal and their level of progress is low, they focus primarily on whether they 
can attain the goal and ask the question, “Can I get there?” A high (vs. a low) velocity in 
progressing suggests a greater chance of eventual goal attainment, which therefore leads 
to greater motivation in goal pursuit. However, when consumers have achieved sufficient 
progress toward the goal and are relatively certain about its attainability, they shift their 
focus to the temporal aspect of goal attainment and become more concerned about the 
question, “When will I get there?” At this stage, a low (vs. a high) velocity in progressing 
should elicit greater motivation because it suggests that the current effort in reducing the 
remaining discrepancy is relatively ineffective and that more effort is necessary to ensure 
a speedy goal attainment.  
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Chapter 1: Literature Review 
PROGRESS AND VELOCITY 
A large body of research has documented how consumers’ levels of progress 
influence their motivation in goal pursuit, and the overarching finding is that as people 
move closer to the attainment of the goal, their motivation increases (e.g., Kivetz, 
Urminsky, and Zheng 2006; Liberman and Förster 2008). However, because movement 
toward goal attainment is a dynamic process that involves both a temporal and a distance 
aspect, trying to understand the motivational consequences of progress by focusing on the 
level of progress alone neglects the temporal aspect of the movement and misses out on 
the influence of the rate of progress, a psychological equivalent of velocity (Carver, 
Lawrence, and Scheier 1996). In contrast with the level of progress—a relatively static 
concept that reflects one’s past achievement—the velocity in progressing provides 
dynamic feedback on the effectiveness of one’s efforts in goal pursuit. For example, 
consider a person who monitors his or her weight loss: while the total weight that has 
been lost indicates the level of progress, equally important is how fast this person has 
been able to make this progress.  
Research in control theories has long suggested that self-regulation is governed by 
a negative feedback loop. In particular, Carver and Scheier (1998) proposed that for each 
action system that provides feedback on the remaining discrepancy to goal attainment, 
there also exists a rate system that deals with the rate of progress. On the basis of this 
theory, monitoring the rate of progress operates by comparing the perceived velocity to a 
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reference value and generates both affective and expectancy-related outcomes. On the 
affective side, the main findings suggest that moving slowly toward a goal induces 
negative affect, which leads to greater efforts to accelerate the pursuit (Cervone et al. 
1994; Gollwitzer and Rohloff 1999). Moving quickly toward a goal, on the other hand, 
induces positive affect and hence decreases the effort (Carver and Scheier 1998). In 
addition, related research has explored specific types of affect and has demonstrated that 
a high (vs. a low) velocity can both increase or decrease effort, depending on the type of 
goals people are pursuing (Holman, Totterdell, and Rogelberg 2005). More recently, in 
multiple goal context, Louro, Pieters, and Zeelenberg (2007) found that positive and 
negative affect can both increase motivation, depending on the attribution of such 
affective experiences (see also, Fishbach and Labroo 2007).  
In contrast with the extensive research on how affective consequences of velocity 
can influence motivation, little research has examined the informational value of velocity 
in influencing motivation. In particular, we are interested in how people may interpret 
their velocity in progressing differently to address their primary concerns—such as 
whether and when the goal can be attained—at different stages of goal pursuit. We 
suggest that because consumers focus on different questions at the initial versus the 
advanced stage of goal pursuit, they interpret the same information on velocity differently 
to address these concerns. As a result, the same velocity information may have opposite 
impact on consumers’ motivation. 
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 “CAN I GET THERE?” – MOTIVATION FROM ATTAINABILITY 
 Research on the dynamics of self-regulation has proposed that when one’s 
commitment to a goal is uncertain or low, focusing on the progress that one has achieved 
will signal his or her commitment to the goal and motivate further pursuit (Koo and 
Fishbach 2008). What, however, determines consumers’ commitment to a goal, and what 
information is more motivating in establishing goal commitment? We propose that 
because goal commitment represents a person’s definitive decision to pursue a goal with 
the expectation of eventually attaining it, the commitment to a goal should be first 
contingent on the perception that the goal is attainable. For example, the social-cognitive 
model (e.g., Bandura 1997) suggests that a person’s willingness to pursue a goal 
increases as a function of the belief that the goal can be attained through effort. Similarly, 
both the value-expectancy models (e.g., Atkinson 1957; Tolman 1955; Vroom 1964) and 
goal-setting theory (Locke and Latham 1990) emphasize that the cognitive assessment of 
one’s chances of attaining a goal is an important factor in people’s decisions to adopt this 
goal. More recently, Zhang and Huang (2010) added to this literature by suggesting that 
in early stages of goal pursuit, people derive motivation primarily from the belief that the 
goal is attainable. Therefore, whenever consumers are uncertain about the attainability of 
a goal, such as when their progress level is still low, they focus on the question, “Can I 
get there?” and seek information to confirm that they can indeed attain the goal. Their 
commitment and, in turn, motivation, should then depend on their answer to this 
question. 
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As compared with a low velocity in progressing, a high velocity suggests that one 
is moving toward the ideal state relatively fast, which thus confirms that the attainment of 
the goal is likely, despite the relatively low levels of progress at the moment. For 
instance, for customers who have just started accumulating reward points in a loyalty 
program, knowing that they are accumulating points at a fast (vs. a slow) rate confirms 
that they can eventually reach the redemption point for the prize. Therefore, these 
customers should be more likely to commit to this goal and show higher motivation for 
further pursuit, despite their current low progress. In contrast, those who experience a low 
velocity in progressing are likely to infer that the goal is beyond their reach and will thus 
disengage from this program.  
“WHEN WILL I GET THERE?”— MOTIVATION FROM SLOW MOVEMENT  
The question of “Can I get there?”, however, is unlikely to dominate for long. 
Once consumers accumulate sufficient progress toward the goal, they feel relatively more 
confident that they can attain it and are more committed to its pursuit (Wood and 
Bandura 1989). With this certainty in mind, consumers shift their focus to whether they 
are reducing the remaining discrepancy at an acceptable speed and ask the question, 
“When will I get there?” For instance, a customer who is approaching the redemption 
point on a loyalty program is unlikely to be concerned about whether the end point is 
reachable, but will focus instead on how much longer it will take him or her to collect the 
additional points needed for the reward.  
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In the models that emphasize the discrepancy reduction aspect in self-regulation 
(e.g., Carver and Scheier 1998; Locke and Latham 1990), the rate of progress signals the 
effectiveness of goal pursuit because it determines the amount of time it takes to reach 
the end point. Ineffective goal pursuit, once experienced, motivates people to correct their 
behaviors to ensure that the goal can be successfully attained within the desired 
timeframe (e.g., Brunstein and Gollwitzer 1996; Wicklund and Gollwitzer 1982). 
Therefore, when people focus on, “When will I get there?”, they interpret the velocity 
information as signaling how effective they have been in reducing the remaining 
discrepancy and adjust their behaviors accordingly.  
As compared with a high velocity, which suggests to people that they are making 
steady progress and that goal attainment is timely, a low velocity signals that their efforts 
in reducing the remaining discrepancy are relatively ineffective, and that reaching the end 
point (although certainly possible) might be delayed. At these times, consumers should be 
motivated to invest more effort to ensure that the goal can be attained within the desired 
timeframe. For example, for a dieter who is approaching his or her ideal weight and thus 
is relatively certain about its attainability, knowing that weight is being lost slowly (vs. 
quickly) will suggest that he or she should try harder so that the ideal weight can be 
attained sooner, hence eliciting greater effort.  
In sum, central to our hypothesis are the different inferences that people make on 
the basis of the same velocity information, depending on their primary concerns. In the 
present model, consumers question whether they can attain the goal initially, but once 
they are relatively certain about its attainability, they begin to question how soon they can 
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attain it. Therefore, the same information on velocity can have opposite motivational 
consequences, depending on which question is being asked: When the low levels of 
progress highlight the uncertainty in goal attainability, consumers interpret the velocity to 
answer the question, “Can I get there?” and are motivated more by a high velocity 
because it suggests higher goal attainability. However, when sufficient progress on the 
goal assures its attainability, consumers interpret the velocity to answer the question, 
“When will I get there?” and, consequently, are more motivated by low velocity because 
it suggests the need for extra effort to ensure a speedy goal attainment.  
We tested the present hypothesis in five studies. We began with a field study 
(Study 1) in which we investigated the proposed hypothesis in the context of contributing 
to a charity goal. In Study 2, we directly assessed people’s concerns (“Can I get there?” 
vs. “When will I get there?”) at different stages of goal pursuit and explored how they 
impact motivation. In Study 3 and Study 4, we tested whether certainty about goal 
attainment was the mechanism underlying the shifting concerns by manipulating the 
point when people can be relative assured of the goal’s attainability: we either delayed 
(Study 3) or moved up (Study 4) when people could be certain that the goal is attainable, 
and examined how motivation is influenced by different velocity information. In Study 5, 
we returned to another field experiment and tested the validity of our hypothesis in the 
context of a customer loyalty program.  
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Chapter 2: Study 1 – Volunteering 
We begin our investigation in a group goal context. Prior research suggests that 
when individuals identify themselves with a certain group, they adopt the group goal as 
their own and contribute to the shared goal as long as it is meaningful (Karau and 
Williams 1997; Wann and Branscombe 1993). Because people seek the same information 
in the pursuit of group goals as they do in individual goals (Koo and Fishbach 2008), we 
were able to test our hypothesis in a group goal context and teamed up with Relief 
Nursery—a nationally recognized nonprofit organization dedicated to preventing child 
abuse—to solicit volunteers for the organization.  
METHOD 
Participants in this study included 132 individuals (63 females, 64 males, 5 
unidentified) who were approached on the campus of a large southwestern university. 
This field experiment used a 2 (progress level: low vs. high) × 2 (velocity: low vs. high) 
between-subjects design.  
Two experimenters distributed campaign letters on campus. The experimenters 
approached participants in public areas, briefly introduced themselves as representatives 
for Relief Nursery, and explained the mission of the organization. They also explained 
that they were running a campaign to recruit volunteers for the organization and passed 
out a campaign letter from Relief Nursery, along with a one-page sign-up sheet.  
The letter from Relief Nursery described a child abuse case and provided a picture 
of a victim of such a case. Following this description, the letter explained the mission of 
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the organization and described its current recruiting campaign. Specifically, the letter 
explained that to effectively implement the early-intervention programs that prevent child 
abuse, the local office of the organization would need 1,200 volunteer hours for the next 
6 to 9 months. The letter further explained potential tasks for volunteers and emphasized 
that the organization would ensure a proper match between their volunteers’ expertise 
and the assigned activities. 
The letter then presented the current situation of the campaign and indicated that 
they were either 200 hours away (high progress) or 800 hours away (low progress) from 
reaching the campaign goal of 1,200 volunteer hours. The letter also stated that, on the 
basis of the progress made over the past few weeks, the sign-up rate had been either 
relatively slow, at around 10 committed hours per week (low velocity), or relatively fast, 
at around 10 committed hours per day (high velocity).  
Participants were then urged to volunteer for the organization and were given a 
sign-up form. They were first asked whether they would like to volunteer for Relief 
Nursery. Those who indicated “no” were thanked and dismissed. Those who indicated 
“yes” provided their personal information and contact details. More importantly, they 
also indicated the number of total hours they were willing to commit to volunteering for 
Relief Nursery in the next 9 months. After they completed the sheet, participants were 
thanked and assured that the organizer of the program would get in touch with them to 
arrange the assignments.  
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Among all of the participants we approached, 54.5% committed to volunteer for 
Relief Nursery, generating a total of 845 volunteer hours for the campaign. The 
volunteers’ information was passed on to Relief Nursery for utilization in upcoming 
activities.  
Participants’ motivation to help the campaign was measured by their willingness 
to volunteer. We first analyzed the percentage of approached individuals who committed 
to help. A logistic regression of individuals’ decisions on whether to volunteer on the 
level of progress, the velocity in goal attainment, and the interaction between them 
yielded the predicted Progress Level × Velocity interaction, β = - 3.81, Wald’s χ2 (1, N = 
132) = 23.26, p < .01. When progress on attaining the campaign goal was low, 78.8% of 
the people in the high velocity condition committed to help, as compared with 40.0% in 
the low velocity condition, χ2 (1, N = 63) = 9.88, p < .01. In contrast, when the progress 
on the campaign goal was high, 75.0% of approached individuals in the low velocity 
condition committed to help, as compared with 27.0% in the high velocity condition, χ2 
(1, N = 69) = 15.80, p < .01 (see Figure 1). 
Also of interest to us was the number of hours people committed to volunteering 
for Relief Nursery. An ANOVA of this variable yielded a significant Progress Level × 
Velocity interaction, F(1, 128) = 7.77, p < .01, and no main effects. When progress on 
attaining the campaign goal was low, people who were told that the sign-up rate was fast 
committed more hours (M = 10.36 hr) than did those who were told that the sign-up rate 
was slow (M = 5.13 hr), t(61) = - 1.88, p < .06. Conversely, when progress on attaining 
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the campaign goal was high, people who were told that the sign-up rate was slow 
committed more hours (M = 7.06 hr) than did those who were told that the sign-up rate 
was fast (M = 3.32 hr), t(67) = 2.17, p < .05 (see Figure 2).  
The results of Study 1 provided initial support for our hypothesis in a public 
charity goal context by showing that while a high (vs. a low) velocity in progressing 
motivated more effort when the overall progress level on attaining the goal was low, a 
low (vs. a high) velocity became more motivating when the progress level was relatively 
high. According to our theorizing, this occurred because people shifted their focus from 
“Can I get there?” to “When will I get there?” as they progressed toward the end point. In 
our next study, we tested this mechanism directly.  
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Chapter 3: Study 2 – Sensory Task 
In Study 2, we manipulated participants’ levels of progress and their perceived 
velocity in a target identification task before measuring their underlying inferences as 
well as their persistence in waiting for a bonus question under extreme noise.  
METHOD 
A total of 159 undergraduates (79 females, 80 males) at a large southwestern 
university participated in this study for partial course credit. This study used a 2 (progress 
level: low vs. high) × 2 (velocity: low vs. high) between-subjects design.  
The cover story told participants that their task was to identify ambiguous visual 
and audio stimuli presented in the task. Points would be awarded for correct answers, and 
those who reached 900 total points in the task would receive a limited-edition school 
keychain as reward.  
In explaining the setup of the experiment, we told participants that there were two 
types of targets in the task: visual and audio. For the visual questions, they would need to 
decipher strings of letters in ambiguous fonts, and the awarded points depended on how 
close their answers were to the correct ones. For audio questions, they would need to 
identify the ambiguous sound played in their headphones. We also displayed a dynamic 
progress bar with the end point of 900 to provide real-time feedback on participants’ 
point accumulation.  
In the first visual section of questions, participants deciphered five ambiguous 
letter strings. By the end of the section, participants in high progress conditions had 
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gained 600 points, whereas those in low progress conditions had collected 300 points. 
Because participants did not know the total number of questions in the task, they were 
unable to infer their relative performance by simply looking at the number of points they 
had achieved, allowing us to manipulate perceived velocity through social comparison. A 
performance analysis page after these questions informed participants in high velocity 
conditions that “based on the questions you have completed, you are gaining points at a 
FASTER rate than the majority of all participants in our database.” In contrast, those in 
low velocity conditions were told that they were gaining points at a slower rate than the 
majority of participants in the database.  
After receiving this information, participants clicked “Continue” and were greeted 
by an “optional audio question.” Participants were told that the optional audio question 
was worth 100 points, but that they would have to wait for their turn because of technical 
restrictions. Participants were then asked to put on their headphones and wait for this 
audio question, or to click “Continue” to quit waiting at any time. During the wait time, 
noisy “music” was played through participants’ headphones. We measured the amount of 
time that participants persisted in waiting for the optional question as an indicator of their 
motivation for getting the bonus. 
In Study 2, we also tested the mechanism through which the perceived velocity 
affected motivation. Under the cover story of getting feedback on the design of the 
experiments, we told participants that they would occasionally run into questions related 
to the design rather than to the content of the experiment in pop-up boxes during the task. 
A box showed up right after participants received the feedback on velocity (but before the 
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optional question). In this box, we included a question that examined the extent to which 
participants were concerned about goal attainability (“How likely do you think it is that 
you will reach 900 points for the keychain?”) and another one about when they would 
reach the end point (“How soon do you think you will reach 900 points for the 
keychain?”). Both items were measured on 7-point scales. We also included questions for 
potential alternative mechanisms, such as goal value and importance (e.g., “How much 
are you willing to pay for the limited-edition school keychain?” and “How important is it 
for you to reach 900 points for the school keychain?”), and mood states. 
After answering these questions, participants returned to the main task. All 
participants reached 900 points in the end and received the keychain or cash equivalent.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
All participants quit waiting for the bonus question eventually, allowing us to use 
the amount of time they persisted as a measure of their motivation. An ANOVA of the 
wait time (in seconds) yielded the hypothesized Progress Level × Velocity interaction, 
F(1, 155) = 10.04, p < .01. No other effects emerged in this analysis. Among participants 
who had made only low progress on the goal, those who thought they were progressing 
quickly persisted longer under the noise (M = 114.92 s) than did those who thought they 
were progressing slowly (M = 72.24 s), t(73) = - 2.37, p < .05. In contrast, among the 
participants who had made high levels of progress, those who learned that they were 
progressing slowly persisted more (M = 98.52 s) than those who thought they were 
progressing relatively fast (M = 67.56 s), t(82) = 2.07, p < .05 (see Figure 3).  
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We further analyzed the concerns that people had at different stages of goal 
pursuit. An ANOVA of the perceived attainability of the goal (“Can I get there?”) yielded 
a main effect of progress level, F(1, 155) = 5.04, p < .05, and a main effect of velocity, 
F(1, 155) = 23.28, p < .01. In addition, an ANOVA of how soon participants thought they 
would reach the goal (“When will I get there?”) also yielded a main effect of velocity, 
F(1, 155) = 47.37, p < .01. There was no significant difference in perceived goal value, 
commitment level, or mood across conditions.  
How, then, did these concerns influence participants’ motivation? Specifically, 
did the two concerns (“Can I get there?” vs. “When will I get there?”) weigh differently 
when people advanced from a low to a high level of progress? To answer this question, 
we performed two moderated mediation analyses. In the first analysis, we examined 
whether the relationship between velocity feedback (low vs. high) and one’s motivation 
was mediated by participants’ concerns about “Can I get there?” and whether this 
mediation was moderated by their progress levels. According to our theorizing, the path 
from velocity feedback (independent variable) to motivation (dependent variable) should 
operate through the concern about “Can I get there?” (mediator), and this should apply 
only when one has achieved a low (vs. a high) level of progress. 
To assess this moderated mediation model, we followed Preacher, Rucker, and 
Hayes (2007, Model 3) and used a bootstrapping procedure that generated a sample size 
of 5,000 to assess the regression models. The first part of this model showed that velocity 
positively predicted participants’ perceived goal attainability, β = .35, t(159) = 4.72, p < 
.01. The second part of the model, which regressed participants’ motivation on velocity, 
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their concern about “Can I get there,” their progress level, and the interaction between 
their concern and progress levels, yielded a significant Concern × Progress Level 
interaction, β = - .24, t(159) = - 2.98, p < .01, suggesting that the effect of the concern 
about “Can I get there?” on participants’ motivation depended on their level of progress. 
Specifically, when participants’ progress level was low, high perceived goal attainability 
(an inference based on high velocity) elicited greater motivation, β = .19, z = 2.48, p = 
.01; this effect, however, became nonsignificant when participants’ progress level was 
high, β = .01, z = .44, ns (see Figure 4). 
We then performed a second moderated mediation analysis to examine whether 
the path from velocity feedback (independent variable) to motivation (dependent 
variable) operated through the concern about “When will I get there?” (mediator), and 
whether it applied only when one had made a high (vs. a low) level of progress. 
The first part of this model showed that velocity feedback positively predicted 
how soon participants thought they could reach 900 points for the reward, β = .48, t(159) 
= 6.84, p < .01. The second part of the model regressed participants’ motivation on 
velocity, their concern about “When will I get there,” their progress level, and the 
interaction between their concern and progress levels, and yielded a significant Concern 
× Progress Level interaction, β = - .28, t(159) = - 3.50, p < .01, suggesting that the effect 
of the concern about “When will I get there?” on motivation again depended on their 
progress level. When the progress level was high, the concern about when one could 
attain the goal elicited greater motivation, β = - .26, z = - 4.69, p < .01; this effect, 
however, was not significant when the participants’ progress level was low, β = - .01, z = 
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- .01, ns (see Figure 5). This analysis suggests that only when people have accumulated 
sufficient progress do they switch to focus on the timeframe of goal attainment, and their 
concern about “When will I get there?” influences their motivation. 
Results from Study 2 support our proposed mechanism that the type of velocity 
(high or low) affects motivation differently, depending on the stage of pursuit. Based on 
our conceptualization, people shift their primary concern from “Can I get there” to 
“When will I get there” when they become relatively certain about the goal’s 
attainability. Our next two studies will test this specific hypothesis by varying the point 
when people can be certain about whether they can attain the goal. Specifically, we 
reason that if the level of progress indeed switches people’s focus by confirming goal’s 
attainability, then whenever high levels of progress do not confirm goal’s attainment 
(such as when goal attainment does not depend on an individual’s performance), people 
should be motivated more by the knowledge that they are moving at a high (vs. a low) 
velocity, regardless of their progress level. Conversely, if people can be certain about the 
goal’s attainability early on in the pursuit, they should be motivated by low (vs. high) 
velocity even when their current progress is still low. We tested these implications in 
Study 3 and Study 4. 
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Chapter 4: Study 3 – Collaboration 
Participants in Study 3 completed a number-related task for a performance-based 
reward. The task was framed either as an individual task, in which the attainability of the 
reward depended solely on participants’ own performance and thus became relatively 
certain as one accumulated sufficient progress, or as a collaborative task, in which the 
attainability of the reward was based on joint performance with an unknown teammate 
and thus remained uncertain throughout the task.  
METHOD 
A total of 229 undergraduates (111 females, 118 males) participated in this study. 
The experiment used a 2 (progress level: low vs. high) × 2 (velocity: low vs. high) × 2 
(task frame: individual vs. collaborative) between-subjects design.  
Participants completed a study that was professed to test people’s sense of 
numbers. The instructions explained that the task was divided into multiple sections and 
that participants would gain points for correctly answering each question. We framed the 
task as either individual or collaborative in determining the performance-based reward: In 
the individual-task conditions, participants could win an additional $30 cash reward if 
they could reach 700 points by the end of the task; therefore, whether they could win the 
bonus depended solely on their own performance. In the collaborative-task conditions, 
participants would be randomly paired with another student who was completing the 
same task in a separate room. If their average score reached 700 points, each of them 
would win an additional $30 cash reward. In this case, whether they could win the reward 
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depended not only on their own performance, but also on that of an unknown person; 
therefore, attainment remained relatively uncertain throughout the goal pursuit. 
After the general instructions, participants started the first section of the task and 
completed 10 number-related questions (e.g., “If x + (x + 1) + (x + 2) = 366, what is x?”). 
Participants indicated their answers on a slider with numbered marks only on both ends 
and were told that the points they would gain depended on how close their answers were 
to the correct number on the slider. This procedure was used to ensure that participants 
were less certain about the exact points they would gain even if they knew the correct 
answer, allowing us to more convincingly manipulate their progress level and velocity.  
We manipulated progress level and velocity through feedback to participants. In 
high progress conditions, participants earned 505 points after the first 10 questions, 
whereas those in low progress conditions earned 205 points after the same 10 questions. 
We again manipulated participants’ perceived velocity through social comparison: After 
the first section, a feedback page informed participants in high velocity conditions that 
“based on the questions you have completed so far, you are gaining points at a FASTER 
rate than the majority of participants in our database,” whereas the participants in low 
velocity conditions were told that they were gaining points at a slower rate than that of 
the majority of participants in the database.  
After the feedback, participants answered a few questions about their feelings 
toward the experiment, including their current mood level (7-point scale; 1 = very bad, 7 
= very good), among other filler questions. After answering these questions, participants 
entered the second section, in which they needed to provide exact answers in a box, 
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instead of using a slider, for questions similar to those in the first section. For incorrect 
answers, a pop-up notification would ask them to try again. Alternatively, participants 
could skip the question by clicking “Continue.”  
We made the three questions in this section unsolvable and recorded the time 
participants spent on them before giving up as the indicator of their motivation. After 
completing this section of questions, participants were thanked and debriefed. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We conducted a regression analysis on the average time that participants spent on 
these unsolvable questions using progress level, velocity, task frame, and all of their 
interaction terms as predictors. This analysis yielded a Progress Level × Velocity × Task 
Frame three-way interaction, F(1, 220) = 5.70, p < .05. We then explored the impact of 
velocity feedback on participants’ motivation depending on their progress level, in each 
type of task. As hypothesized, there was a significant Progress Level × Velocity 
interaction in the individual-task condition, F(1, 220) = 13.5, p < .01. Consistent with 
earlier studies, when the progress level was low, those who thought they were gaining 
points quickly spent more time on the unsolvable questions (M = 52.38 s) than did those 
who thought they were gaining points slowly (M = 31.97 s), F(1, 220) = 9.46, p < .01. In 
contrast, when the progress level was high, those who thought they were gaining points 
slowly spent more time on the same unsolvable questions (M = 60.78 s) than did those 
who thought they were gaining points at a faster rate (M = 49.30 s), F(1, 220) = 4.61, p < 
.05.  
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Importantly, this pattern of results was not observed when the task was framed as 
a collaborative task, and the attainability of the goal (“Can I get there?”) remained 
uncertain throughout the task; instead, we found a main effect of velocity, F(1, 220) = 
9.71, p < .01. For all participants in this condition, those who thought they were gaining 
points quickly spent more time on these unanswerable questions (M = 54.39 s) than did 
those who thought they were gaining points slowly (M = 38.10 s) (see Figure 6). Also, in 
this study, participants’ mood levels did not significantly differ across conditions, F(1, 
220) = .73, ns, nor did mood predict participants’ motivation in reaching the goal, β = - 
.04, ns; therefore, we could rule out mood as an alternative account for the present 
findings. 
The results of Study 3 demonstrated that when the goal attainability continued to 
be uncertain, even high progress levels did not make people shift from asking, “Can I get 
there?” to “When will I get there?” Thus, a high (vs. a low) perceived velocity remained 
more motivating. This pattern confirmed that it is indeed the certainty about goal 
attainability that determined people’s interpretation of velocity and its subsequent impact 
on motivation. In our next study, we test this mechanism from yet another perspective: If 
people switch to question “When will I get there?” and are concerned about the 
timeframe of goal attainment after they become relatively certain about the goal’s 
attainability, they should be motivated by low (vs. high) velocity whenever they believe 
the goal is attainable—even when their current progress is still low.  
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Chapter 5: Study 4 – Wine Labels 
In Study 4, we provided information on the attainability of the goal at an early 
stage of goal pursuit and assessed whether people who had received the early 
confirmation of goal attainability would behave like those who had accumulated 
sufficient progress and become more motivated by a low (vs. a high) rate of progress. 
METHOD 
A total of 225 undergraduates (105 females, 120 males) participated in Study 4 in 
return for cash compensation. This study used a 2 (velocity: low vs. high) × 2 
(confirmation of goal attainability: no vs. yes) between-subjects design.  
The cover story told participants that the researchers were interested in how 
people process information on wine labels. The participants’ task was to complete nine 
rounds of label-related questions. In each round, they would view a wine label and 
answer some questions (e.g., place of origin, vintage, name) according to their memory of 
the information on the labels. Participants were allowed to spend as much time as they 
wanted to memorize the information, and they would receive points for correct answers 
as well as a $30 bonus for reaching 900 total points after nine rounds. Participants were 
further told that feedback would be provided after each round, including on their 
accumulated points (in absolute numbers) and on their momentary rate of progress (in 
percentile among all participants, according to the points they gained in the previous 
question). We displayed participants’ total accumulated points as a number next to their 
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goal of 900 points (e.g., “200/900”) and their momentary speed as a number on a vertical 
bar anchored by 0% (slowest in the database) and 100% (fastest in the database). 
After two trial rounds, participants commenced the main task. We ensured that all 
participants made the same, steady progress toward the goal of 900 points, gaining about 
100 points in each question. We then manipulated participants’ momentary velocity by 
telling them that they were performing at around the 20th percentile (e.g., 20%, 23%) after 
each round (low velocity conditions), or at around the 80th percentile (e.g., 78%, 83%) 
after each round (high velocity conditions). By providing information on both level and 
rate of progress, we were able to manipulate the two variables independently and to 
discern their respective impact.  
We also divided the task into three stages, with three rounds in each stage. In 
addition to the regular feedback, all of the participants received an additional piece of 
feedback after the first three rounds saying, “You have completed Stage 1 and have 
gained 305 points.” Participants in the early confirmation conditions were further told 
that, “Based on your performance, you are qualified to proceed to the Stage 2. Our 
records indicate that most participants who qualified for Stage 2 succeeded in reaching 
900 points.” In comparison, participants in the no confirmation condition were told only 
that they had qualified for Stage 2.  
In all of the conditions, we measured the amount of time that participants spent on 
memorizing the wine label in each round as the indicator of their motivation for reaching 
the final goal of 900 points. All participants were debriefed after completion of the task 
and were entered into a lottery for a cash reward. 
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We first computed separate measures of participants’ motivation depending on 
their levels of progress: the total time participants spent on memorizing wine labels in 
Stage 1 (Rounds 1 to 3—low progress, before the manipulation of confirmation), in Stage 
2 (Rounds 4 to 6—moderate progress, after manipulation of confirmation), and in Stage 3 
(Rounds 7 to 9—high progress), and performed separate ANOVA analyses on these 
measures. The analysis on time spent in Stage 1 (low progress) yielded only a main effect 
of perceived velocity, F(1, 187) = 11.06, p < .01. At this stage, participants who were 
gaining points at a relatively fast rate spent more time memorizing wine labels (M = 
92.22 s) than did those who were progressing more slowly than others (M = 71.84 s). The 
analysis on time spent in Stage 3 (high progress) also yielded only a main effect of 
perceived velocity, F(1, 187) = 8.33, p < .01, showing that participants who were gaining 
points at a slower rate spent more time memorizing wine labels (M = 87.80 s) than did 
those who thought they were progressing faster than others (M = 68.16 s). 
More importantly, the analysis on the amount of time spent in Stage 2 yielded the 
predicted Perceived Velocity × Confirmation interaction, F(1, 187) = 5.99, p < .05, and 
there were no main effects. At this middle stage, among the participants who did not 
receive confirmation on goal attainability, there was no significant difference between 
those who thought they were moving at a faster rate (M = 88.30 s) and those who thought 
they were progressing more slowly than others (M = 73.24 s), t(91) = - 1.42, p = .16. If 
anything, the pattern seemed to be consistent with that observed when progress level was 
low: higher perceived velocity was more motivating than slow. In contrast, among the 
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participants who received confirmation on goal attainability, those who were gaining 
points slowly spent significantly more time memorizing wine labels (M = 96.70 s) than 
did those who were progressing quickly (M = 76.76 s), t(96) = 2.08, p < .05 (see Figure 
7). This result suggests that relative certainty of goal attainability made people with low 
progress behave more like those who had achieved high progress and focus more on the 
timeframe of goal attainment. 
The design of the study further allowed us to explore the trend of people’s 
motivation as they progressed toward the end point of goal attainment, and, in particular, 
how their motivation changed when goal attainment was relatively secured. According to 
our model, when initial goal progress is high and people are relatively certain about goal 
attainment, a high velocity in progressing should suggest that they are successfully 
reducing the remaining discrepancy in a timely manner; therefore, they should maintain, 
or even decrease, their effort. On the other hand, a low velocity in progressing at the 
same stage should suggest that the goal attainment might be delayed and that they should 
increase their efforts to ensure a speedy attainment. We analyzed the motivation of 
participants in the no-confirmation group to test these predictions and found the expected 
pattern: For participants receiving low velocity feedback, their effort did not differ 
significantly between Stage 1 (70.42 s) and Stage 2 (73.24 s), F(1, 46) = .70, ns, but it 
significantly increased from Stage 2 to Stage 3 (84.91 s), F(1, 46) = 14.76, p < .01, 
constituting a linearly increasing trend as the participants accumulated greater progress, 
F(1, 46) = 12.14, p < .01. In contrast, for participants receiving high velocity feedback, 
their effort remained unchanged as they moved from Stage 1 (93.37 s) to Stage 2 (88.30 
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s), F(1, 45) = .93, ns, but dropped significantly from Stage 2 to Stage 3 (65.81 s), F(1, 45) 
= 69.95, p < .01, constituting a linearly decreasing trend, F(1, 45) = 47.07, p < .01. This 
pattern suggests that when people approach the end point of a goal (vs. at initial stages of 
pursuit), a low velocity in progressing increases their motivation, whereas a high velocity 
in progressing has the opposite impact.  
The results of Study 4 provided further evidence that people derive greater 
motivation from a high (vs. a low) velocity in progressing when they ask, “Can I get 
there?” but that they are more motivated by low (vs. high) velocity when they ask, 
“When will I get there?” In our final study, we tested the implications of the findings 
using another field experiment in the context of a customer loyalty program.  
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Chapter 6: Study 5 – Free Coffee 
In Study 5, we distributed two different versions of loyalty cards at a coffee shop: 
a “uniform velocity card” that gave customers a fixed number of points for purchases at 
all stages in the program, or a “variable velocity card” that allowed customers to 
accumulate points at a faster rate initially and at a slower rate when they approached the 
redemption point.  
METHOD 
The field study used a two-cell design (uniform velocity vs. variable velocity). 
We designed the program so that it required customers to accumulate 24 points on a 
loyalty card within 6 weeks to redeem for a free coffee and cookie combo. Depending on 
the condition, customers received either a uniform velocity card or a variable velocity 
card. Both conditions required eight purchases in total to reach 24 points, and the only 
difference was the rate at which consumers could accumulate points: For customers with 
the uniform velocity card, each coffee purchase would earn three points. For customers 
with the variable velocity card, each of the first four purchases would earn five points, 
and then one point for each of the next four purchases. Therefore, even though the 
number of necessary purchases was identical in both conditions, consumers experienced a 
different rate of progress in the program while making the same number of purchases. 
We distributed a total of 120 cards among customers of a coffee shop on campus and 
recorded the issuing date, date of purchases, and redemption date.  
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION   
By the end of the program, we collected a total of 38 cards—a total redemption 
rate of 31.67%. A chi-square analysis revealed that 23.80% of the customers in the 
uniform velocity condition redeemed the card, as compared with 40.35% in the variable 
velocity condition, χ2 (1, N = 120) = 3.80, p < .05.  
In addition to the redemption rate, two additional variables were analyzed as 
indicators of consumers’ motivation: First, as compared with customers who got the 
uniform velocity card (M = 3.20 days), those who were given the variable velocity card 
were quicker to come back after they received the card (M = 0.83 days), t(36) = 3.63, p < 
.01, an indication that they were more motivated to initiate the pursuit of the goal. In 
addition, we found that customers in the variable velocity condition took less time to 
complete all necessary purchases for redemption (M = 16.78 days) than did those in the 
uniform velocity condition (M = 24.80 days), t(36) = 2.37, p < .05. Interestingly, once 
customers completed all purchases, the time it took for them to come back to redeem the 
reward did not differ between the variable velocity (M = 2.78 days) and the uniform 
velocity (M = 3.73 days) conditions, t(36) = .63, ns, further indicating that what 
motivated customers in the variable velocity condition was the goal to reach the end 
point, rather than their inherent preference for the coffee. In summary, the results of 
Study 5 further confirmed our hypothesis in a real-world marketing context; we found 
that a loyalty program with a variable velocity structure that addressed customers’ 
different concerns at initial versus advanced stages of goal pursuit was more effective in 
motivating repeated purchases.  
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Chapter 7: General Discussion 
Because people have different concerns at various stages of goal pursuit, they 
interpret their rate of progress toward the end point differently to address their concerns 
about either goal attainability (“Can I get there?”) or the timeframe of goal attainment 
(“When will I get there?”). We found that although a high velocity in progressing 
confirms that one can attain the goal and motivates further pursuit when one’s initial 
progress level is low and goal attainability is uncertain, a low velocity in progressing 
suggests that extra effort is necessary to ensure a speedy attainment and motivates further 
pursuit when one has accumulated sufficient progress and the goal attainability is 
relatively secured.   
The results of five studies provided consistent support for the hypothesized 
dynamics. Using a public charity goal context, in Study 1, we showed that when the 
progress level on volunteer recruitment was low, a high (vs. a low) velocity of 
recruitment elicited more contributions; however, when the progress level on reaching the 
campaign goal was high, a low (vs. a high) velocity motivated more committed help. In 
Study 2, we directly measured people’s concerns at different stages of goal pursuit and 
confirmed that high (vs. low) velocity motivated effort in initial stages of goal pursuit by 
increasing the perceived attainability of the goal, and that low (vs. high) velocity 
motivated effort in later stages of goal pursuit by suggesting the need for additional effort 
to ensure speedy attainment. In Studies 3 and 4, we directly tested the proposed 
mechanisms by delaying or moving up the confirmation of goal attainability, and showed 
that it was indeed people’s concerns about “Can I get there?” versus “When will I get 
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there?” that determined the impact of momentary velocity on motivation. Finally, in 
Study 5, we used a real customer loyalty program to demonstrate that the point structure 
that allowed consumers to experience a high velocity of point accumulation in the 
beginning but a low velocity later on motivated more repeated purchases than the 
traditional point structure that awarded points at a constant speed throughout the 
program.  
IMPLICATIONS FOR SELF-REGULATION THEORIES 
Central to our model is consumers’ spontaneous shift of focus from the question, 
“Can I get there?” to “When will I get there?” as they progress toward the end point of 
goal pursuit. This shift has important implications for the Expectancy × Value models, 
which have frequently been adopted to explain people’s motivation in goal pursuit (e.g., 
Olson, Roese, and Zanna 1996; Vroom 1964). Our findings suggest that the two 
determinants of motivation do not always play equal roles. Consistent with Zhang and 
Huang’s (2010) findings, we suggest that goal attainability—a key aspect of expectancy 
(Liberman and Förster 2008)—has a stronger impact on motivation when the question 
“Can I get there?” is the primary concern, either because people are still far from the end 
point (Studies 1 and 2) or because the outcome does not completely depend on their own 
performance (Study 3). In these situations, a high velocity in progressing, which allows 
people to infer higher expectancy of goal attainment, should be more effective in 
increasing people’s motivation.  
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While previous findings suggest that people derive motivation primarily from the 
value of the goal once they are relatively certain about the goal’s attainability (e.g., 
Zhang and Huang 2010), the present research suggests an alternative mechanism that 
influences motivation without altering the goal value. In our studies, we found that 
people’s concern about the timeline of goal attainment did not impact the goal value (e.g., 
Study 2). Instead, low velocity operates through an informational route and elicits 
motivation by suggesting a need for additional effort for a speedy goal attainment. 
Accordingly, whenever a speedy attainment is of little value and people are not 
concerned about the timeline of attainment, the information on velocity should have 
minimal impact on motivation. 
The present research also has specific relevance for research in the classical “goal 
looms larger” effect on motivation (e.g., Liberman and Förster 2008). Whereas previous 
findings have focused on how individuals’ relative position to goal attainment can 
influence their motivation, we suggest that, even holding the level of progress constant, 
the perception of a high or a low rate of progress can independently affect their 
motivation by providing information that addresses different concerns they have. Unlike 
the level of progress, the velocity of movement may increase or decrease consumers’ 
motivation in goal pursuit, depending on whether they focus on the question “Can I get 
there?” or “When will I get there?” 
In the present model, we also extended extant research that conceptualized the 
level of progress (i.e., action system) and the velocity in progressing (i.e., rate system) as 
two parallel systems and treated them as two orthogonal factors. In our framework, the 
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level of goal progress determines the primary concerns people have about the pursuit. 
Depending on their stages in a goal pursuit, people interpret the information on velocity 
differently to address their active concerns. This conceptualization allowed us to 
manipulate the two variables independently and to identify the opposite impact of the 
same progress rate (low or high) at various stages of goal pursuit.  
An interesting aspect left unexplored in the present research is the variation of 
velocity. In our studies, participants received information only about constant velocity 
(low or high) and experienced no change in the rate of progress. Although some 
customers in Study 5 experienced some variation, this decrease happened during a 
relatively long period of time and may not have generated a noticeable impact on 
motivation. Prior research, however, has found that people moving along a decreasing 
trend of velocity (e.g., having decreasing task performance) experience a negative mood 
(Lawrence, Carver, and Scheier 2002), which may further influence their motivation. 
Future research can explore how the variations in velocity, including the magnitude and 
direction of the changes, can be of more informational value in addressing consumers’ 
concerns and influencing their motivation.  
Although the present research demonstrated that people switch from asking “Can 
I get there?” to “When will I get there?” as they progress toward the end point of a goal, 
future investigation should further explore the spontaneous nature of this shift. For 
example, does spontaneity mean that people are unaware of the changes in the source of 
motivation? Similarly, would the spontaneous switch influence whether people actively 
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seek different types of feedback (positive vs. negative) in goal pursuit? Future research 
should address these important questions. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKETING AND NONPROFIT ORGANIZATIONS 
The present research has important implications for marketers who try to increase 
consumer motivation in goal pursuit. For example, when designing customer loyalty 
programs, our findings suggest that the loyalty program will be more effective in 
generating repeated purchases if it is structured to address consumers’ active concerns. 
An effective loyalty program, as we demonstrated, should allow customers to experience 
a relatively speedy start to signal higher attainability of the reward, but a relatively slow 
rate of progress once they are well into the program, because a low velocity suggests a 
greater need for effort to ensure a speedy attainment. Similarly, to motivate purchases, 
marketers should consider designing separate loyalty programs for customers who are 
asking, “Can I get there?” (e.g., first-time buyers) and for those who feel relatively 
certain about the goal’s attainability (e.g., experienced customers) and are asking, “When 
will I get there?” On the basis of our findings, a program that allows customers to 
experience a low velocity in progressing will be motivating for repeat customers, whereas 
a program that gives customers a sense of high velocity in progressing should be more 
attractive for new customers.   
Furthermore, because people rely on the same information when working on a 
social goal as on personal goals (Koo and Fishbach 2008), the present research also sheds 
important light on how organizations can motivate people to join forces and contribute to 
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a social cause. We suggest that the communication strategy should be tailored to the level 
of progress on the goal and to the public’s current concerns, so that it focuses on “We can 
get there” initially, but shifts to emphasize the need for additional effort so that “We will 
get there soon.” Information on velocity, accordingly, should be presented in a way that 
addresses the corresponding concerns. For example, given the same actual donation in a 
given period of time, an organization raising funds might choose to provide information 
about goal progress at longer intervals initially, so that each time the public will perceive 
a larger increase in donations and therefore experience a higher velocity in progressing 
and higher perceived goal attainability. As they get closer to the end point, feedback on 
progress should be given more frequently so that the public perceives less progress in 
donations between intervals, creating a sense of slow momentary speed and in turn 
eliciting greater motivation. By understanding different concerns that people have in goal 
pursuit and tailoring the communication strategies accordingly, social agents can be more 
effective in motivating greater effort investment. 
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SECTION 2: SO NEAR AND YET SO FAR: THE MENTAL 
REPRESENTATION OF GOAL PROGRESS 
 
Introduction 
In the course of goal pursuit, people often actively monitor their levels of 
progress, and these assessments can have a profound influence on their subsequent 
motivation (e.g., Carver & Scheier, 1998; Fishbach, Dhar, & Zhang, 2006; Louro, 
Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2007). For example, motivation increases as people are getting 
close to the end point of goal pursuit (Förster, Higgins, & Chen Idson, 1998; Hull, 1932; 
Liberman & Förster, 2008), and they may  also feel liberated to pursue other goals if 
they perceive that a sufficient level of progress has been made on the focal pursuit 
(Fishbach & Dhar, 2005). However, what determines people’s assessment of their 
progress? Is it always the case that people form accurate mental representations of their 
progress level and then act based on these assessments?  
In the present research, we propose a self-regulatory analysis of people’s mental 
representation of goal progress and explore the possibility that the mental representation 
of progress level, instead of being a faithful reflection of one’s actual pursuit level, can 
function as a self-regulation mechanism that helps to ensure subsequent motivation in the 
pursuit of important goals. We suggest that when individuals have just started pursuing a 
goal and have accumulated limited progress, they are primarily concerned about the 
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attainability of the goal and derive their motivation from the sense that the goal is 
attainable. Therefore, they are likely to exaggerate the level of progress in their mental 
representation to signal a higher chance of eventual goal attainment, which in turn helps 
to elicit greater motivation. However, when people have made substantial progress and 
are approaching the end point of the pursuit, the attainment of the goal is relatively 
secured and they derive their motivation from the sense that discrepancy still exists 
between their current and desired states. At these times, individuals are likely to 
downplay the achieved progress to signal a greater need for effort in their mind, which 
consequently helps elicit greater effort in the pursuit. 
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Chapter 8: Literature Review 
MENTAL REPRESENTATION OF PROGRESS 
 Prior research has shown that people’s level of progress on a goal can have a 
profound impact on their motivation. For example, in the pursuit of goals with specific 
endpoints, people are motivated by the progress that needs to be made to achieve goal 
attainment (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Higgins, 1987; Locke & Latham, 2002). Relatedly, 
the Goal Gradient Hypothesis documents the phenomenon that people’s motivation 
increases as they move closer to the endpoint of the pursuit (Lewin, 1935, 1951; 
Liberman & Förster, 2008). 
One common assumption in the extant research that studies how goal progress 
influences motivation is that there should be no systematic biases in people’s mental 
representation of their level of progress, so that the perceived progress would be a 
generally faithful reflection of the actual levels. For example, a typical paradigm in these 
studies involve providing people with feedback on their level of progress before assessing 
their motivation, or monitoring the changes in people’s motivation as they progress from 
the first step to the last one in the task (see, e.g., Förster, Higgins, & Chen Idson, 1998; 
Louro, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2007). While these findings did not explicitly assume that 
people hold veridical representations of their progress level, the study treatments and the 
interpretation of results were based on the assumption that people’s mental representation 
of their progress level would not be systematically different from the objective feedback 
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received, so that the experimenter could reliably attribute motivational consequences to 
the progress level feedback. 
While it is plausible to assume that people’s mental representations of goal 
progress are reasonably accurate, oftentimes they could be susceptible to various 
influences. First, in many situations, one’s precise progress on attaining a goal can be 
difficult to gauge. For instance, a weight watcher will need meticulous calculation to 
know exactly how well he or she is doing in controlling their daily calorie intake. 
Similarly, a political candidate can rely only on various mixed feedback during a 
campaign to infer the progress on obtaining the necessary votes, but cannot know the 
exact outcome until the moment of truth. Even for progress that we can easily measure, 
such as one’s current weight or bank account balance, it is often the case that people 
maintain only a rough representation of their general position in relation to the desirable 
goal state, rather than representing the progress level using the most precise 
measurement.  
The fact that goal progress can impact motivation, and that the precise mental 
representation of progress may be difficult to gauge or even entirely absent, raises the 
possibility that individuals may employ such representations as a mechanism to help 
motivate greater effort. From an instrumental perspective, the ambiguity in mental 
representations of goal progress allows people to systematically and strategically alter 
them, so that the modified representations can function to help maintain high levels of 
motivation. Specifically, we posit that while a dieter who hopes to lose 25 pounds and 
has made some progress will have a general sense of where s/he is at on this goal (i.e., the 
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initial stage of having lost a few pounds versus the more advanced stage of having lost a 
significant amount of pounds), this person will strategically bias how much progress s/he 
believes s/he has made toward attaining this goal, so that s/he can remain motivated 
throughout the pursuit.  
Prior research has found ample support for the notion that perceptions and 
judgments are influenced by motivation (Balcetis & Dunning, 2006; Dunning, 2001; 
Dunning, Brewer, & Hewstone, 2004; Festinger, 1957; Gilbert et al., 2000; Kunda, 
1990). For instance, distance perception is influenced by factors such as ease of reaching 
a tool only when the actor intends to use that tool (Witt, Proffitt, & Epstein, 2005), 
suggesting that how people perceive their surroundings greatly depends on their intention 
and motivation to act within it. Similarly, whether people believe that they have seen a 
letter (“B”) or a number (“13”) on a computer screen before it crashes is influenced by 
the outcome of such visual perception; the symbol that leads to a desirable freshly 
squeezed orange juice is believed to be seen by the majority of people, whereas the 
symbol that leads to a less desirable, chunky veggie smoothie is reported as less seen 
(Balcetis & Dunning, 2006).  
In the context of goal pursuit, research has found that people modify their mental 
representation of the available options so that it is easier for them to resolve self-control 
conflicts in favor of the higher level goal (see, e.g., Mischel & Ayduk, 2004; Trope & 
Fishbach, 2000). For example, when encountering temptations that may undermine their 
pursuit of a long-term goal, people form psychologically distant representations of 
temptations so that they are likely to avoid these items (Fujita et al., 2006). Similarly, 
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individuals exaggerate the extent to which they believe such temptations can undermine 
their goal, so that the temptations appear more costly to pursue and are more likely to be 
avoided (Zhang, Huang, & Broniarczyk, 2010). 
If indeed people systematically alter their mental representations of progress 
levels as an instrumental mechanism to help maintain high levels of motivation, what are 
the determinants of these alterations? Do people consistently exaggerate their progress, or 
downplay it? On the basis of the dynamics of self-regulation (Fishbach, Zhang, & Koo, 
2009; Koo & Fishbach, 2008), we theorize that the direction of bias in mental 
representation depends on a person’s stage of goal pursuit. That is, depending on whether 
people have just started to pursue a goal, or have made substantial progress and are 
approaching the end point, they either exaggerate or downplay, respectively, their 
specific progress level in their mental representations, such that their motivation for 
subsequent pursuit remains high. 
ATTAINABILITY-BASED MOTIVATION 
Based on the findings in the dynamics of self-regulation, people can construe their 
goal pursuit in two different ways: They can construe it either as commitment toward the 
desirable end state, or as making progress toward this desirable state. These two 
construals of goal pursuit, in turn, constitute two different sources of motivation: the 
commitment to the goal and the lack of progress on a goal (Fishbach, Zhang, & Koo, 
2009; Koo & Fishbach, 2008). For instance, if a person has lost three pounds and 
interprets this progress as an indicator of his or her commitment to the goal of being 
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healthy, this person is likely to continue working out to lose more weight; on the other 
hand, this person can also focus on the discrepancy between having lost three pounds and 
the end goal of losing 10 pounds -- this lack of progress signals that more efforts will be 
necessary and will also be a motivator for continued effort.  
It is unlikely, however, that individuals are concerned about both goal 
commitment and the lack of progress to the same extent at all times. Instead, when people 
first start to pursue a goal, they are less certain about their commitment to the goal and 
will question whether they should continue to work toward goal attainment; hence, their 
commitment level would be the main source of motivation at this stage. What, then, 
determines individuals’ commitment level?  
One important component of goal commitment refers to the belief that the goal is 
attainable (Atkinson, 1957; Bandura, 1997; Bandura & Pervin, 1989; Liberman & 
Förster, 2008; Lewin, 1951; Mischel, Cantor, & Feldman, 1996). For example, the 
expectancy-value models emphasize the cognitive assessment of one’s chances of 
attaining the goal as an important factor for the motivation in the pursuit (Atkinson, 1957; 
Tolman, 1955; Vroom, 1964). Similarly, the social–cognitive model (Bandura, 1997) also 
suggests that a person’s self-efficacious beliefs of whether the goal can be attained 
through effort will determine one’s willingness to pursue the goal. Furthermore, goal-
setting theory proposes that the assessment of attainability is an important factor in 
individuals’ decisions to adopt a goal (Locke & Latham, 1990).  
At the initial stages of goal pursuit, when one has only made limited progress and 
is still questioning whether the goal is attainable, the perception that greater progress has 
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been made on this goal signals that one is moving steadily toward the desirable end state, 
and that eventual attainment is more likely. It follows, therefore, that people may 
exaggerate how much progress they have made on the goal in their mental 
representations, so that the goal seems more attainable and they could remain motivated 
to continue the pursuit. For example, a couple who have just started to save for the down 
payment of a new house may exaggerate the amount of money they have saved in the 
first few months so that the needed amount does not seem so out of reach. By doing so, 
they become more committed to this goal, despite being only at the initial stage of the 
pursuit, and can stay motivated to push forward on this goal.   
DISCREPANCY-BASED MOTIVATION 
 Individuals, however, do not always question the attainability of the goal or 
observe their achieved progress for assurance of goal attainability. When people have 
accumulated sufficient progress and are approaching the end point, they feel relatively 
confident about its attainment and thus are highly committed to this goal. At these stages, 
people focus instead on reducing the remaining discrepancy to the desirable end point 
(Higgins, 1987; Koo & Fishbach, 2008; Locke & Latham, 2002). For instance, once the 
couple who are saving for the new house have achieved sufficient progress and are 
approaching the needed amount, they should be less concerned about whether they can 
ultimately save enough for the down payment. The priority at this point will be to 
eliminate the remaining distance to finally reach the end point. In these situations, the 
remaining discrepancy becomes the main determinant of motivation. 
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  Prior research has suggested that people mobilize their efforts on the basis of how 
much is left to be done in order to succeed (Brehm & Self, 1989; Brehm et al., 1983; 
Wright & Kirby, 2001). When people feel that more efforts are necessary to eliminate the 
remaining discrepancy on the goal, they become more motivated and increase effort 
accordingly. Conversely, if the remaining discrepancy seems trivial and requires little 
effort to overcome, motivation tends to drop and relaxation becomes more likely. 
Therefore, motivation at this advanced stage of goal pursuit should be negatively 
impacted by the size of discrepancy: As long as the goal is perceived to be attainable, the 
greater the discrepancy, the greater people’s motivation should be.  
 If a more sizeable discrepancy to the end point induces greater motivation, it 
follows that people at the advanced stage of goal pursuit would downplay the level of 
progress they have achieved and, in turn, exaggerate the remaining distance to the end 
point, so that they remain motivated to eventually complete the goal. An exaggerated 
discrepancy in these situations, while not threatening the attainability of the goal, signals 
that one needs to invest more effort to eliminate the remaining gap, and thus should elicit 
greater motivation. Applying to the earlier example, for the couple who have 
accumulated sufficient progress toward the goal of saving for a new house, mentally 
downplaying the amount of their total savings (and hence exaggerating the remaining 
gap) signals that although they are well on track of reaching their goal, additional efforts 
and actions are still necessary. This systematic alteration of mental representation, in 
turn, should motivate more continued effort in saving.  
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 Taken together, the present theorizing suggests that, while being aware of their 
general stages of goal pursuit, individuals also strategically alter the mental 
representations of their specific progress levels as a self-regulatory instrument to 
motivate further effort. The direction of the alterations, furthermore, depends on one’s 
stage of goal pursuit: While people exaggerate their progress levels at the initial stage of 
goal pursuit to signal higher goal attainability, they downplay their specific progress level 
to signal the need for further effort when they are relatively close to the end point.  
This theorizing goes beyond the extant paradigm in studying the impact of goal 
progress on motivation by challenging the assumptions that people always desire 
accuracy with their representations of goal progress and that the way people see their own 
progress should not be systematically different from the reality. In the present framework, 
the mental representation of goal progress is more than a faithful reproduction of the 
actual situation; instead, it reflects one’s desire to complete the important goals, 
sometimes at the cost of accuracy. This conceptualization is also consistent with the 
Action-Based Model of cognitive dissonance (Harmon-Jones & Harmon-Jones, 2002; 
Harmon-­‐Jones, Amodio, & Harmon-­‐Jones, 2009), which builds on the assumption that 
perceptions and cognitions are action-oriented, and posits that dissonance motivates 
effort to bring cognitions in line with one’s behavioral commitment, resulting in effective 
actions such as goal-directed behaviors; that is, dissonance is only aroused when effective 
action may be taken. Similarly, in the present theorizing, because the systematic 
alteration of mental representation is an instrumental mechanism to boost effort and to 
ensure the successful attainment of valuable goals, it should occur only when efforts are 
 46 
necessary and effective in helping one secure goal attainment, and when the accuracy in 
mental representation is relatively unimportant. In other situations, such as when the goal 
is of little value, when efforts are ineffective in helping goal attainment, or when the costs 
of errors in mental representations are high, such alterations should not occur.  
We tested our hypothesis in four studies. Across all studies, participants were 
asked to estimate their achieved progress at different stages of goal pursuit, and we 
measured their perceived specific progress level as well as their subsequent motivation in 
the pursuit. We started with a field study using a collective donation goal and examined 
whether individuals who perceived the collective goal to be of high (vs. low) value 
altered their mental representation of specific progress level, and in turn became more 
motivated to donate. Study 2 further tested if such alteration of mental representation 
could occur even when specific number-based feedbacks were provided. In Studies 3 and 
4, we directly tested the self-regulatory nature of the observed phenomenon; we 
manipulated the effectiveness of effort in goal pursuit (Study 3) and the importance of 
accuracy in mental representations (Study 4), and tested whether the systematic 
alterations would still occur. 
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Chapter 9: Study 1 – T-shirt Donation Drive 
In the first study, we aimed to examine our hypothesis in the real world with a 
field experiment. We simulated what people would normally encounter in their daily 
lives and used visual stimuli to provide vague feedback on progress. In addition, we 
included a control group to capture participants’ baseline mental representation of 
progress, which served as the comparison benchmark to shed light on whether 
participants exaggerated or downplayed specific progress levels, as hypothesized. We 
also included process measures to examine whether people indeed had different concerns 
at different stages of pursuit. If people alter their perceived specific progress level to 
remain motivated in an important goal pursuit, they should exaggerate their specific 
progress level at early stages of pursuit to increase the perceived goal attainability when 
the goal value is high (vs. low), but conversely downplay the achieved specific progress 
level at more advanced stages of pursuit of the same high- (vs. low-) value goal, to signal 
a greater need for subsequent effort. Both of these alterations of specific progress level 
would lead to greater motivation in the pursuit.  
The context of the field experiment was a t-shirt donation drive for a charitable 
cause. We manipulated the importance of the goal by changing the cause of donation and 
manipulated the stage in the pursuit by showing participants different visual stimuli: a 
high or low number of boxes full of donated used t-shirts to-date. We measured 
participants’ mental representations of specific progress level by asking them to estimate 
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the number of t-shirts in these boxes, and we recorded the number of t-shirts they donated 
as the indicator of their motivation to attain this collective goal. 
METHOD 
 Participants. A total of 305 American undergraduate students (124 men, 181 
women) at the University of Texas at Austin participated in this study. The gender of the 
participants did not yield any effects here or in subsequent studies and was therefore 
omitted from further consideration. 
 Procedure. This study used a 2 (stage in the pursuit: initial vs. advanced) × 3 
(goal value: low vs. high vs. control) between-subjects design. Participants first signed up 
for a regular session of extra-credit study, and the content of the study was not disclosed. 
Four days before the scheduled experiment date, these participants received an email 
about a used t-shirt donation drive on campus with a link to an online survey. In the high-
value conditions, participants were first reminded of the recent January 2010 earthquake 
in Haiti (experiment was conducted four weeks after the earthquake). Then, they read a 
paragraph about how most refugees in Haiti were still in desperate need of living 
essentials such as shelter and clothing, and that without things as simple as basic clothing, 
many of them could not go back to school or to work. A picture of a refugee in Haiti was 
also included to raise attention to the issue. In the low-value conditions, participants read 
a paragraph about the economic situation in Honduras, and that half of the population still 
remained below the poverty line; a picture of the flag of Honduras was included in these 
conditions. A pretest using 7-point scales (1 = Not at all and 7 = Very important / Very 
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much) showed that participants perceived the issue of refugees in Haiti to be more 
important (M = 5.10, SD = 1.46) than that of poor people in Honduras (M = 4.00, SD = 
1.41), t(50) = 7.25, p < .01. Furthermore, they cared about the refugees in Haiti more (M 
= 5.12, SD = 1.29) than they did for poor people in Honduras (M = 4.18, SD = 1.38), 
t(50) = 6.95, p < .01. 
After reading about the issues, participants were informed that we were 
organizing a used t-shirt donation event on campus, and they were invited to donate some 
of their used t-shirts either to the refugees in Haiti or to the poor people in Honduras, 
depending on the condition. Specifically, we told participants that the campaign aimed to 
collect 1,000 t-shirts to send to refugees in Haiti (or to poor people in Honduras), and that 
the t-shirts could be of any size or color. To mimic individual goal pursuit situation, we 
led participants to believe that if the total donation amount was less than 1,000 t-shirts, 
the campaign would fail and the t-shirts collected may not be shipped to the designated 
countries. Participants then saw a picture of the used t-shirts we had collected so far for 
the campaign. In the initial-stage conditions, there were two full boxes (size 24" x 18" x 
24") of t-shirts in the picture, whereas in the advanced-stage conditions, there were 10 
full boxes of t-shirts in the picture (see Appendix for stimuli). In both conditions we 
emphasized that we still needed t-shirt donations, so that participants believed that their 
donation was critical for the campaign’s success. 
After viewing the picture of used t-shirts that we had collected for the campaign, 
participants were urged to participate in the donation event and were told that to better 
manage this campaign, we would like to first get some feedback on the organization and 
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communications of this campaign from potential donors such as them. The first question 
asked participants to estimate the specific progress of the campaign: they were asked to 
estimate how many used t-shirts they thought we had collected so far on the basis of the 
picture they saw on the previous page; participants typed a number between 0 and 1,000 
in a textbox. In addition, participants were asked to indicate how likely they thought we 
could successfully reach the goal of collecting 1,000 t-shirts (7-point scale; 1 = Not at all 
and 7 = Very likely), as well as how hard they thought we needed to work to collect the 
remaining t-shirts to reach the goal of getting 1,000 t-shirts (1 = No need to work at all 
and 7 = Work very hard).  The former question gauged participants’ perceived goal 
attainability, whereas the latter question measured their concern for discrepancy 
reduction. These questions were embedded among other filler questions about the 
campaign.  
Participants were then told that donation boxes would be set up when they came 
to the lab to participate in the extra-credit study a few days later. If they were willing to 
donate their t-shirts, they could simply bring their t-shirts with them and drop them off at 
the lab. Participants were assured that this donation drive was not part of the requirement 
for extra credit and that it was completely voluntary whether to donate. Participants were 
also offered an alternative drop-off time and location in case they could not bring the t-
shirts to the lab. When participants came to the lab for an extra-credit study four days 
later, we set up a small donation site at the corner of the lab, and a campaign assistant 
accepted and recorded all of the donations. We used the last four digits of participants’ 
phone numbers to match their actual donations with the information they provided in the 
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online survey, while maintaining the anonymity of the donation process. We then used 
the number of t-shirts that the participants donated as an indicator of participants’ 
motivation to help attain this collective goal. 
In control conditions, participants did not read any information about the t-shirt 
donation drive and were instead asked to take an evaluation task to evaluate stimuli such 
as words and pictures. During the task, they viewed the same pictures of two or 10 boxes 
of t-shirts and were asked to estimate the number of t-shirts in these pictures; their 
estimates served as the baseline numbers in our analyses. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Mental representation of specific progress level. Our first dependent variable 
was the progress that participants estimated—the number of used t-shirts in the boxes. 
Because the answers to this question were not normally distributed, we log-transformed 
the measure to reduce the skewness, then submitted it to a 2 (stage in the pursuit: initial 
vs. advanced) × 3 (goal value: low vs. high vs. control) factoral ANOVA. The analysis 
first yielded a main effect of perceived stage in the pursuit, F(1, 299) = 103.93, p < .01: 
participants who saw two boxes of donated t-shirts reported less progress (M = 142.83, 
SD = 143.96) than those who saw 10 boxes (M = 575.47, SD = 535.81). More 
importantly, this main effect was qualified by a Stage in the Pursuit × Goal Value 
interaction, F(1, 299) = 8.18, p < .01. To examine the interaction term and explore how 
the treatments differed among three levels of goal value, we assigned orthogonal planned 
contrast codes based on the goal value conditions. Of primary interest was the contrast 
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code of (2, -1, -1) for the high-value condition, the low-value condition, and control 
condition, respectively. This code allowed us to contrast the high-value condition that we 
believed would induce the alteration of mental representation with the other two 
conditions. The other contrast code was (0, -1, 1), to test the difference between the low-
value and control conditions. The planned contrast analyses at each stage in the pursuit 
revealed that among participants who saw two boxes of t-shirts in the picture, those who 
thought the campaign was for earthquake refugees in Haiti estimated more t-shirts in 
these boxes (M = 220.84, SD = 194.89) than those who thought the campaign was for 
poor people in Honduras (M = 109.36, SD = 82.96) and those in the control group (M = 
91.51, SD = 77.36), F(1, 153) = 29.39, p < .01; there was no significant difference 
between the latter two groups, F(1, 153) = .46, ns. In contrast, among participants who 
saw 10 boxes of t-shirts in the picture, those who thought the campaign was for refugees 
in Haiti estimated fewer t-shirts in the boxes (M = 424.00, SD = 326.39) than those who 
thought the campaign was for poor people in Honduras (M = 711.06, SD = 758.70) and 
those in the control group (M = 617.13, SD = 418.35), F(1, 146) = 7.25, p < .01; there 
was no significant difference between the latter two groups, F(1, 146) = .75, ns (see 
Figure 8). 
Different concerns in goal pursuit. We further performed a 2 (stage in the 
pursuit: initial vs. advanced) × 2 (goal value: low vs. high) factoral ANOVA on 
participants’ perceived attainability of the goal as well as on their concern for 
discrepancy reduction, excluding those participants in the control group. The analysis on 
the likelihood of attaining the goal showed a main effect of stage, F(1, 203) = 31.33, p < 
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.01, such that participants who saw two boxes of donated t-shirts perceived the goal to be 
less attainable (M = 5.46, SD = 1.34) than those who saw 10 boxes (M = 6.32, SD = .90). 
The main effect was qualified by the hypothesized Stage in the Pursuit × Goal Value 
interaction, F(1, 203) = 4.59, p < .05. For the participants who saw two boxes of donated 
t-shirts, those in the Haiti campaign condition thought that the goal of collecting 1,000 t-
shirts was more likely to be attained (M = 5.75, SD = 1.30) than those in the Honduras 
campaign condition (M = 5.14, SD = 1.32), t(103) = – 2.35, p < .05, and the estimated 
progress level predicted their perceived likelihood of goal attainment, B = .003, t(103) = 
3.98, p < .01. However, consistent with our theorizing, neither the difference in the 
likelihood of goal attainment, nor the correlation, existed among participants who saw 10 
boxes of donated t-shirts (MHaiti = 6.29, SD = .90 vs. MHonduras = 6.36, SD = .92, ns).  
We conducted the same analyses on people’s concern on the reduction of 
discrepancy. The 2 (stage in the pursuit: initial vs. advanced) × 2 (goal value: low vs. 
high) factoral ANOVA first showed a main effect of stage, F(1, 203) = 4.44, p < .05; 
participants who saw two boxes of donated t-shirts thought that we should put in more 
effort to collect remaining t-shirts (M = 5.80, SD = 1.24) than those who saw 10 boxes (M 
= 5.41, SD = 1.61). The main effect was qualified by the hypothesized Stage in the 
Pursuit × Goal Value interaction, F(1, 203) = 4.06, p < .05. Subsequent contrast analyses 
showed that for participants who saw 10 boxes of donated t-shirts, those in the Haiti 
campaign condition thought that we should put in more effort to collect the remaining t-
shirts (M = 5.71, SD = 1.36) than those in the Honduras campaign condition (M = 5.06, 
SD = 1.81), t(100) = –2.05, p < .05, and the estimated progress level negatively predicted 
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how much effort they thought was needed to reach the goal, B = - .001, t(100) = - 4.55, p 
< .01. However, as expected, there was no significant difference among participants who 
saw two boxes of donated t-shirts regarding how much more effort was required to 
reduce the remaining discrepancy (MHaiti = 5.73, SD = 1.22 vs. MHonduras = 5.88, SD = 1.27, 
ns), nor a correlation between the progress level and the expectation of additional effort. 
Motivation. We then examined how the factors of stage in the pursuit, goal value, 
and people’s estimated specific progress levels, together, influenced their actual donation 
behaviors. Since only 46.4% of participants chose to donate in this study (with a total of 
307 t-shirts collected), we analyzed the data using a Tobit model with zero (no donation) 
as the lower limit. Specifically, we conducted Tobit analyses on the number of t-shirts 
that participants donated, using goal value, the stage in the pursuit, estimated progress, 
and all the interaction terms as predictors. The analysis yielded a Goal Value × Stage in 
the Pursuit × Mental Representation of Specific Progress Level interaction, B = - .01, 
t(198) = - 2.75, p < .01, with no other effects. To further examine this three-way 
interaction, we then conducted Tobit analyses on the number of donated t-shirts using the 
stage in the pursuit, mental representation of specific progress level, and their interaction 
term as predictors for each of the goal value conditions, respectively. The results showed 
that, when the goal value was high (to help refugees in Haiti), there was a main effect of 
stage in the pursuit, B = 2.33, t(105) = 2.17, p < .05, and more importantly, a significant 
Stage in the Pursuit × Mental Representation of Specific Progress Level interaction, B = - 
.01, t(105) = - 3.22, p < .01, suggesting that the effect of estimated progress on people’s 
motivation depended on their current stage in the pursuit. Further analyses showed that, 
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consistent with our prediction, participants who saw two boxes of t-shirts collected for 
refugees in Haiti donated more t-shirts after reporting that more progress had been made 
on attaining the goal; specifically, these participants’ estimated specific progress level 
positively predicted how many t-shirts they donated (B = .10, t(52) = 2.58, p < .01). In 
contrast, for participants who saw 10 boxes of t-shirts collected for refugees in Haiti, they 
donated more t-shirts after reporting that we had made less progress on the goal; that is, 
these participants’ estimated specific progress level negatively predicted how many t-
shirts they donated (B = – .10, t(52) = – 1.92, p = .05). However, supporting our 
prediction that biased progress estimates were less likely when the goal was of low value, 
the stage in the pursuit × mental representation of specific progress level interaction term 
was not significant when the campaign was for poor people in Honduras, B = .002, t(92) 
= .68, ns, and participants’ estimated progress did not predict their actual donation at 
either stage of the pursuit (two boxes of t-shirts, B = – .03, t(47) = – .65, ns; 10 boxes of 
t-shirts, B = .001, t(44) = .28, ns). 
Moderated mediation model. Lastly, we fully tested the relationships among 
various factors through a moderated mediation analysis. We followed Preacher, Rucker, 
and Hayes (2007, Model 5) and used a bootstrapping procedure that generated a sample 
size of 5,000 to assess the regression models. The first part of this model regressed 
participants’ mental representation of specific progress level on goal value, stage in the 
pursuit, and their interaction term. The result was consistent with the earlier ANOVA and 
showed a main effect of stage, B = .39, t(207) = 5.33, p < .01, such that people in the 
advanced stages of pursuit estimated greater progress than those in the initial stages, 
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qualified by the Stage in the Pursuit × Goal Value interaction, B = - .17, t(207) = - 2.36, p 
< .05, suggesting that the impact of goal value on mental representation of specific 
progress level indeed depended on people’s current stage in the pursuit (see Figure 2). 
The second part of the model, which regressed participants’ motivation to donate on their 
mental representation of specific progress level, stage in the pursuit, goal value, the 
interaction between stage in the pursuit and goal value, and the interaction between stage 
in the pursuit and mental representation of specific progress level, yielded a main effect 
of stage, B = - .18, t(207) = - 1.94, p = .05, a main effect of mental representation of 
specific progress level, B = .42, t(207) = 2.40, p < .05, and more importantly, a 
significant Stage in the Pursuit × Mental Representation of Specific Progress Level 
interaction, B = - .44, t(207) = - 2.56, p = .01; the result suggested that it is people's 
mental representation of specific progress level that determined their motivation, and this 
relationship is moderated by their current stage in the pursuit (see Figure 9). 
These results provided initial support for our hypothesis that people alter their 
mental representations of the achieved specific progress level to elicit greater motivation 
in the pursuit of valuable goals. In addition, by including a control condition and the 
measures for participants’ concerns at different stages of goal pursuit, we were able to 
derive that it is indeed the case that people at the initial stages of pursuit exaggerate the 
specific progress level to increase the perceived goal attainability, and those at the 
advanced stages downplay their specific progress level to highlight the need for extra 
effort.  
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Chapter 10: Study 2 – Number-based Feedback and Willingness to Pay 
In Study 2, participants completed a word identification task and were offered a 
limited-edition school magnet as a reward for reaching the required number of points. We 
manipulated their perceived stage in the pursuit by providing feedback on their current 
points. We then measured participants’ mental representations of progress and their 
subsequent task efforts.  
METHOD 
 Participants. A total of 143 undergraduate students (67 men, 76 women) at the 
University of Texas at Austin participated in the study on computers in exchange for 
partial course credit.  
 Procedure. In Study 2, we used a stage in the pursuit (initial vs. advanced) × goal 
value design, in which the stage in the pursuit was manipulated as a between-subjects 
factor, and the value of the goal was measured as an individual difference factor. All 
participants were told that the researchers were interested in how people identify different 
words, and that they needed to correctly identify and type down the strings of letters they 
saw on the screen. Participants were further told that the more letters they could correctly 
identify in the letter string, the more points they could earn. While shorter letter strings 
offered less points per question, longer letter strings would, together, offer more points 
per question; the maximum points participants could potentially earn in a letter string was 
set as 800 points. Participants were then told that they would receive an additional 
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prize—a limited-edition school magnet—if they could earn a total of 21,500 points or 
more by the end of the task. A picture of the prize was shown to participants, and we 
measured participants’ perceived value of the goal by asking them to write down how 
much they would be willing to pay for the magnet if they were to buy this magnet in a 
store. We assumed that the more people were willing to pay for the magnet, the more 
valuable it was for them to reach 21,500 points in the task to obtain the prize. 
After the instruction, participants commenced the task and answered the first 15 
letter identification questions. The letters were heavily distorted and barely legible so that 
participants would be uncertain about the actual number of points they earned, making it 
possible for us to convincingly manipulate their perceived stage in goal pursuit. The time 
that participants spent on these 15 questions was recorded as a comparison benchmark. 
At the end of the first 15 questions, a pop-up box informed participants that the computer 
would now calculate their current scores. Participants in the initial-stage condition were 
told that they had earned 3,157 points thus far, whereas those in the advanced-stage 
condition were told that they had earned 11,813 points, suggesting that the attainability of 
the reward was relatively more secured. It is crucial to note that, because participants 
were not informed of the total number of questions in the task, and that the total points 
available for each question could vary based on the length of the letter strings, the 
feedback on current scores merely indicated their current progress on the goal of reaching 
21,500 points, rather than providing information on the difficulty of the task, accuracy 
rate, or their relative ability to succeed. The questions inserted at the end of the study 
provided additional assurance for the validity of this manipulation: There was no 
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significant difference in participants’ perceived difficulty of the task between the initial-
stage and the advanced-stage conditions (B = - .15, t(139) = - 1.46, ns), nor was there a 
difference in their perceived ability to succeed in this task (B = .06, t(139) = .68, ns). 
Upon receiving their current scores, participants were reminded that they had a 
limited number of questions left, and that they needed to earn 21,500 points (or more) to 
win the reward. A few questions then appeared to ask participants to indicate their 
feelings and evaluations about the task before continuing. Among filler questions (e.g., 
mood scales), we asked participants to estimate their current progress: “Without 
calculating, what percentage of points have you earned so far toward the points required 
for the reward (please enter an estimate between 0% and 100%)?” After participants 
answered these questions, they were directed to answer more word-identification 
questions. For the ease of comparison, this section contained 15 questions that were 
similar in nature to those in the first section, and we measured the amount of time that 
participants spent on these questions as the indicator of their motivation to win the prize. 
After completing the task, participants were debriefed and dismissed.    
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Mental representation of specific progress level. We regressed participants’ 
estimated specific progress level (in percentages) on their stage in the pursuit, perceived 
goal value (mean-centered and standardized), and the interaction between the two factors. 
The analysis first yielded a main effect of stage in the pursuit, B = .44, t(139) = 5.94, p < 
.01, suggesting that participants who thought they had earned more points reported 
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greater progress. More importantly, we found the predicted Stage in the Pursuit × Goal 
Value interaction, B = – .25, t(139) = – 2.83, p < .01. We further explored the effect of 
goal value on the represented specific progress level at different stages in the pursuit by 
comparing the slopes of goal value at each stage. For participants who were at the initial 
stage of the pursuit and were thus highly uncertain about goal attainment, their perceived 
goal value positively predicted their reported specific level of progress, B = .20, t(73) = 
2.19, p < .05; those who were willing to pay more for the prize reported having made 
greater progress on the goal. In contrast, for participants who were relatively close to the 
end point and thus were relatively certain about goal attainment, their perceived goal 
value negatively predicted their reported specific progress level, B = – .31, t(66) = – 2.14, 
p < .05;  those who were willing to pay more for the prize reported having made less 
progress. For the ease of interpretation, we graphed Figure 10 using goal value at one 
standard deviation above and below the mean (see Figure 10). 
Motivation. How did the mental representation of progress influence our 
participants’ subsequent motivation? In this experiment, participants were allowed to 
spend as much time as they wanted on the first 15 questions as well as the remaining 15 
questions after receiving progress feedback; therefore, we could assess the change in the 
amount of time they spent on the questions after receiving progress feedback as a 
measure of the impact of their mental representations of progress. There was no 
significant difference in the time that participants spent on the first 15 questions (pre-
feedback motivation) across conditions (stage in the pursuit: B = – .09, t(139) = – 1.11, 
ns; goal value: B = – .10, t(139) = – 1.00, ns; stage in the pursuit × goal value interaction: 
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B = – .08, t(139) = – .76, ns). To assess the change in their motivation after feedback, we 
deducted the time that participants spent on the first 15 questions (pre-feedback 
motivation) from the time that they spent on the second set of 15 questions (post-
feedback motivation) to obtain a “time difference,” and standardized the variable. We 
regressed this variable on people’s stage in the pursuit, perceived goal value, mental 
representation of specific progress level, and all the interaction terms. The analysis 
yielded a main effect of stage in the pursuit, B = .21, t(135) = 2.19, p < .05, and a 
hypothesized Stage in the Pursuit × Mental Representation of Specific Progress Level 
interaction, B = - .36, t(135) = - 3.60, p < .01. We further examined the interaction term 
by comparing the slopes of reported progress at each stage of pursuit, and we found that 
for participants at the initial stage of pursuit, their mentally represented progress level 
positively predicted the change of their subsequent effort in attaining the goal, B = .35, 
t(73) = 3.20, p < .01; those who reported greater progress tended to increase their effort to 
a greater extent in the latter 15 questions. In contrast, for those who were at advanced 
stage of pursuit, their mentally represented progress level negatively predicted the change 
of their subsequent effort, B = – .64, t(66) = – 6.81, p < .01; those who reported less 
progress tended to increase their effort to a greater extent in latter questions. 
Although we did not obtain the goal value × stage in the pursuit × mental 
representation of specific progress level interaction, on the basis of our a priori 
theorizing, we also followed the procedures in Study 1 and explored the stage in the 
pursuit × mental representation of specific progress level interaction when the goal value 
was one standard deviation above and below the mean, respectively. The results showed 
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a pattern consistent with Study 1: When the goal value was high, we observed a 
significant Stage in the Pursuit × Mental Representation of Specific Progress Level 
interaction, B = – .08, t(135) = – 2.48, p = .01, suggesting that the estimated progress 
influenced motivation based on people’s current stage; however, when the goal value was 
low, the stage in the pursuit × mental representation of specific progress level interaction 
term was less/not significant, B = – .06, t(135) = – 1.63, p = .11. 
Moderated mediation model. Following the procedures in Study 1, we tested the 
relationships among all factors together through a moderated mediation analysis 
(Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007, Model 5) with a bootstrapping procedure that 
generated a sample size of 5,000. The first part of this model regressed participants’ 
mental representation of specific progress level on goal value, stage in the pursuit, and 
their interaction term. The result again showed a main effect of stage, B = .44, t(143) = 
5.94, p < .01, such that people in the advanced stages of pursuit estimated greater 
progress than those in the initial stages, qualified by the Stage in the Pursuit × Goal Value 
interaction, B = - .25, t(143) = - 2.83, p < .01, confirming that the impact of goal value on 
mental representation of specific progress level depended on people’s current stage in the 
pursuit (see Figure 4). The second part of the model, which regressed participants’ 
change of effort on their mental representation of specific progress level, stage in the 
pursuit, goal value, the interaction between stage in the pursuit and goal value, and the 
interaction between stage in the pursuit and mental representation of specific progress 
level, yielded a main effect of stage, B = .22, t(143) = 2.44, p < .05, and a significant 
Stage in the Pursuit × Mental Representation of Specific Progress Level interaction, B = - 
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.36, t(143) = - 3.77, p < .01; the result again confirmed that it is people's mental 
representation of specific progress level that determined their motivation, and this 
relationship is moderated by their current stage in the pursuit (see Figure 11). 
These results provided further evidence for our hypothesis that people who value 
their goals will represent their achieved, specific level of progress in distinctive ways to 
maintain their motivation in the pursuit, even when the progress feedback was number-
based. These altered mental representations of specific progress level, although biased, 
further determine individuals’ subsequent motivation and effort in the pursuit. 
If indeed the mental representation of specific goal progress is a self-regulatory 
mechanism that individuals use to ensure successful goal attainment, it should occur only 
when people believe that self-regulation is effective in helping them attain the goal. 
Whenever self-regulation is perceived to be ineffective in attaining the goal, such bias in 
mental representations should not occur. In Study 3, we tested this hypothesis.  
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Chapter 11: Study 3 – Self-Regulation Effectiveness 
In Study 3, participants worked on a pitch differentiation task and were offered a 
reward for reaching the required number of points in the task. We informed participants 
either that pitch identification is an innate ability and cannot be improved through 
practices, or that it can be improved through effort. We also manipulated their perceived 
stage in the pursuit by providing feedback on their accumulated points. We measured 
participants’ mental representations of their specific progress level in percentages, as well 
as their subsequent effort in the task.  
METHOD 
 Participants. A total of 123 undergraduate students (60 men, 63 women) at the 
University of Texas at Austin participated in the study for partial course credit.  
 Procedure. The study used a 2 (stage in the pursuit: initial vs. advanced) × 2 
(self-regulation effectiveness: effective vs. ineffective) between-subjects design. Upon 
arriving at the lab, participants were told that researchers were studying how people 
differentiate pitches of sound. Participants were asked to complete a few separate pitch-
identification tasks. Each task asked them to first listen to 10 different pitches, ranging 
from Level 1 (lowest) to Level 10 (highest), and then to correctly identify the level of 
pitches in the question section. We also offered a performance bonus and told participants 
that they would earn points based on how close their answers were to the correct ones. If 
they could reach more than 23,900 points at the end of two pitch-identification tasks, they 
would receive an additional $20 for their performance. 
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After the instruction, participants commenced the task and were first shown an 
information page that explained the nature of the pitch-identification task. The 
information indicated that: “Our ears have thousands of ciliated cells with different 
sensitivities. These cells identify the frequencies that make up a particular pitch, as well 
as the spectrum of different frequencies that blend together.” In the self-regulation 
effective conditions, participants then read that they could improve their abilities in 
identifying a specific pitch through learning and familiarizing the ears with that pitch; 
that is, they could prepare their ears to “capture” certain pitches through repeatedly 
exposing their ears to that pitch. In the self-regulation ineffective conditions, participants 
read that the sensitivity of the ciliated cells is genetically determined, and that some 
people are better at identifying higher pitches, whereas others are better at lower pitches. 
It was further emphasized that the genetic nature meant that one’s sensitivity to given 
pitches does not change, nor will it be influenced by learning or effort.  
After the information page, participants put on their headsets and started the first 
task. They listened to the 10 pitches (from Level 1 to Level 10) as paced by the program, 
and then answered 20 pitch-identification questions by indicating the level of the pitch 
played in each question on a 10-point scale. After completing this task, a pop-up box 
informed participants that the computer would now calculate their current scores and 
provide some feedback. We manipulated the stage in goal pursuit by changing the 
amount of progress that participants had achieved on the task: Participants in the initial-
stage conditions were told that they had earned 7,966 points thus far (about one-third of 
the total points needed for the reward), whereas participants in the advanced-stage 
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conditions were told that they had earned 15,932 points (about two-thirds of the total 
points needed for the reward). Similar to the previous study, because participants were 
not given information on the total number of questions in the task nor the point structure 
of each question, the feedback on their current scores merely indicated their current 
progress level rather than providing information on the difficulty of the task or on their 
relative ability/performance. In addition, the questions inserted at the end of the study 
showed that there was no significant difference between the initial-stage and the 
advanced-stage conditions in participants’ perceived difficulty of the task (F(1, 119) = 
1.52, ns) and their perceived ability to succeed (F(1, 119) = 2.23, ns). 
After receiving the feedback, participants proceeded to the second pitch-
identification task. For this task, we told participants that they could rewind the sound 
clip as many times as they wished and that they could spend as much time as they wanted 
listening to the 10 pitches before moving on to the question section. We also reminded 
participants that they would need 23,900 points for the $20 prize.  
Right before this second task began, a few questions appeared in a pop-up box 
and asked participants to “evaluate the design of the experiment” before moving on. 
Among a number of filler questions, we asked participants to report their progress so far: 
“Without calculating, what percentage of points do you think you have earned so far 
toward the points required for the reward (please enter an estimate between 0% and 
100%)?” After participants answered these questions, they started the second pitch-
identification task. We recorded the amount of time that participants spent on listening to 
these pitches before clicking “Continue” to load the question section as the indicator of 
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their motivation for achieving better performance in this task. Upon finishing this task, 
participants were told that they had completed the study and were thanked and debriefed. 
No participant raised any suspicions about the task or about the feedback they had 
received during the task.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Mental representation of specific progress level. We submitted participants’ 
reported progress to a 2 (stage in the pursuit: initial vs. advanced) × 2 (self-regulation 
effectiveness: effective vs. ineffective) factoral ANOVA. Consistent with prior findings, 
the analysis first yielded a main effect of the stage in the pursuit, F(1, 119) = 231.68, p < 
.01, indicating that participants who were told that they had earned 15,932 points felt that 
they had made more progress (M = 60.59, SD = 11.43) than those who had earned 7,966 
points (M = 31.03, SD = 10.76). More importantly, the analysis yielded the predicted 
Stage in the Pursuit × Self-Regulation Effectiveness interaction, F(1, 119) = 9.00, p < 
.01. Subsequent contrast analyses revealed that among the participants at initial stages of 
pursuit, those who believed that the performance in the task depended on their effort felt 
that they had made more progress (M = 33.97, SD = 10.17), compared with those who 
thought that the ability of pitch identification was genetically determined and could not 
be improved by effort (M = 28.00, SD = 10.67), t(57) = – 2.20, p < .05. In contrast, 
among the participants who thought that they had made substantial progress on the goal, 
those who believed that the performance depended on their effort reported less progress 
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(M = 57.81, SD = 10.41) than those who thought the ability of pitch identification could 
not be improved by effort (M = 63.55, SD = 11.88), t(62) = 2.06, p < .05 (see Figure 12). 
Motivation. We then examined how the factors of self-regulation effectiveness, 
stage in the pursuit, and people’s estimated specific progress levels, together, influenced 
participants’ subsequent effort in the pursuit (i.e., the time that participants spent on 
listening to the pitches in the second task before entering the question section). 
Specifically, we regressed this motivation measure on the self-regulation effectiveness, 
stage in the pursuit, estimated progress, and all the interaction terms. The analysis yielded 
a main effect of self-regulation effectiveness, B = .85, t(115) = 6.90, p < .01, a stage in 
the pursuit × mental representation of specific progress level interaction, B = - .59, t(115) 
= - 4.72, p < .01, and more importantly, a significant Self-Regulation Effectiveness × 
Stage in the Pursuit × Mental Representation of Specific Progress Level interaction, B = - 
.73, t(115) = - 5.85, p < .01. To further examine this three-way interaction, we then 
regressed the motivation measure on the stage in the pursuit, mental representation of 
specific progress level, and their interaction term, for self-regulation effective and self-
regulation ineffective conditions, respectively. The results showed that, when effort was 
perceived to be effective, there was a significant Stage in the Pursuit × Mental 
Representation of Specific Progress Level interaction, B = - 1.31, t(59) = - 6.38, p < .01, 
suggesting that the effect of estimated progress on people’s motivation depended on their 
current stage in the pursuit. Further analyses showed that, when participants thought that 
they were at initial stages of pursuit and that effort was effective in improving their 
performance, the reported progress positively predicted their subsequent effort in 
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repeatedly listening to pitches, B = .70, t(28) = 5.24, p < .01; those who reported greater 
progress tended to invest more effort. Conversely, for those who thought that they were 
approaching the end point and that effort was effective in improving their performance, 
the reported progress negatively predicted their subsequent effort in practicing, B = – .57, 
t(31) = – 3.81, p < .01; those who reported less progress invested more effort. In contrast, 
for participants who were led to believe that their performance in pitch identification 
could not be improved through effort, the stage in the pursuit × mental representation of 
specific progress level interaction term was not significant, B = .14, t(56) = .99, ns, and 
participants’ reported progress did not predict their subsequent effort in practicing, 
regardless of whether they were at initial (B = – .07, t(27) = – .36, ns) or advanced (B = 
.21, t(29) = 1.17, ns) stage of the pursuit.  
Moderated mediation model. We then tested the relationships among all factors 
through a moderated mediation analysis (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007, Model 5) 
with a bootstrapping procedure that generated a sample size of 5,000. The first part of 
this model regressed participants’ mental representation of specific progress level on self-
regulation effectiveness, stage in the pursuit, and their interaction term. The result 
showed a main effect of stage, B = .80, t(123) = 15.22, p < .01, such that people in the 
advanced stages of pursuit estimated greater progress than those in the initial stages, 
qualified by the Stage in the Pursuit × Self-Regulation Effectiveness interaction, B = - 
.16, t(123) = - 3.00, p < .01, suggesting that the impact of self-regulation effectiveness on 
mental representation of specific progress level depended on people’s current stage in the 
pursuit (see Figure 6). The second part of the model, which regressed participants’ effort 
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investment on their mental representation of specific progress level, stage in the pursuit, 
self-regulation effectiveness, the interaction between stage in the pursuit and self-
regulation effectiveness, and the interaction between stage in the pursuit and mental 
representation of specific progress level, yielded a main effect of self-regulation 
effectiveness, B = .27, t(123) = 3.29, p < .01, and more importantly, a significant Stage in 
the Pursuit × Mental Representation of Specific Progress Level interaction, B = - .54, 
t(123) = - 3.87, p < .01; the result suggested that it is people's mental representation of 
specific progress level that determined their motivation, and this relationship is 
moderated by their current stage in the pursuit (see Figure 13). 
These results further support the proposition that people use their mental 
representation of specific progress level strategically as a self-regulatory mechanism to 
motivate themselves, and that they do so only when they believe that effort would be 
effective in helping them attain the goal. These results help to rule out the possibility that 
the mental representation of progress was a consequence of pure cognitive biases. By 
demonstrating that the phenomenon occurs only when efforts are perceived to be 
effective in goal attainment, we offer evidence for the self-regulatory nature of this 
operation.  
Based on our proposed mechanism, people strategically alter their mental 
representations of goal progress to maintain high levels of motivation. One unresolved 
issue is whether the motivation to accurately assess goal progress would help or hinder 
one’s subseuqent motivation in goal pursuit. We expect that self-regulation biases in 
progress assessment will be more likely to occur when accuracy motivation is low; when 
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the accuracy motivation for the representation is high, people would be less likely to 
systematically bias their progress estimates. Ironically, this absence of bias among high 
accuracy individuals is expected to dampen their subsequent motivation, as it removes an 
important self-regulation instrument. We tested this hypothesis in the next study.  
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Chapter 12: Study 4 – Accuracy Goal 
In this final study, we tested the moderating effect of accuracy motivation on 
biased mental representation of goal progress level. We expect that individuals who have 
lower accuracy motivations will be more likely to exhibit self-regulation driven biases in 
their representations of specific progress level and, as a result, become more motivated in 
pursing the goal than those who aim to be accurate in their goal progress mental 
representations.  
METHOD 
 Participants. A total of 173 undergraduate students (95 men, 78 women) at the 
University of Texas at Austin participated in the study in exchange for compensation of 
$5.  
 Procedure. The study used a 2 (stage in the pursuit: initial vs. advanced) × 2 
(importance of accuracy: low vs. high) between-subjects design. When participants 
arrived at the lab, they were informed that researchers were interested in people’s 
cognitive processes—how people identify and differentiate objects. Participants were told 
that they would view five sets of pictures and identify the differences within each set. 
Specifically, they would view Picture A in the set first, for as long as they would like to. 
When they clicked “Continue” to move on, Picture A would disappear and Picture B, 
which was slightly different from Picture A, would appear. They would then be asked to 
identify the differences between the two pictures by clicking on the different parts in 
Picture B. When they correctly identified the differences, they would earn points, and the 
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points they earned would be reflected in the progress bar on the screen; anchored from 0 
to 500 points. Participants further read that, if they reached 500 points at the end of five 
sets of pictures, they would win a bonus cash prize of $30 on top of their $5 
compensation. We set the reward at $30 to ensure that the goal was valuable to all 
participants in the study. 
 Participants then commenced the task. In the initial-stage conditions, participants 
completed one set of pictures and about 1/5 of the progress bar was filled. In the 
advanced-stage conditions, participants completed four sets of pictures, and the red filling 
in the progress bar increased as they moved on in the task; 4/5 of the progress bar was 
filled after participants completed the 4th set. In both conditions, the difficulty of the task 
and participants’ ability/performance should be perceived as the same; the only thing that 
differed was their current stage in the pursuit. 
 Participants then encountered an instruction page, either after the 1st set or the 4th 
set of pictures, depending on condition. Specifically, the instruction informed participants 
that, before they moved on to the next set, we would like to ask them to answer a few 
questions about the task they were completing. Here we manipulated the importance of 
accuracy: While those in the low-accuracy conditions read that the researchers were 
planning to have a large number of participants for the study, and therefore a rough 
estimate from each of them would be sufficient, those in the high-accuracy conditions 
read that as a result of budget constraints, the researchers could run only a limited number 
of participants for the study, and thus they should try to be as accurate as possible in their 
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responses, avoiding both overestimation and underestimation (Neuberg, 1989; Zhang & 
Fishbach, 2010). 
Participants then entered the question section, and were asked to make estimates 
about the task. Among filler questions, we asked participants to estimate (based on the 
progress bar they saw earlier) how many points they thought they had earned so far out of 
the total of 500 points; participants typed a number between 0 and 500 in a textbox. 
Following the estimates, we also asked participants to indicate how likely they thought 
they would win the $30 bonus cash in the task (7-point scale; 1 = Not at all and 7 = Very 
likely), as well as how hard they thought they needed to work to earn the remaining 
points for the $30 prize (1 = No need to work at all and 7 = Work very hard).  
After completing these questions, participants continued with the task and were 
again reminded that they could look at Picture A for as long as they wanted to. We 
recorded how much time participants spent observing Picture A in this new set (after they 
provided estimates for their current progress) as a proxy for their motivation. All 
participants completed the task, were debriefed, and all were entered in the drawing for 
the cash rewards.    
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Mental representation of progress level. We submitted the points participants 
estimated that they had earned in the task to a 2 (stage in the pursuit: initial vs. advanced) 
× 2 (importance of accuracy: low vs. high) factoral ANOVA. The analysis first showed a 
main effect of stage in the pursuit, F(1, 169) = 283.11, p < .01, such that those in the 
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advanced stages reported to have received more points in the task (M = 395.87, SD = 
60.50) than those in the initial stages (M = 161.13, SD = 119.26). There was also a main 
effect of accuracy, F(1, 169) = 4.82, p < .05, such that those in the low-accuracy 
conditions estimated more points (M = 305.34, SD = 137.38) than those in the high-
accuracy conditions (M = 253.02, SD = 158.84). More importantly, these main effects 
were qualified by the expected Stage in the Pursuit × Accuracy interaction, F(1, 169) = 
20.78, p < .01. Among the participants who completed one set of pictures and were at the 
initial stage of pursuit, those who were not asked to be accurate in their estimations 
reported to have earned more points (M = 213.86, SD = 149.26), compared with those 
who were trying to be accurate (M = 122.10, SD = 70.28), t(85) = 3.82, p < .01. In 
contrast, among the participants who have completed four sets of pictures and were at the 
advanced stage of pursuit, those who were not asked to be accurate reported having 
earned less points (M = 380.56, SD = 60.77), compared with those trying to be accurate 
(M = 412.68, SD = 56.23), t(84) = - 2.54, p < .05 (see Figure 14).  
Different concerns in goal pursuit. We further performed a 2 (stage in the 
pursuit: initial vs. advanced) × 2 (importance of accuracy: low vs. high) factoral ANOVA 
on participants’ perceived attainability of the goal as well as on their concern for 
discrepancy reduction. The analysis on the likelihood of attaining the goal showed a main 
effect of stage, F(1, 169) = 58.90, p < .01, such that those in the advanced stages thought 
they were more likely to attain the goal (M = 5.13, SD = 1.18) than those in the initial 
stages (M = 3.47, SD = 1.57). The main effect was qualified by the hypothesized Stage in 
the Pursuit × Accuracy interaction, F(1, 169) = 6.97, p < .01. For the participants who 
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had just started the pursuit, those in the low-accuracy condition thought that the bonus 
cash was more likely to be attained (M = 4.00, SD = 1.76) than those in the high-accuracy 
condition (M = 3.08, SD = 1.29), t(85) = 2.81, p < .01, and the estimated progress level 
predicted their perceived chance of attaining the goal in the end, B = .007, t(85) = 5.48, p 
< .01. In contrast, neither the difference in the chance of attaining the goal, nor the 
correlation, existed among participants who were approaching the end point of the pursuit 
(Mlow-accuracy = 5.04, SD = 1.02 vs. Mhigh-accuracy = 5.22, SD = 1.33, ns). These results 
provided evidence that people who were not concerned about the accuracy in estimates 
exaggerated their progress level at the initial stages to signal higher goal attainability, and 
they did not do so in more advanced stages in which the goal attainability was relatively 
secured. 
We conducted the same analyses on people’s concern about additional effort 
investment to reduce the remaining discrepancy. The 2 (stage in the pursuit: initial vs. 
advanced) × 2 (importance of accuracy: low vs. high) factoral ANOVA showed the 
hypothesized Stage in the Pursuit × Accuracy interaction, F(1, 169) = 7.72, p < .01. There 
was no main effect in this analysis. Subsequent analyses showed that among participants 
who were approaching the end point of the pursuit, those in the low-accuracy condition 
reported a greater need for extra effort to earn the remaining points (M = 6.16, SD = 1.02) 
than those in the high-accuracy condition (M = 5.46, SD = 1.29), t(84) = 2.78, p < .01, 
and the estimated progress level negatively predicted how much effort they thought they 
would need to reach the goal, B = - .005, t(84) = - 2.57, p = .01. In contrast, among the 
participants in the initial stage of the pursuit, this variable did not differ between the two 
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accuracy conditions, (Mlow-accuracy = 5.46, SD = 1.02 vs. MHigh-accuracy = 5.76, SD = 1.29, ns), 
nor did we find the correlation between the progress level and the expectation of 
additional effort. 
Motivation. What happens to individuals’ motivation when they try to be 
accurate in estimates? We performed a regression analysis on the time participants spent 
on trying to memorize Picture A after estimating their progress, using accuracy, stage in 
the pursuit, estimated progress, and all the interaction terms as predictors. The analysis 
yielded a main effect of accuracy, B = - .19, t(165) = - 2.59, p = .01, a stage in the pursuit 
× mental representation of specific progress level interaction, B = - .27, t(165) = - 3.37, p 
< .01, and the hypothesized Accuracy × Stage in the Pursuit × Mental Representation of 
Specific Progress Level interaction, B = .21, t(165) = 2.60, p = .01. To further examine 
the three-way interaction, we regressed the motivation measure on the stage in the 
pursuit, mental representation of specific progress level, and their interaction term, for 
low-accuracy and high-accuracy conditions, respectively. The results showed that, when 
accuracy was not important, there was a significant Stage in the Pursuit × Mental 
Representation of Specific Progress Level interaction, B = - .48, t(78) = - 4.46, p < .01, 
suggesting that the effect of estimated progress on people’s motivation depended on their 
current stage in the pursuit. Further analyses showed that, among participants who were 
not instructed to be accurate with their estimates, the reported progress positively 
predicted their subsequent effort in observing Picture A at the initial stage of the pursuit, 
B = .43, t(35) = 2.80, p < .01, but negatively predicted their subsequent effort at the 
advanced stage, B = – .47, t(43) = – 3.49, p < .01. This relationship, again, was not 
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observed among participants who were asked to provide accurate estimates: the stage in 
the pursuit × mental representation of specific progress level interaction term was not a 
significant predictor, B = - .06, t(87) = - .59, ns, and the reported progress did not predict 
participants’ subsequent effort, regardless of whether they were at the initial (B = .21, 
t(48) = 1.45, ns) or advanced (B = .16, t(39) = 1.01, ns) stage of the pursuit. 
Moderated mediation model. We then tested the relationships among all factors 
through a moderated mediation analysis (Preacher, Rucker, & Hayes, 2007, Model 5) 
with a bootstrapping procedure that generated a sample size of 5,000. The first part of 
this model regressed participants’ mental representation of specific progress level on the 
importance of accuracy, stage in the pursuit, and their interaction term. The result showed 
the hypothesized Stage in the Pursuit × Accuracy interaction, B = .33, t(173) = 4.48, p < 
.01, suggesting that the impact of the importance of accuracy on mental representation of 
specific progress level depended on people’s current stage in the pursuit (see Figure 8). 
The second part of the model, which regressed participants’ effort investment on their 
mental representation of specific progress level, stage in the pursuit, importance of 
accuracy, the interaction between stage in the pursuit and accuracy, and the interaction 
between stage in the pursuit and mental representation of specific progress level, yielded 
the hypothesized Stage in the Pursuit × Mental Representation of Specific Progress Level 
interaction, B = - .31, t(173) = - 4.20, p < .01; the result suggested that it is people's 
mental representation of specific progress level that determined their motivation, and this 
relationship is moderated by their current stage in the pursuit (see Figure 15). 
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Results in Study 4 provided critical support for our hypothesis that people alter 
their mental representations of goal progress as a self-regulation mechanism to elicit 
greater effort in the pursuit. When accuracy in estimates is important, this operation 
ceases and people’s mental representations do not show systematic biases, which, 
ironically, had a negative impact on their subsequent effort. In addition, we explored the 
mechanism through which the distortions influence motivation: While the inflated 
progress level at the initial stages increases motivation by enhancing the perceived goal 
attainability, the downplayed progress level at the advanced stages increases motivation 
by highlighting the need for extra effort. Importantly, by showing that a desire to be 
accurate can eliminate the systematic biases in the representations, we were able to 
further confirm that these alterations, instead of being attention-based biases, are indeed 
self-regulatory instruments designed to help ensure successful goal attainment.    
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Chapter 13: General Discussion 
 Past research has emphasized the impact of progress feedback on people’s 
subsequent motivation in goal pursuit (Förster, Higgins, & Chen Idson, 1998; Hull, 1932; 
Liberman & Förster, 2008; Louro, Pieters, & Zeelenberg, 2007). The present 
investigation extends the previous findings and focuses on one’s mental representation of 
specific progress levels as a determinant of motivation. By taking a motivational 
approach, we find that mental representations of goal progress can function as a self-
regulation mechanism that helps people maintain high levels of motivation in goal 
pursuit. While people exaggerate their specific progress level to increase perceived goal 
attainability at initial stages of pursuit to elicit greater motivation, they downplay the 
specific progress level to highlight the need for greater effort at advanced stages of goal 
pursuit to elicit greater motivation.  
 The results of four studies provided convergent support for the proposed 
mechanism. Study 1 tested our hypothesis in the context of a collective donation goal 
pursuit. We found that when the donation cause was highly (vs. less) valuable, people 
exaggerated the progress that had been made on the goal above the baseline condition to 
signal higher goal attainability in initial stages of the pursuit, but conversely downplayed 
the level of progress below the baseline condition to signal a higher need for additional 
effort in advanced stages of the pursuit. Such alterations in mental representations, in 
turn, impacted people’s subsequent motivation in contributing to the collective goal. In an 
individual goal context, Study 2 found that participants who were starting to accumulate 
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points for a reward reported greater achieved progress when the reward was of high (vs. 
low) value to them, which subsequently led to greater effort in the task. Conversely, 
participants who were approaching the total points required for the reward reported less 
progress when the reward was of high (vs. low) value to them, which also resulted in 
increased effort in further pursuit.  
 In Study 3, we found that such alteration of progress occurred only when self-
regulation was perceived to be effective and necessary in helping one attain the goal; 
participants who thought they could (vs. could not) improve their performance through 
practice in a pitch-identification task estimated greater achieved progress when they had 
just started accumulating points, but reported less progress when they were approaching 
the total points required for reward. Their altered mental representations of specific 
progress levels, in turn, predicted their subsequent motivation. Lastly, Study 4 provided 
further evidence for the self-regulatory nature of the observed phenomenon by showing 
that participants who were trying to be accurate with their estimates did not alter their 
mental representations, and their motivation, in turn, suffered compared with those who 
were less concerned about the accuracy and hence altered their mental representations as 
a motivational instrument. Importantly, because the participants who were concerned 
about accuracy would monitor their progress as (if not more) intensely and closely as 
those who were not concerned about accuracy, this study also ruled out the possibility 
that the observed alteration of mental representation was a result of more intense 
monitoring of one’s progress. 
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IMPLICATIONS FOR OTHER RESEARCH 
If we view the process of goal pursuit as moving along a straight line anchored by 
the starting point on one end and the ideal state on the other, progress and the remaining 
discrepancy to attainment would represent two opposing sides of the same construct: 
While progress represents how much one has accomplished from the starting point, 
discrepancy represents the distance one still needs to cover to reach the end point. Prior 
research has found evidence that both accomplished and unaccomplished goal progress 
can be motivating: On one hand, people are motivated by negative feedback that is based 
on the discrepancies to goal attainment (Carver & Scheier, 1998; Higgins, 1987; Locke & 
Latham, 2002); on the other hand, one’s achieved progress also motivates effort by 
signaling greater chance of goal attainment (Liberman & Förster, 2008). The present 
framework unites the two streams of literature by adding a temporal dimension and 
suggests that people derive motivation from different sources at different stages of goal 
pursuit: While they are mostly concerned about goal attainability and are more motivated 
by the achieved progress in the initial stages of goal pursuit, they become mostly 
concerned about reducing the discrepancy and are more motivated by the unachieved 
progress in advanced stages of goal pursuit. 
At the center of this dual-source view is the level of progress on a goal, which 
addresses both concerns in goal pursuit. The present research analyzes people’s 
tendencies to use the mental representation of their progress level as a self-regulatory 
instrument. By strategically biasing the representations of their progress levels on the 
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goal, they either enhance the goal commitment or highlight the magnitude of discrepancy, 
so that their motivation remains high throughout the entire pursuit.  
 Past research has documented various instruments that people employ to prevent 
obstacles from undermining their goal attainment. They can modulate the choice 
situations (Ainslie, 1975; Becker, 1960; Green & Rachlin, 1996; Rachlin & Green, 1972; 
Schelling, 1978, 1984; Thaler, 1991; Thaler & Shefrin, 1981), change the value of 
different options in conflicts (Fishbach, Zhang, & Trope, 2010; Kuhl, 1986; Myrseth, 
Fishbach, & Trope, 2009), or shift the level of abstraction of the available options (Fujita 
et al., 2006; Mischel & Ayduk, 2004). The present investigation extends this research 
stream from single-choice situations to goal pursuit that requires continued efforts, and 
demonstrates that people in these contexts modify the mental representation of their 
achievement as an instrument to ensure goal attainment. These strategic alterations, as we 
demonstrate in the present research, are in operation whenever the attainment of an 
important goal is at stake and, unlike in previous studies, do not require the presence of 
an immediate self-control conflict to be triggered. 
The finding that people strategically modify their mental representations of 
achieved progress to elicit greater motivation further contributes to the discussion on the 
interaction between motivation and cognition. Rather than always representing the world 
accurately in their minds, people’s cognitions—including evaluations of other people, 
estimated likelihood of an event, and interpretations of ambiguous stimuli—are often 
influenced by their momentary motivations (Balcetis & Dunning, 2006; Dunning, 2001; 
Kunda, 1990). Extending these findings, we have demonstrated a productive motivation-
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cognition cycle of reinforcement in goal pursuit: Individuals’ motivation to ensure the 
completion of important goals initiates the operation that biases their cognition 
(exaggerating or downplaying achieved progress), which in turn comes back to exert 
further positive influence on their motivation to attain the goal. This cycle of 
reinforcement further highlights the intertwined relationship between motivation and 
cognition and sheds light on our understanding of the interaction between the two.  
RELATED CONCEPTUALIZATIONS  
We posit that the biases in mental representation reflect a motivational, self-
regulatory mechanism that individuals use to elicit greater motivation. Alternatively, they 
might also reflect other cognitive biases that are non-motivational in nature. For example, 
the optimism bias (Taylor & Brown, 1988) represents one’s unrealistic expectation of 
greater success in the future than what a person actually achieved during a comparable 
period in the past. Optimism bias suggests that holding optimistic expectations about the 
future can enhance one’s feelings of self-efficacy and can increase one’s motivation to 
attain the goal by functioning as more challenging performance standards to elicit greater 
efforts (Ajzen, 1985; Armor & Taylor, 2002; Bandura, 1997; Buehler, Griffin, & Ross, 
1994; Gollwitzer, 1990; Oettingen & Mayer, 2002). Similarly, defensive pessimism (e.g., 
Norem & Cantor, 1986; Norem & Illingworth, 1993; Showers, 1992) suggests that when 
anticipating difficulties in goal pursuit, people sometimes set unrealistically low 
expectations in order to help manage their emotional experiences in case of failure, and to 
motivate greater effort. According to this account, it is possible that people might have 
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been downplaying their progress so that they could better prepare themselves for the 
potential failures and the emotional consequences. Notably, both the optimism and 
defensive pessimism would predict that such biases should occur for goals that are both 
within and outside their control; for instance, people exercising defensive pessimism 
would think through various possible outcomes (usually worse-case scenarios) of an 
event, whether it is a performance (within their control) or a situation (outside their 
control), to help manage their anxiety level (Norem & Illingworth, 1993). That is, people 
display optimism and defensive pessimism regardless of their perceived level of control 
in the pursuit of the goal.  
Our empirical evidence, however, supports the self-regulatory nature of the biases 
in the mental representation of goal progress by showing that this phenomenon occurs 
only when people feel that efforts are instrumental in helping them attain the goal. 
Whenever the outcome of a goal pursuit is found to be outside of people’s personal 
control (e.g., genetically determined in Study 3), their mental representations of specific 
progress level do not display the same systematic bias, nor do these representations 
predict people’s subsequent efforts in the pursuit. Therefore, mere optimism or 
pessimism cannot account for our findings. Instead, this pattern is more consistent with a 
counteractive self-regulation conceptualization, which emphasizes the instrumental 
nature of such representations. Because efforts are not instrumental in helping the 
attainment of goals that are beyond people’s control, people do not engage in self-
regulation, and hence the systematic biases in mental representations do not occur. 
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A WORD ON ACCURACY AND MOTIVATION 
Biases in perceptions and judgments are generally regarded as undesirable, and 
much research from decision making as well as from clinical psychology suggest that an 
accurate perception about one’s circumstance is often desirable and provides better 
directions for people’s important decisions (Ambady & Gray, 2002; Fletcher & Kerr, 
2010; Funder, 1987; Rule et al., 2008). Indeed, in many situations, people benefit from an 
accurate representation of the outside world because it allows them to make decisions 
that are more in line with reality and facilitates human behaviors such as planning and 
coordination. 
Despite all the benefits associated with accuracy in perceptions, it is also 
important to take notice of the situations in which biases, within reasonable scope, may 
be instrumental and beneficial. As we demonstrated in the present research (e.g., Study 
4), a desire to be accurate in estimates brought about the unintended costs of decreased 
motivation in goal pursuit; a biased representation, on the other hand, proved to be 
effective in eliciting greater motivation to ensure the attainment of an important goal. 
These findings add to the growing evidence that a healthy amount of bias, particularly 
when it is motivational in nature, can be of positive value (e.g., Taylor & Brown, 1988; 
Zhang & Fishbach, 2010). Besides an appropriate amount of bias, the timing and 
direction of the bias are also crucial. For instance, prior research (e.g., Taylor & 
Gollwitzer, 1995) has found that, while people are motivated to be accurate in their 
evaluations at the deliberation stage of the pursuit to carefully evaluate the pros and cons 
of competing goals as well as their own capabilities, people become more biased in their 
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evaluations at the implementation stage, which helps them to better allocate effort and 
resources to facilitate the attainment of the chosen goal. Our research sheds light on the 
direction of beneficial biases after one initiates the pursuit: By altering the mental 
representation of specific progress levels in distinctive directions at different stages of 
goal pursuit, people can effectively motivate themselves and increase the likelihood of 
eventual goal attainment.  
Moreover, this benefit of biases can have important implications for social agents 
who try to motivate other people. Because the use of biased mental representation 
requires a certain degree of freedom in the representation, frequent feedback could limit 
the effectiveness of such operations. On the basis of our findings, one should be aware of 
both the benefits and costs of frequent progress feedback, and the question of how 
frequent the feedback should be depends on the relative value of the goal and the initial 
motivation level of the individual. For example, instead of providing frequent progress 
feedback to all individuals, our findings would suggest that for people who are motivated 
to pursue the goal, a certain level of ambiguity in progress feedback would facilitate their 
own self-regulation efforts and allow them to proactively use mental representations to 
help them attain the goal. In a similar vein, an interesting question is how people 
strategically balance between the use of precise information and self-regulatory 
instruments that require a certain degree of ambiguity. When precise feedback on goal 
progress is easily accessible, would people strategically forgo, avoid, or suppress such 
feedback so that they could employ their own self-regulatory tactics? How often, for 
example, would an everyday runner seek information on the distance covered or calories 
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burned from monitoring gadgets/devices, and would this frequency change as this person 
gets closer to the end point of the pursuit? Further investigations on these questions 
would be an interesting avenue for future research. 
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SECTION 3: FRIEND OR FOE? THE DYNAMICS OF 
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN GOAL PURSUIT 
 
Introduction 
All of us are pursuing important goals in our lives; the pursuit of goals such as a 
higher degree, better health, or other personal desires drives our consumption behaviors. 
For example, people purchase memberships in fitness programs to help them achieve a 
weight-loss goal, and participate in different kinds of loyalty programs to win rewards. 
Interestingly, we often are not alone in the pursuit of these goals. We may know a few 
friends who are also trying to lose weight, and we may have a few neighbors who are also 
trying to collect loyalty stamps at a nearby coffee shop to redeem for a free bag of coffee 
beans. How, then, do we see these people who are pursuing the same goal as us? Do we 
see them as partners and seek companionship from them, or conversely view them as 
competition and thus distance ourselves from them, even though the attainment of the 
goal is available for everyone (e.g., everyone can lose weight, and everyone can redeem 
for a free bag of coffee beans)? Consequently, how willing are we to share helpful tips to 
assist others in their pursuit? Does this pattern remain the same throughout the entire 
course of goal pursuit, or does it change at one point?  
These research questions are important for several reasons. From the consumers’ 
perspective, helping others in their pursuit could enhance one’s own confidence and 
 90 
motivation in his/her own pursuit. On a collective level, the sharing of helpful tips 
facilitates knowledge exchange and collective wisdom among those who are working on 
the same goal, leading to greater joint welfare. From the marketers’ perspective, 
consumers’ autonomous information-sharing behaviors can help to generate word-of-
mouth and serve as a free, yet credible, advertisement to further promote their products 
and services (Phelps, Lewis, and Mobilio 2004; Liu 2006). In addition, marketers have 
designed various programs for consumers to join force to pursue similar, individual goals 
together (e.g., Weight Watchers, AA, quit-smoking programs), under the assumption that 
these consumers would remain close to each other and facilitate others’ pursuit. 
Therefore, it is important for us to examine how consumers really perceive and interact 
with others who are pursuing the same goal. 
Specifically, this paper examines how people’s perceived closeness with others, 
who are in the same pursuit (i.e., pursuing the same goal and are in the same stage of 
pursuit), may change during the course of goal pursuit. We built on the research of the 
interpersonal relationships in self-regulation processes (e.g., Fitzsimons and Finkel 
2010), and propose that consumers either see others in the same pursuit as “friends” to 
seek companionship from them, or see them as “foes” and seek to reduce the remaining 
discrepancy more efficiently than others to reach the goal sooner; such shift of 
relationship has many behavioral consequences, including whether consumers share 
helpful, goal-related information with others. We also identified two factors that lead to 
this shift of closeness, including the stage consumers are in during their own pursuit 
(Huang and Zhang 2011), and consumers’ inherent zero-sum belief (Crocker and 
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Canevello 2008). 
We organize the remainder of the article as follows: We review research that 
leads to our prediction that people’s perceived closeness with others changes during the 
course of goal pursuit, as well as its implications on their information-sharing behaviors. 
We then test this hypothesis in one longitudinal field study, three experiments, and one 
qualitative field study. We conclude by addressing the theoretical contributions of these 
findings for understanding the dynamics of interpersonal relationships in goal pursuit, 
and the implications for managerial practices. 
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Chapter 14: Literature Review 
INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIPS IN SELF-REGULATION PROCESSES 
 Prior research has provided evidence on how interpersonal relationships can 
influence self-regulation processes (for review, see Fitzsimons and Finkel 2010). For 
instance, the mere presence of significant partners can make the related goals more 
accessible, and thus trigger the pursuit on a nonconscious level (Fitzsimons and Bargh 
2003). Interpersonal relationships can also deplete or bolster our resources for self-
regulation (Ackerman, Goldstein, Shapiro, and Bargh 2009; Knowles, Finkel, and 
Williams 2007), and provide social support to facilitate the pursuit (Uchino 2004). In 
addition, it has been found that people take active roles in managing their interpersonal 
relationships to ensure successful goal attainment. For example, people automatically 
bring to mind, and become closer to, others who can help them make further progress on 
the goal (i.e., instrumental others) when a goal is active (Fitzsimons and Shah 2008) and 
when significant progress has not been made on a goal (Fitzsimons and Fishbach 2010).  
While the majority of research on interpersonal relationships in self-regulation 
processes focuses on the impact of socially close others, such as one’s parents, a good 
friend, or a romantic partner, relatively little research has investigated the impact that the 
people who are in the same goal pursuit may have on each other. For one thing, seeing 
others pursue a goal would remind and activate the same goal in one’s association 
network, consequently leading one to initiate the same pursuit (i.e., Goal Contagion 
Effect by Aarts, Gollwitzer, and Hassin 2004). Interestingly, the extent of this contagion 
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effect is proportional to the perceived effort in others’ pursuits, such that the more effort 
others invest in the pursuit, the higher the accessibility of the goal and thus the more 
motivated one becomes in one’s own pursuit (Dik and Aarts 2007). In addition to 
initiating the pursuit, one can also vicariously complete the pursuit by observing others 
completing their goal pursuits (McCulloch, Fitzsimons, Chua, and Albarracín 2011).  
However, besides mimicking others’ goal pursuit processes, it is unclear how 
people actually perceive and interact with others who are in the same pursuit as 
themselves (i.e., pursuing the same goal and are in the same stage of pursuit). In 
particular, when everyone is trying to advance toward the same goal, and the attainment 
of the goal is available for everyone, do they see each other as friends, or foes? 
Consequently, do they share goal-related information to help others in their pursuit, or do 
they keep the helpful tips to themselves? 
OTHERS IN THE SAME PURSUIT – FRIEND OR FOE? 
Friend for companionship. When people pursue the same goal and are in the 
same stage of pursuit (e.g., aiming to lose 20 pounds of weight), they are striving for the 
same ultimate end-state (e.g., a fitter self), and such shared similarity could create a sense 
of companionship and draw them closer to each other (“we are in the same boat!”). 
Indeed, as suggested by prior literature, similarity between individuals leads to greater 
interpersonal attraction, trust, and understanding, and people tend to affiliate with others 
who share similar interests, have a similar social status, or are in a similar situation 
(Cohen and Zhou 1991; Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter 2003; Makela, Kalla, and Piekkari 
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2007; Schacter 1959). In addition, similarity can be a base for people to form 
psychological group/category in their minds, generating a strong sense of identification 
with similar others (Self-Categorization Theory, Williams and O’Reilly 1998; Monge and 
Contractor 2003). Therefore, people should feel similar and close to others in the same 
goal pursuit. 
When people feel close to and seek companionship from others who are pursuing 
the same goal, they should be more willing to help others in their pursuits. In deed, there 
is abundant evidence that people are more favorable and helpful toward similar others 
(e.g., Singh and Tan 1992; Byrne and Nelson 1964). For example, clerks approve a 
greater amount of loan to applicants who hold similar attitudes and values as them 
(Golightly, Huffman, and Byrne 1972), and people in general are more altruistic and 
willing to make a greater monetary investment to help socially close others (Rachlin and 
Jones 2008). Even when the sense of similarity is built on a less profound reason, such as 
having the same surname or wearing similar apparel, it can still lead to greater likelihood 
to help (Keasey and Keasey 1971; Guéguen, Pichot, and Dreff 2005).  
Such willingness to help others in the same pursuit can be displayed through 
various behaviors, including the sharing of helpful goal-related information (e.g., sharing 
dieting tips to others who are also trying to lose weight). That is, consumers who are 
working on the same goal and see each other as friends should be more willing to share 
goal-related information, to help each other in the pursuit. For instance, in the business-
to-business context, it has been found that companies are more likely to share knowledge 
when they have encountered similar problems in the past and have similar experiences 
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(Cohen and Levinthal 1990; Ounjian and Bryan 1987). Therefore, it is plausible to 
propose that consumers would see others in the same pursuit as friends to seek 
companionship from them, and such perceived closeness will also lead them to share 
more helpful, goal-related information with each other. 
 Foe to compete against. On the other hand, people could also see others in the 
same pursuit as competition, which results in distancing (vs. close companionship) from 
each other. As prior research shows, people conduct social comparisons as they encounter 
other people; that is, we view others as performance benchmarks that we would like to 
exceed (Festinger 1954). As a result, knowing that one is performing better or worse than 
others can lead to various distinctive effects on one’s emotions and motivation (Festinger 
1954; Blanton 2001; Buunk and Gibbons 2007). Such desire to compare exists in many 
species and has evolutionary value, because it serves as an adaptive mechanism for sizing 
up one’s competition (Gilbert, Price, and Allan 1995). 
Even though the desire to compare and compete could manifest in many domains 
of our lives and could be practiced on various targets, people do not compete to the same 
degree against everyone, in every domain. Specifically, Tesser’s (1988) Self-Evaluation 
Maintenance Model (SEM model) proposes that when the domain is self-relevant, people 
are more likely to compare and feel threatened by others’ performance. When one 
decides to pursue a goal, the domain of the pursuit should already be seen as self-relevant 
and important in one’s eyes; therefore, it is likely that one would intensely monitor and 
compare one’s progress against others’ progress during the pursuit of this important goal. 
In addition, because similar others provide a meaningful standard for self-evaluation 
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(Festinger 1954), prior literature has also suggested that people compare more with 
similar others under stress (Schachter 1959; Gerard and Rabbie 1961), such as in the 
work environment, in marriages, and in hospital settings (Buunk, Schaufeli, and Ybema 
1994; Bunk, VanYperen, Tayler, and Collins 1991; Kulik and Mahler 2000). Likewise, 
people tend to compare and compete with others who are expected to perform at about 
the same level as themselves (Goethals and Darley 1977; Wheeler and Zuckerman 1977). 
Based on these findings, we can derive that the “similar others” in the pursuit of an 
important goal would likely become the target of comparison and thus competition; 
specifically, because the people who are in the same situation would provide a 
meaningful standard for comparison, one should be more likely to compete with their 
peers who are in the same stage of the same pursuit, such that attaining the goal sooner 
than them becomes greatly enjoyable, and falling behind is threatening and painful. 
Because people could perceive others in the same stage of the pursuit of an 
important goal as competition, they should then be reluctant to help these peers make 
further progress on their goals, and thus will not share helpful goal-related information 
with each other. For instance, prior research has found that similarity between a help 
giver and a help seeker on an ego-central task -- which is likely to occur in the context of 
pursuing an important goal -- can pose a threat and thus inhibit helping behaviors (Nadler 
1987). Similarly, people give less improvement information to relationally close others 
(e.g., friends, rather than strangers), to prevent being outperformed by close others when 
future comparison opportunities arise (Pemberton and Sedikides 2001).  
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Therefore, while it is plausible to propose that people would view others who are 
pursuing the same goal and are in the same stage of pursuit as friends, to seek 
companionship from them and be willing to share goal-related information with them to 
further facilitate others’ pursuits, it is equally plausible to hypothesize the opposite; that 
is, people would perceive others in the same pursuit as foes, to distance themselves from 
and thus be reluctant to share goal-related information with them. 
A SWITCH FROM FRIENDS TO FOES – THE EXAMINATION OF TWO FACTORS 
Stage in goal pursuit. What, then, decides whether people see others in the same 
pursuit as friends or foes? We explored two factors in this paper: the stage in goal pursuit 
and one’s zero-sum belief. Based on the theory of dynamics of self-regulation (Fishbach, 
Zhang, and Koo 2009; Koo and Fishbach 2008) and the findings that people have 
different concerns as they progress from the initial stage to the advanced stage of goal 
pursuit (Huang and Zhang 2011; Huang, Zhang, and Broniarczyk 2012), we first theorize 
that how people view others in the same pursuit will depend on their current stage in the 
pursuit. That is, depending on whether people have just started to pursue a goal or have 
made substantial progress and are approaching the end point, they would either view 
others as companion or as competition. 
When people first begin to pursue a goal, they will be concerned about whether 
the goal is attainable and whether they should commit to this pursuit (Huang and Zhang 
2011; Huang, Zhang, and Broniarczyk 2012). As a result, in this early stage of goal 
pursuit, people are likely to derive motivation based on the expectation that they can 
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eventually attain the goal (Atkinson 1957; Bandura 1997; Liberman and Förster 2008; 
Lewin 1951; Locke and Latham 1990). One way for people to enhance the perceived 
attainability of the goal is to relate to other people who are also pursuing the same goal 
and are in the same stage of pursuit, because knowing that “we are in the same boat” can 
signal to oneself that the goal is indeed attainable for most people. As a result, in the 
initial stage of goal pursuit, one would view others in the same pursuit as “friends,” to 
seek companionship from them and to share goal-related information with them. For 
example, for a person who just joined the Weight Watchers program and is worried about 
whether he/she can lose 30 pounds to reach the goal weight, he/she will view other 
customers in the same stage of the program as companions, because this view would 
enhance one’s belief that losing 30 pounds is indeed possible for everyone in the 
program. As a result, one should feel close to the customers who are in the same pursuit, 
and be willing to share dieting tips with each other. 
However, once this person has lost a significant amount of weight and is 
approaching the goal weight, he/she will feel more certain that the goal is indeed 
attainable through one’s own, continued effort. That is, one no longer needs to draw 
support and companionship from others in the same pursuit. Instead, the focus in this 
advanced stage of pursuit is to reduce the remaining discrepancy efficiently to attain the 
goal in a timely manner (Huang and Zhang 2011; Huang, Zhang, and Broniarczyk 2012). 
Therefore, in this advanced stage of goal pursuit, people derive motivation from the 
estimate of the remaining discrepancy (Higgins 1987; Koo and Fishbach 2008; Locke and 
Latham 2002), and mobilize effort based on how much remains to be done to finally 
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attain the goal (Brehm and Self 1989; Wright and Kirby 2001). Such intense monitoring 
on one’s progress and the remaining discrepancy will lead one to intensely compare one’s 
progress against others’ progress, especially those who are in the same stage of pursuit, 
because these same-stage peers provide a meaningful standard for comparison. As a 
result, in the advanced stage of goal pursuit, one would be more likely to view others who 
are in the same pursuit as “foes,” to compare and compete against, and seek to make 
more progress and attain the goal sooner than them; consequently, they will be reluctant 
to share goal-related information to help others in their pursuit. For example, for a person 
who has lost a significant amount of weight in the Weight Watchers program and is now 
focusing on reaching one’s goal weight as soon as possible, he/she will view others in the 
same stage of the program as comparison benchmark and competition, and seek to lose 
more weight than them every week. As a result of such competition, one would feel more 
distant from other customers who are in the same pursuit, and be reluctant to share 
dieting tips to help others lose more weight. 
Zero-sum belief. Another important factor that determines this switch from 
friends to foes as one moves from the initial to the advanced stages of goal pursuit is 
one’s tendency to view goal pursuit as a competition (i.e., one’s inherent zero-sum 
belief). As discussed earlier, many goal pursuit situations are not zero-sum games, in the 
sense that everyone in the pursuit could eventually reach the end point and enjoy the 
reward; for example, everyone in the Weight Watchers program could lose 10 pounds of 
weight, and everyone in the frequent flyer program could earn enough points to redeem 
for a free flight – reaching the end point earlier than others does not provide extra reward. 
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Therefore, not every individual would see these joint goal pursuits as contests and seek to 
win when they reach the advanced stage of the pursuit.  
Specifically, based on the research on social comparisons, communal values, and 
zero-sum belief, we propose that the extent to which people view joint goal pursuits as 
competitions would decide whether the proposed dynamics (from friends to foes) 
manifest. For instance, recent research by Locke (2003) has found that communal values 
would magnify the positive effects of connective comparison (such as helpfulness and 
mood improvement), but not negative contrastive comparisons, and that people with high 
communal values would place less importance on vertical (either upward or downward) 
comparisons. Therefore, for the people who have a low zero-sum belief, they are more 
likely to view others in the same pursuit as friends and focus on the communal feelings, 
rather than treating them as comparison benchmarks, and thus would not become 
competitive against them as they reach the advanced stage of the pursuit.  
However, for the people with a high zero-sum belief, they would be more likely to 
make the hypothesized switch from being friends with same-pursuit peers early on, to 
becoming foes in the advanced stage of the pursuit – the switch happens when they no 
longer need to seek companionship to confirm the goal’s attainability, and begin to view 
the same-pursuit peers as comparison benchmarks and seek to “win” the alleged 
competition. Crocker and Canevello’s (2008) research provided support for this notion. 
They found that people could aim to be compassionate or aim to manage their self-image 
as they interact with others and build social networks over time; more importantly, it is 
those who strive to maintain their self-image (vs. be compassionate) that would focus on 
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their own needs and desires, and thus view social interactions as zero-sum games, such 
that someone’s gain always comes with the other person’s lose. That is, although the 
people with a high zero-sum belief would still draw others close as companions when 
they are uncertain about the goal’s attainability, they are likely to become distant and 
competitive against the same-pursuit peers once they reach the advanced stage of the 
pursuit and no longer need the supportive benefits; this is because the same-pursuit peers 
have become potential threats in this advanced stage of the pursuit, and attaining the goal 
later than them incurs a lose while faster attainment implies a gain. 
Five studies allowed us to monitor how people’s perceived closeness with others 
who were in the same pursuit changed throughout the course of pursuit, as well as how 
their information sharing behaviors evolved based on the two proposed factors. 
Specifically, Studies 1a and 1b tested our hypothesis in longitudinal academic goal 
contexts and demonstrated how people’s perceived closeness with others who were 
pursuing the same academic goal changed from initial stage to the advanced stage of goal 
pursuit, and how such relationship was different from other types of interpersonal 
relationships. In Study 2 we directly manipulated the stage of goal pursuit in the lab 
setting, and measured both people’s perceived closeness and their information-sharing 
behaviors as proxies for the shift of their relationship with others who were pursuing the 
same goal. Studies 3 and 4 incorporated the second factor of zero-sum belief; while Study 
3 tested the interactive impact of the two factors on perceived closeness, Study 4 tested 
this interactive impact on information-sharing behaviors. In addition, Study 4 directly 
examined the underlying mechanisms, i.e., drawing others closer to enhance the 
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perceived goal attainability, and distancing others to treat them as comparison benchmark 
and competition. Finally, Study 5 externally validated our hypothesized patterns through 
a real-world, large-scale qualitative field study with the Weight Watchers. 
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Chapter 15: Study 1a – The Shift of Closeness with Same-pursuit Peers 
vs. Significant Others  
In Study 1a, we tracked students’ perceived closeness with two groups of people: 
their peers in the same academic pursuit and significant others. This study employed a 
longitudinal academic goal pursuit context and lasted for six weeks, allowing us to 
capture the natural shifts of interpersonal relationships as the students make more 
progress toward their academic goal. We hypothesized that people’s perceived closeness 
with same-pursuit peers would naturally decrease (i.e., becoming more distant) as they 
progressed to the end-point of the pursuit, whereas their perceived closeness with 
significant others would not show the same negative trend, because significant others 
were not seen as competition as people reached the advanced stage of goal pursuit. 
METHOD 
A total of 19 undergraduate students from a southwestern university participated 
in this study for a coffee-shop gift card. This study used a Stage in the Pursuit (mid-
semester (week1) to the end-of-semester (week 6)) × Interpersonal Relationship (same-
pursuit peer vs. significant other) design; both the stage in the pursuit and the 
interpersonal relationship are measured as within-subject variables.  
The first part of the study was conducted in the lab around the middle of the 
semester. The cover story informed participants that the researchers were interested in 
learning more about their academic goal, academic life and relationships on campus. 
Participants were first asked to set their academic goal for this semester. The study was 
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conducted at the middle of the semester (i.e., six weeks before the end of the semester) 
instead of at the beginning of the semester, to ensure that the academic goal identified by 
the participants was realistic, because the participants would have a general idea as to 
how much they could achieve by the end of the semester. After participants set the 
academic goal, they were asked to report their progress on a scale from 0 to 100 and 
answered a few filler questions about this goal (e.g., “how important is it for you to do 
well at this school?”). 
All participants were then asked to identify a person they knew, who was 
pursuing a similar academic goal to theirs and was at a similar stage of progress. To make 
sure that this “same-pursuit peer” stayed concrete in their minds, participants were asked 
to type down this person’s name and provide a short description regarding this person 
(age, affiliation etc.). Participants were then asked to report their perceived closeness 
with this person on a 10-point scale (1 = not close at all, 10 = extremely close), embedded 
among others questions such as their similarity in attitudes and opinions regarding 
students’ benefits on campus. In addition, participants were asked to think of a person 
they knew, who was not pursuing the same academic goal but facilitated their 
achievement of their academic goal. To ensure that this “significant other” was concrete 
in participants’ minds, we asked them to type down this person’s name and the 
relationship between the participant and this significant other. Participants were then 
asked to report their perceived closeness with this significant other on a 10-point scale (1 
= not close at all, 10 = extremely close), embedded among others questions such as how 
long they have known this person.  
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After reporting these relationships, participants continued with other studies in the 
lab session, provided their email address, and then left the lab. Five follow-up surveys 
were emailed to the participants during the five following weeks, one survey per week, 
from the middle of the semester to the end of the semester. In each follow-up survey, 
participants were first reminded of the academic goal they set in the lab, and asked to 
report their current progress on this goal on the same scale from 0 to 100. They were then 
reminded of the same-stage peer they identified earlier (the name and the description they 
provided in the first survey), and then asked to report how close they were to this “same-
pursuit peer” at the present moment, on the same 10-point scale (1 = not close at all, 10 = 
extremely close). After a few filler items about their academic life, participants were 
reminded of the significant other they identified in the first survey (the name and the 
relationship), and then asked to report how close they were to this person at the present 
moment on the 10-point scale (1 = not close at all, 10 = extremely close). These follow-
up surveys allowed us to track the natural shifts in participants’ interpersonal 
relationships from the mid-point of their academic goal pursuit to the end of the pursuit. 
After participants completed all five follow-up surveys, they received the coffee-shop gift 
card at the end of the semester. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
As a manipulation check, we first conducted a repeated-measure ANOVA on the 
progress participants reported they have made on the academic goal during the six-week 
period, to ensure that participants indeed made more progress as they advanced from the 
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middle to the end of the semester. The analysis yielded a main effect of the stage in the 
pursuit, F(5, 90) = 4.71, p < .01, such that participants made more progress on the 
academic goal they set in the lab from week 1 to week 6 (Mweek1 = 62.0%, Mweek2 = 70.8%, 
Mweek3 = 76.3%, Mweek4 = 81.5%, Mweek5 = 78.7%, Mweek6 = 83.4%).  
We then conducted the repeated-measure ANOVA on participants’ perceived 
closeness with same-pursuit peers from week 1 to week 6. The analysis yielded a 
significant effect of the stage in the pursuit, F(5, 90) = 5.09, p < .01 (Mweek1 = 7.16, Mweek2 
= 6.37, Mweek3 = 6.00, Mweek4 = 5.42, Mweek5 = 5.58, Mweek6 = 5.26). The trend analysis 
confirmed that participants’ perceived closeness with same-pursuit peers showed a 
negative linear trend as they advanced from week 1 to week 6, F(1, 18) = 8.22, p = .01; 
that is, as participants made more progress on their academic goal, they became more and 
more distant from same-pursuit peers. We then conducted the same analysis on 
participants’ perceived closeness with significant others from week 1 to week 6. The 
effect of the stage in the pursuit was not significant, F(5, 90) = 1.05, ns (Mweek1 = 8.00, 
Mweek2 = 7.68, Mweek3 = 7.42, Mweek4 = 7.42, Mweek5 = 7.63, Mweek6 = 8.00). The trend analysis 
suggested that the participants’ perceived closeness with significant others followed a 
quadratic trend from week 1 to week 6, F(1, 18) = 5.68, p < .05, such that participants’ 
perceived closeness with significant others dropped slightly during the middle of the 
semester, but then picked up as they approached the end of their academic pursuit (see 
Figure 16). 
In this study, we found that people distanced themselves from others who were 
pursuing the same academic goal as they made more progress toward the end-point, 
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whereas their relationship with significant others remained close throughout the pursuit. 
To further establish that people indeed treat others who are pursuing the same goal 
differently (i.e., from being friends to foes), in the next study, we employed the same 
method to examine people’s perceived closeness with same-pursuit peers versus others 
who were pursuing a different academic goal. 
 
 108 
Chapter 16: Study 1b – The Shift of Closeness with Same-pursuit Peers 
vs. Different-pursuit Others 
In Study 1b, we tracked students’ perceived closeness with their peers in the same 
academic pursuit and a different group of people: similar others who were pursuing a 
different academic goal. This study employed the same 6-week academic goal pursuit 
context as in Study 1a. We hypothesized that people’s perceived closeness with same-
pursuit peers would naturally decrease (i.e., becoming more distant) as they progressed to 
the end-point of the pursuit, whereas their perceived closeness with a similar other who 
was pursuing a different academic goal would not show the same negative trend, because 
a different-pursuit other would not be seen as a competition as one reached the advanced 
stage of academic goal pursuit. 
METHOD 
A total of 26 undergraduate students from a southwestern university participated 
in this study for a coffee-shop gift card. This study used a Stage in the Pursuit (mid-
semester (week1) to the end-of-semester (week 6)) × Interpersonal Relationship (same-
pursuit peer vs. different-pursuit other) design; both the stage in the pursuit and the 
interpersonal relationship are measured as within-subject variables. 
We followed the procedures in Study 1a and asked participants to set their 
academic goal for the semester, identify a person who was pursuing a similar academic 
goal to theirs and was at a similar stage of progress, and report their perceived closeness 
with this same-pursuit peer on a 10-point scale (1 = not close at all, 10 = extremely 
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close). Different from Study 1a, instead of listing a significant other, the participants in 
this study were asked to then think of a person they knew, who was similar to them (they 
had a lot in common), but was currently studying at a different university; participants 
were also asked to type down the name and provide a description of this “different-
pursuit other.” They were then asked to report their perceived closeness with this 
different-pursuit other on a 10-point scale (1 = not close at all, 10 = extremely close), 
embedded among others questions such as how long they have known this person.  
Five follow-up surveys were emailed to the participants during the five following 
weeks, tracking their progress on the academic goal, and their perceived closeness with 
the same-stage peer as well as the different-pursuit other.  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Similar to Study 1a, the manipulation check on progress level again yielded a 
main effect of the stage in the pursuit, F(5, 125) = 6.98, p < .01, such that participants 
indeed made more progress on the academic goal they set in the lab from week 1 to week 
6 (Mweek1 = 67.6%, Mweek2 = 66.4%, Mweek3 = 73.9%, Mweek4 = 77.4%, Mweek5 = 78.1%, Mweek6 = 
84.4%,).  
We then conducted the repeated-measure ANOVA on participants’ perceived 
closeness with same-pursuit peers from week 1 to week 6. The analysis yielded a 
moderate effect of the stage in the pursuit, F(5, 125) = 2.09, p = .07 (Mweek1 = 7.46, Mweek2 
= 7.04, Mweek3 = 7.19, Mweek4 = 6.81, Mweek5 = 6.73, Mweek6 = 6.69). The trend analysis again 
showed a significant, negative linear trend, such that participants became more distant 
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from the same-pursuit peers as they advanced from week 1 to week 6, F(1, 25) = 4.68, p 
< .05. We then conducted the same analysis on participants’ perceived closeness with 
different-pursuit others from week 1 to week 6. The analysis yielded a significant effect 
of the stage in the pursuit, F(5, 120) = 4.96, p < .01  (Mweek1 = 5.76, Mweek2 = 6.76, Mweek3 = 
7.16, Mweek4 = 7.36, Mweek5 = 7.68, Mweek6 = 7.20). The trend analysis showed that the 
participants’ perceived closeness with different-pursuit others followed a positive linear 
trend, F(1, 24) = 13.64, p < .01, such that as participants accumulated more progress on 
their academic goal, they became closer to the others who were pursuing a different 
academic goal at a different university (see Figure 17). 
Consistent with Study 1a, we found that people distanced themselves from others 
who were pursuing the same academic goal as they made more progress toward the end-
point, whereas their relationship with others who were pursuing a different academic goal 
improved throughout time. That is, how we treat others who are pursuing the same goal 
as us displays a unique pattern – which is different from how we manage other types of 
interpersonal relationships like significant others or friends in different institutions – we 
tend to draw these same-pursuit peers closer in the initial stage of pursuit, but gradually 
push them away as the end-point gets near. 
While the results in this longitudinal study provided initial support for our 
hypothesis, we had a few concerns about the data. First of all, in this study we tracked 
participants’ perceived closeness with others from the middle of the semester to the end 
of the semester, and treated it as a whole goal pursuit process. However, it is likely that 
the trend analysis only captured the shifts of closeness from the mid-stage (rather than the 
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initial stage) to the advanced stage of goal pursuit, and thus did not capture the entirety of 
the pursuit. In addition, we asked participants to report their own progress on the 
academic goal; although the manipulation check ensured that participants indeed made 
more progress as weeks went by, we could not know if the participants were honest about 
the report of their progress in the survey. Therefore, in subsequent lab studies, we directly 
manipulated participants’ progress into either the initial stage or the advanced stage of 
goal pursuit, to see if the hypothesized pattern in perceived closeness still occur. In the 
next study, we also measured people’s information sharing behaviors (i.e., the sharing of 
helpful tips) as a reflection of the shifts in their perceived closeness (from friends to 
foes). 
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Chapter 17: Study 2 – Perceived Closeness and Information Sharing 
Behavior  
In Study 2, participants signed up for a lab survey session with a same-gender 
friend. We provided participants feedback of their own progress in the task (initial stage 
vs. advanced stage of pursuit), and manipulated whether their friend was in the same 
stage of the same pursuit or not (same-pursuit vs. control). Based on our hypothesis, 
when participants knew that their friend was pursuing the same goal and was in the same 
stage as themselves, they would view the friend either as a companion or a competition, 
depending on the stage they were in. We compared participants’ perceived closeness with 
their friends before and after the manipulation of the progress feedback to capture the 
shifts in their perceived closeness. We also measured participants’ information-sharing 
behavior as a reflection of such shift in relationship. 
METHOD 
A total of 160 undergraduate students from a southwestern university participated 
in this study for partial course credit. This study used a Stage in the Pursuit (initial vs. 
advanced) × Friend’s Pursuit (same-pursuit vs. control) between-subject design. In 
addition, we manipulated participants’ progress relative to their friends’ progress in the 
same-pursuit conditions (slightly ahead vs. slightly behind) to ensure that the proposed 
pattern would occur no matter who was winning at the moment, as long as the participant 
was in the same stage of pursuit as his/her friend.   
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Participants signed up for the session with a same-gender friend, and were asked 
to fill out a pre-session survey one week before the lab session. The pre-session survey 
asked participants to report their demographic information, as well as how close they 
were with their friend on 10-point scales (adopted from Berscheid, Snyder, and Omoto 
1989; Fitzsimons and Fishbach 2010; Schmitt, Silvia, and Branscombe 2000): “Relative 
to your other relationships, how close are you and XX (XX is the friend’s name),” “XX 
and I have many things in common,” “As a friend, I like XX,” “XX is someone I would 
like to have as a close friend,” and “I would like to meet and interact with XX more 
often.” We created a pre-session closeness score by averaging participants’ answers in 
these five questions (Cronbach's α = .97). 
On the day of the lab session, participants and their friends were led to two 
separate rooms. The cover story informed participants that some tasks in the session 
might require them to work remotely with their friend, and thus we have arranged for 
them to sit in different rooms and have remotely connected their computers (e.g., 1A in 
Room A) to their friends’ computers (e.g., 1B in Room B); since the studies would be 
randomly allocated to each computer station, the participants were also reminded that 
they may or may not encounter such tasks. The cover story was implemented to ensure 
the credibility of the progress feedback and the sitting arrangements.  
Participants then continued to read that the first study in the session was a “Verbal 
Creativity Task.” To enhance the perceived importance of the task, we told participants 
that the task would gauge their vocabulary skills and the capacity to seek out novel and 
creative solutions to verbal problems, which was a recently discovered skill by 
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psychologists and educators (Pemberton and Sedikides 2001). Specifically, in this task 
participants were asked to rearrange the letters of one word to make as many new words 
as they could (each word they created must be at least 3 letters long). Participants were 
told that they would earn points when they generated correct new words using the letters 
from the original word; the more letters they used from the original word and the more 
words they generated, the more points they would earn. If they reach 1,000 points at the 
end of the task, they would win a $10 cash reward. 
After the introduction, participants commenced to the task. After two sets of 
verbal creativity questions, participants were asked to wait as the computer analyzed their 
performance thus far. After two minutes, the computer provided different feedback to 
manipulate participants’ perceived stage in the pursuit of 1,000 points – half of the 
participants received feedback indicating that they were at the initial stage of pursuit 
(either 213 points or 216 points), whereas the other half of the participants were led to 
believe that they have reach advanced stage of pursuit (either 813 points or 816 points). 
For those in the “friends in same pursuit” condition, the computer then displayed the 
progress that the participant’s friend has made so far in the task. To enhance the 
credibility of the progress feedback, participants were asked to type down the name of 
their friend on the screen, as well as their own computer number so that the system could 
access the paired computer their friend was working on in the adjoining room. The 
computer then reported that their friends were in the same stage of pursuit as themselves, 
earning either 216/213 points (initial-stage conditions) or 816/813 points (advanced-stage 
conditions). To ensure that the relative performance (slightly ahead vs. slightly behind) 
 115 
would not influence the hypothesized pattern, we counterbalanced the manipulation of 
the scores, such that half of the participants in the initial-stage conditions would receive 
feedback of 216 points while their friend has earned 213 points (slightly ahead), and the 
other half of the participants in the initial-stage condition would receive feedback of 213 
points while their partner had 216 points (slightly behind); following the same procedure, 
we also counterbalanced the relative progress among the participants in the advanced-
stage conditions. In contrast, for the participants in the “friend’s pursuit control” 
condition, the computer did not display the progress or the task that the participants’ 
friends were working on in the session; therefore, these participants did not know 
whether their friends were pursuing the same goal or not, since there were several 
surveys/tasks included in the session.  
 After the manipulation of progress feedback, we asked participants to report how 
close they were with their friend on the same 10-point scales as in the pre-session survey. 
We created a post-session closeness score by averaging participants’ answers in these 
five questions (Cronbach's α = .97). Participants were then given an opportunity to assist 
their friends who were working (or may work) on the same task; specifically, participants 
could send “hints” to their friends about the words that could be generated from the 
original words they have worked on thus far – a “hint” should not include the new word 
itself and could only be “clues,” such as “the number after 9” or “a type of metal.” Since 
the computers in the adjoining room displayed the verbal creativity questions in the 
opposite order, we ensured participants that the hints they provided would be valuable to 
help their friends earn more points, even if they were already working on this task. We 
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then measured the time participants spent on providing tips for their friends, as well as 
the length of the hints, as a reflection of their relationship with the friend at the moment. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Perceived closeness. We first calculated the shift in participants’ perceived 
closeness with their friend by deducting the pre-session closeness score from the post-
session closeness score; a positive score would suggest an increase in closeness, whereas 
a negative score suggests distancing. The ANOVA of the shift of closeness score on the 
stage in the pursuit (initial vs. advanced), friend’s pursuit (same-pursuit vs. control), 
relative progress (slightly ahead vs. slightly behind), and all their interaction terms 
yielded the hypothesized Stage in the Pursuit × Friend’s Pursuit interaction, F(1, 152) = 
6.53, p = .01. There was no other effect in this analysis, suggesting that the relative 
progress between the participant and their friend (i.e., whether the participant was slightly 
ahead or behind) did not influence the perceived closeness. Further contrast analyses 
showed that, among the participants at the initial stages of goal pursuit, those who knew 
that their friends were in the same stage of the same pursuit felt closer to their partners 
(M = .56) than those who did not know about their friends’ pursuit (M = .20), t(69) = - 
1.86, p = .067. In contrast, this pattern reversed among the participants who were in the 
advanced stages of goal pursuit, such that the participants who knew that their friends 
were in the same stage of the same pursuit felt more distant from them (M = - .05) than 
those who were not informed of their friend’s pursuit (M = .40), t(87) = 1.96, p = .05 (see 
Figure 18). 
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Information-sharing behavior. We then conducted the same analyses on 
participants’ information-sharing behavior, including the time they spent on providing 
helpful tips for their friends and the length of the tips. The ANOVA of the time 
participants spent on sharing tips yielded the hypothesized Stage in the Pursuit × Friend’s 
Pursuit interaction, F(1, 152) = 8.56, p < .01. There is no other effect in this analysis. 
Further contrast analyses showed that, among the participants at the initial stages of goal 
pursuit, those who knew that their friends were in the same stage of the same pursuit 
spent slightly more time developing tips (M = 115.99 seconds) than those in the control 
condition (M = 93.13 seconds), t(69) = - 1.01, p = .32. In contrast, among the participants 
who were in the advanced stages of goal pursuit, those who knew that their friends were 
in the same stage of the same pursuit spent less time developing tips (M = 86.71 seconds) 
than those in the control condition (M = 153.74 seconds), t(87) = 3.20, p < .01 (see 
Figure 19).  
Consistently, the ANOVA of the length of the tips also yielded the Stage in the 
Pursuit × Friend’s Progress interaction, F(1, 152) = 8.43, p < .01. There is no other effect 
in this analysis. Further contrast analyses showed that, among the participants in the 
initial stages of goal pursuit, those who knew that their friends were in the same pursuit 
as themselves provided more helpful tips (M = 46.86 words) than those in the control 
condition (M = 31.40 words), t(69) = - 1.44, p = .15. In contrast, among the participants 
who were in the advanced stages of goal pursuit, those who knew that their friends were 
in the same stage of the same pursuit provided less helpful tips (M = 33.74 words) than 
those who were not informed of their friend’s pursuit (M = 69.35 words), t(87) = 2.71, p 
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< .01 (see Figure 20).  
The results in this study showed that, when pursuing the same goal as their 
friends, participants became closer to their friends when they just started the pursuit, but 
became distant from their friends as they moved closer to the end point, even though the 
reward was available for everyone to attain. Such shift of relationship from friends to 
foes also manifested through their information sharing behaviors, such that people spent 
less effort sharing tips to their same-pursuit peers as they reached the advanced stage of 
the pursuit; in comparison, they were more willing to help when their friends were not 
pursuing the same goals as themselves. 
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Chapter 18: Study 3 – The Zero-sum Belief 
Study 3 served two important purposes. First of all, an alternative explanation for 
the patterns observed in the prior study is anticipated reciprocation/retaliation; that is, 
people could anticipate that by sharing information with others in the same pursuit, others 
would also share information to help them, or reciprocate the favor through other ways in 
the future; conversely, if they do not offer to help, others would retaliate against them in 
the future. To rule out this alternative explanation and show that our hypothesized pattern 
influences people’s interactive behaviors above and beyond the expectation of 
reciprocation/retaliation, in this study we paired participants with a partner using random 
selection, and ensured that the pairs did not know each other. In addition, we set up the 
computer system such that participants could send messages to help their assigned 
partners, but could not receive any message in return. This set-up allowed us to fully 
attribute the information-sharing behaviors observed in the lab to participants’ own 
willingness to help, rather than expectation of reciprocation/retaliation in the future.  
Secondly, because the people who held a strong zero-sum belief would be more 
likely to see others pursuing the same goal as competition when they reach the advanced 
stage of goal pursuit (i.e., their success depended on others’ failure, even when the goal 
was available for everyone to attain), we expect the hypothesized pattern to manifest only 
among those with a strong zero-sum belief. Therefore, we measured participants’ zero-
sum belief at the end of the study, and incorporated this moderator into our analyses.  
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METHOD 
A total of 129 undergraduate students from a southwestern university participated 
in this study for partial course credit. This study used a Stage in the Pursuit (initial vs. 
advanced) × Zero-sum Belief mixed design; the zero-sum belief was measured as an 
individual difference factor.  
At the beginning of the session, participants were informed that they would be 
paired with a student who was participating in the study in the adjoining room, because 
some tasks may require them to remotely communicate with each other. Participants then 
followed instructions to enter their demographic information into the pairing program, 
including their gender, major, age, and preferred leisure activities. They then waited for 
the computer to assign a partner for them. After 15 seconds, all participants read that they 
were now paired with a participant in the adjoining room, and a short profile of this 
assigned partner was displayed on the screen for their information. The profile was 
manipulated such that each participant was paired with someone with the same gender 
and the same major, but different preferences for leisure activities to enhance the 
credibility of the profile. Following the procedure in the prior study, a short survey then 
popped up and asked participants to report how close they felt they were with this partner 
on five 10-point scales, such as “I feel that my assigned partner and I have many things in 
common,” “As a friend, I think I will like my assigned partner,” “my assigned partner is 
someone I can see myself being closer to.” We created a pre-pursuit closeness score by 
averaging participants’ answers in these questions (Cronbach's α = .94). 
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After the pairing process, participants commenced the session and went through 
two filler studies. They then entered the main task – an online shopping study. 
Participants were invited to visit some shopping website, and for each site, they would 
view the products and online prices, and select the ones they considered “good online 
deals” based on their knowledge of the retail price of these products. Participants were 
told that the more good online deals they identified (i.e., the cheaper the online products 
were, comparing to their current price in the retail store), the more points they would 
earn. If they could earn 500 points at the end of the shopping task, they would have saved 
$500 virtual dollars through identifying good deals online, and thus would win a $30 
Amazon gift card as reward. The reward was guaranteed for everyone who could earn 
500 points by the end of this task. 
Participants viewed two online shopping websites, one for furniture and the other 
for electronics. We selected products that students were familiar with, but would not shop 
on a regular basis (such as designer sofas and home theater sound systems), so that they 
would remain uncertain about their performance; this design allowed us to convincingly 
manipulate participants’ current stage in the pursuit through providing different progress 
feedback. Specifically, we manipulated participants’ progress while keeping their 
invested effort constant across the two stage-in-the-pursuit conditions: all participants 
saw a progress bar with 500 points anchoring on the right-end of the bar, and while the 
participants in the initial-stage condition had about 1/5 of the bar filled (equal to about 
100 points), the participants in the advanced-stage condition had about 4/5 of the bar 
filled (equal to about 400 points) after completing these two shopping sites. The screen 
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also displayed their partner’s current score, either 100 points (initial-stage condition) or 
400 points (advanced-stage condition), so that participants knew that their partner was 
pursuing the same goal and was in about the same stage of pursuit as themselves. 
Because we displayed participants’ own progress through the progress bar, but provided 
the partner’s progress information using the actual score, we could ensure that the 
participants did not become suspicious about having the same exact score as their partner 
(and yet believed that their partners was in the same stage of pursuit). After the progress 
feedback, the same five 10-point closeness scales popped up to gauge participants’ 
perceived closeness with their assigned partner at the moment. We created a post-pursuit 
closeness score by averaging participants’ answers in these questions (Cronbach's α = 
.96). 
After the progress report, participant continued to complete the task. Participants 
then answered a few filler surveys, one of which gauged their zero-sum belief (adopted 
from Crocker and Canevello 2008). Specifically, participants were asked to indicate how 
much they agreed with statements such as “In order to succeed in this world, it is 
sometimes necessary to step on others along the way” and “My successes don’t mean 
much if most other people succeed at the same task,” on 10-point scales (1 = Strongly 
disagree, 10 = Strongly agree). All participants were entered into a lottery for the reward. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Stage in the pursuit. We first calculated the shift in participants’ perceived 
closeness with their assigned partner by deducting the pre-pursuit closeness score from 
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the post-pursuit closeness score; a positive score would suggest an increase in closeness, 
whereas a negative score suggests distancing. We then conducted t-test analyses on the 
pre-pursuit closeness score, post-pursuit closeness score, and the shift of closeness, 
respectively, using the stage in the pursuit (initial vs. advanced) as the predictor. The 
analysis showed that while there was no significant difference in the pre-pursuit closeness 
score (Minitial = 6.76 vs. Madvanced = 6.61), t(127) = .55, ns, people felt less close with their 
partners when they had reached the advanced stage (M = 5.59) than the initial stage (M = 
6.18) of the pursuit, t(127) = 2.11, p < .05; that is, there was a strong distancing effect 
among those who were in the advanced stage (shift of closeness score: M = - 1.02) than 
the initial stage (M = - .58) of the pursuit, t(127) = 2.47, p = .015.  
Zero-sum belief. Based on our hypothesis, we expected the competitiveness to 
exist among those with a strong zero-sum belief because, even though every participant 
could have earned the gift card, the people with a strong zero-sum belief would be more 
likely to view the task as a zero-sum game, and became competitive against their partners 
as they reached the advanced stage of the pursuit. Therefore, we conducted a regression 
analysis on the shift of closeness score using two predictors, the stage in the pursuit 
(initial vs. advanced), zero-sum belief, as well as their interaction. This analysis yielded a 
main effect of the stage in the pursuit, β = - .22, t(125) = - 2.48, p < .05, indicating that 
people became more distant from their partners when they were in the advanced stage 
than the initial stage of goal pursuit, and a main effect of the zero-sum belief, such that 
the people who held a stronger zero-sum belief felt more distant from their partners, β = - 
.14, t(125) = - 2.34, p < .05. More importantly, this analysis yielded a moderate Stage in 
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the Pursuit × Zero-sum Belief interaction, β = - .09, t(125) = - 1.43, p = .16. Following 
the spotlight analysis procedures (Irwin and McClelland 2001), we explored the impact 
of stage in the pursuit on the shift of closeness score depending on the zero-sum belief. 
For participants with a strong zero-sum belief (one standard deviation above the mean), 
they were significantly more distant from their partners when they reached the advanced 
stage of the pursuit (M = - 1.34) than in the initial stage of the pursuit (M = - .66), β = - 
.34, t(125) = - 2.76, p < .01. However, for individuals with a weak zero-sum belief (one 
standard deviation below the mean), stage in the pursuit did not affect their feeling of 
closeness, β = - .09, t(125) = - .74, ns. We graphed Figure 21 based on the spotlight 
analysis (1 S.D. above versus below the mean). 
The results in this study showed that, while there was a general pattern that people 
became more distant from others pursuing the same goal as they moved closer to the end-
point, such shift of relationship from friends to foes manifested only when people held a 
strong zero-sum belief, because they were more likely to view the attainment of the goal 
as a competition. In the next study, we directly measured the underlying mechanisms of 
goal attainability, comparison and competitiveness that led to the observed shift in 
perceived closeness. 
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Chapter 19: Study 4 – Underlying Mechanisms  
Study 4 served several important purposes. First of all, we adopted the procedure 
in Study 3 to rule out the alternative explanation of expected reciprocity. In addition, we 
directly manipulated participants’ invested effort when manipulating their current stage 
of goal pursuit, such that those in the initial-stage condition invested less effort than those 
in the advanced-stage condition, to mimic real-life goal pursuit processes. This 
manipulation helped to rule out perceived difficulty of the task, velocity, or perceived 
ability as alternative factors that led to the observed pattern. 
More importantly, we directly measured the proposed mechanisms in this study, 
and tested whether people indeed had different concerns in different stages of goal 
pursuit, and thus sought companionship from others to confirm that the goal was 
attainable when they were in the initial stage of goal pursuit, but conversely treated others 
as comparison benchmark and competition when they have reached the advanced stage of 
the pursuit.  
METHOD 
A total of 113 undergraduate students from a southwestern university participated 
in this study for partial course credit. This study used a Stage in the Pursuit (initial vs. 
advanced) × Zero-sum Belief mixed design; the zero-sum belief was measured as an 
individual difference factor. Similar to the prior study, we expected the hypothesized 
pattern in participants’ information-sharing behaviors to intensify among those with a 
stronger zero-sum belief, because these people were more likely to view others in the 
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same advanced stage of the pursuit as competition, and would aim to attain the goal 
sooner than others.  
At the beginning of the session, participants were informed that they would be 
paired with a student who was taking the study in the adjoining room, because some tasks 
may require them to remotely communicate with each other. Following prior procedures, 
participants were told that their computer stations were designated as “the transmitter,” 
while the corresponding computer their paired partner would use in the adjoining room 
was “the receiver.” That is, when the opportunity to interact occurred, they would be able 
to send messages to their paired partner, but their partner would not be able to send 
messages back to the participants’ stations. 
 Participants then began the first task in the session, and were asked to view and 
memorize calorie and fat information of different food items. Participants were told that 
they would view 5-7 food items on each page, and could spend as much time as they 
liked to memorize the nutrition information for each item on that page, before clicking 
“Continue” to enter the question section. In the question section, they would be asked to 
type down the calorie and fat information of the food items they saw earlier, and they 
would earn points based on how close their answers were to the accurate number. If they 
could reach 100 points at the end of the task, they would win a $30 Amazon gift card. 
Participants then commenced the task. For those in the initial-stage condition, 
they answered three pages of food-item questions, and saw a progress bar indicating that 
they were halfway through Stage 2, out of a total of five stages (the end of Stage 5 
represented 100 points). In other words, participants have earned about 30 points thus far. 
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In contrast, participants in the advanced-stage condition went through 7 pages of food-
item questions, and the progress bar showed that they were halfway through Stage 4, out 
of a total of five stages. That is, they have earned about 70 points. Different from prior 
studies, in which we manipulated participants’ current stage of goal pursuit while keeping 
their invested effort constant between the initial-stage and the advanced-stage conditions, 
in this study we let participants actually spent different amount of effort to reach the 
initial or the advanced stage of goal pursuit, therefore ensuring that the perceived 
difficulty of the task, velocity of progressing, and perceived ability remained constant 
between the two conditions. 
The computer screen then displayed the progress that participants’ paired partner 
has made so far in the task. The progress bar showed that the participants’ paired partner 
was in the same sage of pursuit as themselves (i.e., for participants in the initial-stage 
condition, they saw that their partner was also about halfway through Stage 2). By using 
the progress bar, we were able to ensure that participants viewed themselves to be in the 
same stage of pursuit as their partners, without having to provide specific number-based 
feedback. 
We then asked participants to report their current feelings about the task. 
Specifically, to gauge participants’ perceived goal attainability, we asked them to report 
how difficult they thought it was to earn 100 points for the prize on 10-point scale (1 = 
not difficult at all, 10 = very difficult to attain). To gauge whether participants compared 
their progress against their partner’s progress and viewed them as comparison 
benchmarks, we asked participants to report whether they viewed their assigned partner 
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more like a partner who was facing the same challenges as themselves, or more like a 
comparison benchmark that provided information about how well they were doing (1 = 
more like a partner, 10 = more like a comparison benchmark). In addition, we asked 
participants whether they felt cooperative or competitive with their paired partner (1 = 
cooperative, 10 = competitive). These mechanism questions were inserted among filler 
items to disguise the true purpose of the questions. 
After receiving progress feedback and reporting their current feelings, participants 
were given an opportunity to assist their paired partner who was working on the same 
task in the adjoining room. Specifically, the computer displayed all the answers the 
participants have provided thus far, as well as the error rate (in percentages) alongside 
each answer (i.e., the absolute value of the difference between participant’s answer and 
the accurate number, divided by the accurate number). Participants could then simply 
check the answers they wanted to submit to their paired partner, to provide “reference 
values” for their partner as they encountered these questions. This procedure allowed us 
to measure how willing participants were in helping their paired partner earn more points, 
because we were able to capture the quality of the shared tips – if participants shared a lot 
of wrong answers to their partner, it would indicate that they viewed the partner more like 
a “foe” than a “friend,” and distanced themselves from the partner instead of seeking 
companionship from them. 
After the opportunity to share their answers with the paired partner, participants 
continued to complete the task. Upon completion, they answered a few filler surveys, one 
of which gauged their zero-sum belief through the same 10-point scales (1 = Strongly 
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disagree, 10 = Strongly agree) used in Study 3. All participants were entered into a lottery 
for the reward. 
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
Stage in the pursuit and zero-sum belief. Following the procedures in the prior 
study, we conducted a regression analysis on the error rate of the shared tips using two 
predictors, the stage in the pursuit (initial vs. advanced), zero-sum belief, as well as their 
interaction. This analysis yielded a moderate main effect of the stage in the pursuit, β = 
.97, t(109) = 1.84, p = .07, suggesting that people shared tips with moderately higher 
error rate to their partners when they were in the advanced stage than the initial stage of 
goal pursuit. More importantly, this analysis yielded a significant Stage in the Pursuit × 
Zero-sum Belief interaction, β = - 1.06, t(109) = - 2.70, p < .01. Following the spotlight 
analysis procedures (Irwin and McClelland 2001), we explored the impact of the stage in 
the pursuit on the error rate depending on the zero-sum belief. For participants with a 
strong zero-sum belief (one standard deviation above the mean), they shared significantly 
worse tips (i.e., higher error rate) when they reached the advanced stage of the pursuit (M 
= 468.37% error rate) than in the initial stage (M = - 14.31% error rate), β = 2.41, t(109) 
= 3.21, p < .01. However, for individuals with a weak zero-sum belief (one standard 
deviation below the mean), the stage in the pursuit did not affect the quality of the tips 
they shared, β = - .47, t(109) = - .62, ns. We graphed Figure 22 based on the spotlight 
analysis (1 S.D. above versus below the mean). 
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Underlying mechanisms. Based on our hypothesis, people seek companionship 
in the initial stage of goal pursuit to enhance the belief that the goal is indeed attainable, 
and conversely treat others as comparison benchmarks and compete against them when 
they reach the advanced stage of the pursuit.  
To test these mechanisms, we first conducted a regression analysis on the error 
rate of the shared tips using two predictors, the stage in the pursuit (initial vs. advanced), 
perceived goal attainability, as well as their interaction. This analysis yielded a main 
effect of the perceived goal attainability, β = - .61, t(109) = - 2.15, p < .05, suggesting 
that the more difficult it was for the participants to attain the goal, the better the quality of 
the tips they were willing to share with their assigned partners. Although the Stage in the 
Pursuit × Goal Attainability interaction was not significant, β = .20, t(109) = .72, ns, we 
followed the a-priori hypothesis and conducted two regression analyses to explore the 
impact of perceived goal attainability on the error rate at the initial stage and the 
advanced stage of the pursuit, respectively. We found that for the participants in the 
initial stage of the pursuit, the perceived difficulty of goal attainment negatively predicted 
the error rate of the tip, β = - .81, t(54) = - 3.05, p < .01, such that the more difficult it 
was to attain the goal, the better the tips they were willing to share with assigned partners. 
However, for individuals in the advanced stage of goal pursuit, the perceived goal 
attainability did not affect the quality of the tips they shared, β = - .40, t(55) = - .85, ns. 
We then conducted similar analyses on the mechanism of viewing others as 
comparison benchmarks. First of all, the regression analysis on the error rate of the 
shared tips using two predictors, the stage in the pursuit, comparison benchmark, as well 
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as their interaction, showed the hypothesized Stage in the Pursuit × Comparison 
Benchmark interaction, β = .58, t(109) = 2.86, p < .01; there were no other effects in this 
analysis. The two follow-up regression analyses revealed that, for the participants in the 
advanced stage of the pursuit, the extent to which they viewed assigned partners as 
comparison benchmarks positively predicted the error rate of the tip, β = .91, t(55) = 
2.85, p < .01, such that the more they viewed the assigned partners as comparison 
benchmarks, the worse the tips they shared. However, for individuals in the initial stage 
of goal pursuit, the feeling of comparison benchmark did not affect the quality of the tips 
they shared, β = - .25, t(54) = - 1.16, ns. 
Lastly, we conducted the same analyses on the mechanism of competitiveness. 
The regression analysis on the error rate of the shared tips using two predictors, the stage 
in the pursuit, competitiveness, as well as their interaction, first yielded a main effect of 
the competitiveness, β = .51, t(109) = 2.09, p < .05, suggesting that the more competitive 
participants felt, the worse the quality of the tips they shared with their assigned partners. 
More importantly, this main effect was qualified by the hypothesized Stage in the Pursuit 
× Competitiveness interaction, β = .61, t(109) = 2.48, p < .05. The two follow-up 
regression analyses revealed that, for the participants in the advanced stage of the pursuit, 
the extent to which they viewed assigned partners as competition positively predicted the 
error rate of the tip, β = 1.12, t(55) = 2.93, p < .01, such that the more they viewed the 
assigned partners as competition, the worse the tips they shared. However, for those in 
the initial stage of goal pursuit, the perceived competitiveness did not affect the quality of 
the tips they shared, β = - .09, t(54) = - .36, ns. 
 132 
These analyses confirmed that while the perceived difficulty in attaining the goal 
drove people’s information sharing behavior in the initial stage of the pursuit, it was the 
extent to which people viewed others as comparison benchmarks and the perceived 
competitiveness that decided their information sharing behaviors in the advanced stage of 
goal pursuit. 
In the last study, we returned to the real world and aimed to validate our empirical 
findings – both on the shifting of closeness and the information sharing behaviors – 
through a qualitative dataset collected from a joint global weight-loss program, the 
Weight Watchers. 
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Chapter 20: Study 5 – A Real-world Validation with Weight Watchers  
Study 5 represents a qualitative field validation of perceived closeness in goal 
pursuit in the context of Weight Watchers, the world’s largest and best-known 
commercial weight loss organization (e.g., Heyes 2006; Stinson 2001). According to the 
company information, approximately 1.3 million customers worldwide attend over 
45,000 Weight Watchers meetings led by 12,000 leaders, and in 2011 alone, consumers 
spent almost $5 billion on Weight Watchers branded products and services 
(www.weightwatchersinternational.com). For a weekly fee, Weight Watchers customers 
purchase membership in a weight loss program, the key differentiating features of which 
are tracking daily food points and attending weekly group meetings.  
Weight Watchers represents a well-suited marketing context to validate our 
empirical findings on the shift of perceived closeness and information sharing behaviors 
in joint goal pursuit processes for several reasons: 1) all customers, who are mostly 
strangers before the program, are engaged in the pursuit of the same goal—achieving 
weight loss; 2) meetings are designed to encourage interactions and relationships among 
members in the form of active information sharing and development of companionship; 
3) meetings also encourage public sharing of weight loss progress of each member, 
allowing progress monitoring and competition; 4) typically, members pursue their weight 
loss goals over a sufficient period of time to allow observation of how the relationship 
dynamics evolve in the initial versus advanced stage of goal pursuit. 
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METHOD 
 As our purpose was to gauge how Weight Watchers members perceived each 
other (as a friend or a foe) and whether these perceptions affected their information 
sharing behaviors depending on the stage of weight loss pursuit, we used a set of 
qualitative data collected and published at the Journal of Consumer Research (Moisio and 
Beruchashvili 2010), which included both long interviews (51 participants in three 
different Weight Watchers meeting locations; see Appendix A for the informants’ profile 
table) as well as observations (across 143 meetings) from Weight Watchers in a 
Midwestern city. Please refer to Moisio and Beruchashvili (2010) regarding the details of 
the interview scheme and observation procedures.  
  In the data analysis, we adopted an extended-case method approach (Burawoy 
1998), in which data coding was guided by constant oscillation between our hypothesis 
and data. The verbatim-transcribed data were entered into the qualitative data analysis 
software NVivo, and then we followed analytic procedures recommended for qualitative 
data analysis (Spiggle 1994). We created a coding scheme (please see Appendix B) based 
on our hypothesis. During the coding process, we looked for instances reflective of 
interpersonal relationships, perceived closeness, information sharing behaviors, and how 
these varied depending on the stage of weight loss. We repeated this process several 
times to achieve data reduction and to arrive at the final pool of the findings.  
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RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
We operationalized the stage in goal pursuit based on the percentage of weight-
loss progress made at the time of interview/observation relative to one’s goal weight; 
those who have achieved less than or equal to 50% of their goal weight were categorized 
as in their initial stage of the pursuit, whereas those who have achieved more than 50% of 
their goal weight were categorized as in the advanced stage of the pursuit. Below, we 
reported our findings in each stage of goal pursuit, respectively.  
“We’re all in the same boat:” Companionship and information sharing in the 
initial stage of goal pursuit. The informants experienced pursuit of weight loss as a 
difficult goal to accomplish, and the most challenging part was adhering to Weight 
Watchers dietary regimen. Staying within Weight Watchers daily points was especially 
strenuous at the beginning, when members were struggling to learn about the program 
and how it works. Therefore, Weight Watchers group meetings emerged as a valuable 
company of the “like-minded others” (e.g., Muñiz and O'Guinn 2001) who were all 
struggling for the attainment of the same goal and were willing to lend a helping hand: 
You know the meetings really, put forth good support, a good support system, 
because everybody, you know, everybody that goes there is trying to lose weight 
and they all have the same ups and downs, and the same trials and tribulations that 
I have. We’re all struggling for the same thing. So it’s really nice to go there and 
get that support … gives you the feeling that you’re not alone, that we’re all in the 
same boat … Not that my husband or children don’t support me, but they’re not 
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on diet, so they, maybe, don’t always wanna listen to me, but these people 
[Weight Watchers] know what I’m going through. (Julie) 
This informant, Julie, who has lost 25 out of the goal 50 pounds and who has joined 
Weight Watchers the second time almost eight months ago, appreciated being surrounded 
by the fellow Weight Watchers in the meeting. She emphasized that “being in the same 
boat” with people who were undergoing the same dietary “trials and tribulations” 
provided a sense of support different from the support of her family. Other informants 
concurred with the view expressed by Julie that the pursuit of the same goal as a 
collectivity unfolds in the spirit of building companionship. Everyone in the group 
meetings renders psychological support to one another, as members feel united by 
similarities of their weight loss experiences. 
 The companionship that Julie finds so supportive was also crucial for the 
perception of goal attainability. As already mentioned, informants believed that weight 
loss was a difficult goal to achieve, fraught with challenges such as dietary lapses. These 
experiences often tainted members’ belief in the possibility of attaining the goal, and 
being surrounded by the like-minded Weight Watchers helped alleviate the doubt: 
When I first joined, I went into that meeting, and there were all sorts of people … 
people from all walks of life … some were bigger than me, and some were like, 
why are you here, you know? … when you been tryin’ to lose [weight] your 
whole life like me … [in the meeting] I thought, ‘I can do this too,’ I mean, there 
were all this people, and if they think they can lose hundred pounds, sure I can 
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lose my 25! I just felt very motivated, and it kinda took my doubt away, ‘cause 
you know, I’ve been on and off diets as long as I remember. (Brenda)     
Brenda was the informant who believed she was a “chronic dieter.” She has had multiple 
unsuccessful attempts at weight loss prior to joining Weight Watchers. Brenda felt 
motivated to pursue her goal, encouraged by the sight of other striving Weight Watchers. 
Brenda further elaborated in the interview that fellow Weight Watchers and the group 
leader assured her of the attainability of the goal: “She [group leader] said, ‘you’re here, 
we all, we gonna help you, we gonna do this together,’ I thought that was very neat” 
(Brenda). This assurance that the group members served as companions to get each other 
to the goal was echoed across other informants as well. In our observations of group 
meetings, we heard on more than one occasion that the attendees of the meetings are “in 
it” and will get to the goal together.  
Companionship was clearly manifested during the times of dietary challenges. 
One of the informants, Anna, who wanted to lose at least 50 pounds to ease health issues 
and was relatively new to Weight Watchers, explained: 
Meetings put out good camaraderie … I feel like they’re my friends, because 
they’re there when I need them, and you know, we visit with each other before the 
meeting, and you know, especially the ones who’re like me, just starting, really 
struggling, we even seat together, and we commiserate with each other, and I tell 
them about my week, they say, ‘oh, my week was worse,’ and you go, okay, 
maybe my week was not as bad, so we kinda dust each other off, and we, this, it’s 
good camaraderie. (Anna) 
 138 
Anna felt “good camaraderie” with fellow Weight Watchers especially those who still 
had a lot of weight to lose. She has been on the program for about 3 months and she still 
struggled with sporadic losses and gains. According to Anna, members “commiserate” 
with one another about their dietary mishaps, which she found encouraging. Anna 
referred to her fellow members as “friends,” and they all work together to “dust each 
other off” and keep pursuing their goals.  
The companionship that manifested itself at the group meetings seemed to be 
especially reinforced by information sharing. Meetings, in general, represented the forum 
for voluntary information sharing, which was emphasized by the Weight Watchers 
organization itself (through group leaders). An excerpt from one of the meeting 
observations provided an example: 
The leader addressed the group by asking if anyone had anything to share. A 
female sitting in the second row to the front of the room stood up and introduced 
herself to the group: “Hi guys, I’m Emily [pseudonym], joined four weeks ago … 
just wanted to share … you know, how we think Skinny Cow ice-cream is 2 
points per serving, right? … I did calculate, and with sugar, it actually comes out 
close to 3 points a serving … just wanted to put it out there … I’m trying to figure 
this thing out, like we all do, and people have been helpful, so I wanna do my 
bit.” Emily sat down and the leader thanked her for sharing this very important 
information because Skinny Cow was one of the favorite desserts there; the leader 
suggested that those interested should talk to Emily after the meeting to find out 
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how she calculated the points. (Observation note, location #1, 5:30pm group 
meeting) 
As seen from the excerpt, Emily was one of the new Weight Watchers. She felt 
compelled to share an important finding regarding the Weight Watchers favorite dessert 
with other members. Like Emily, other informants in our sample, who were farther away 
from their goal weights or were relatively new to the program, seemed to be very willing 
to speak up at the group meetings and share helpful advice: 
I love sharing, I always say something about, ‘oh, I found this 2 point snack or,’ 
you know, I like giving tips, I’m struggling myself, so I wanna help others … I 
get advice from meetings, there’s always some good information coming out … 
I’m learning how to do this [weight loss], and so, like, if I find some good recipe, 
or, like for Thanksgiving, I made this, I made this low-point pumpkin pie, oh, it 
was delicious, it was just a point, for a serving, so, I was, I actually typed that up, 
and I had a bunch of it, so I gave that to the leader, so she was giving it out … I 
like helping out that way. (Cynthia) 
Cynthia was a Weight Watcher who has lost 10 pounds of the 40-pound goal. As she was 
learning to navigate the Weight Watchers diet, she enthusiastically shared information 
she found helpful. She went as far as preparing multiple copies of the pie recipe and 
distributing them at the meeting. Among the informants who either joined Weight 
Watchers recently or were still far away from reaching the goal, information sharing was 
quite prevalent.  
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 “I can do it myself:” Certainty of goal attainment, competitiveness, and 
distancing in the advanced stage of goal pursuit. Interestingly, the companionship and 
information sharing that we observed among the informants who were in initial stages of 
goal pursuit seemed to reverse as the informants got closer to their goal weight (i.e., 
having achieved more than 50% of the goal weight). One characteristic of this changing 
dynamic seemed to pertain to the belief that one could attain the goal oneself, without 
seeking companionship from group meetings or fellow Weight Watchers. For instance, 
Patricia, who was 5 pounds shy of her goal of 30-pound loss, expressed her attitude: 
Informant: My plan is to lose this 5 pounds by next week … I know I can do it. 
Interviewer: Have you lost 5 pounds in one week before? 
Informant: Well, I had my downs, there … were weeks in there, I lost like quarter 
of a pound … maybe not in one week, but you know, I didn’t think I could lose 25 
pounds either, which I did, so … I think my body is different now, and I know 
what I gotta do, so I think I’ll get there next week, and hit lifetime. (Patricia) 
Even if Patricia has not lost five pounds in a single week, she was confident that she 
could accomplish the goal on her own – that is, Patricia felt certain about the goal’s 
attainability.  
 Because of this heightened independence and confidence in goal attainability, the 
informants who were getting close to the goal began to monitor their progress more 
intensely, using others in the program as comparison benchmarks, and caring very much 
about whether they were losing weight faster or slower than their fellow Weight 
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Watchers members – a demonstration of their competitiveness. Judith, who was also only 
5 pounds away from her 20-pound goal, explained:  
You can usually tell when you’re gaining … at least I can, for myself … so then I 
don’t feel like showing up at a meeting …’cause I feel I’m the only one in there 
who hasn’t lost, and I don’t wanna see the number on the scale. (Judith) 
Having made progress toward the goal, Judith did not want to weigh in at the Weight 
Watchers scale without scoring a loss. Judith’s attitude was indicative of her 
competitiveness: she wanted to be the winner, not the loser, and “showing up” at the 
meeting may aggravate how she felt about an episodic setback. Informants like Judith did 
not want to disclose that they still could experience dietary slip-ups, even if they were so 
close to reaching their goals, as Carol pointed out: 
… you don’t feel like sharing with everyone that you actually pigged out, and 
that’s the reason you gained … so you stay away and think, I’m gonna do it on 
my own. (Carol) 
Carol, like Judith, would rather try and lose the weight on her own, without being found 
out at the Weight Watchers official scale. This demonstrated not only the confidence she 
had regarding goal attainability, but also an emphasis on progress monitoring and a desire 
to “win” in the weekly weigh-in. 
Regardless of whether informants have made steady progress or experienced the 
temporary setbacks, being close to the goal seemed to induce competitiveness, which led 
to a tendency to reduce interactions with fellow members and even withdrawal from 
group meetings (a demonstration of distancing), as is the case of Sharon: 
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I lost 60 pounds, so I have 10 more to go. … I haven’t been going to meetings 
every week, not actually after I lost 50 pounds, I just don’t think I need to. I may 
go one a month, maybe twice, but that hasn’t been the case … I already got 
everything I need to know from the program, so the fact that I lost 10 pounds 
without going there every week, I mean, it’s not like they’re my friends or 
anything, I don’t need to see them every week. (Sharon) 
Sharon, who lost 60 pounds and has 10 pounds left to lose, has dramatically cut down on 
the frequency of attending group meetings. Sharon has adopted a very instrumental 
approach to group meetings and Weight Watchers peers – people in the group meeting 
were not “friends” any more as Sharon did not feel the need to interact with them on a 
weekly basis. 
 The competitive spirit led to distancing, which could manifest through the 
withdrawal from fellow Weight Watchers and group meetings, as well as how informants 
ceased sharing information with each other. Even if these informants attended group 
meetings, they did so silently. Some observation data pointed to this pattern as well; a 
few of the informants we interviewed, who were at a more advanced stage of goal pursuit 
or about to attain the goal, tended not to speak up in meetings; they preferred to sit in 
back rows of the meeting room and leave shortly after the meeting was over. The 
changed pattern of information sharing was demonstrated by the quote from Susan: 
I’m very close to getting to goal. As of today, I’m officially only 8 pounds out! … 
Well, I share a lot less now, I did all my sharing … ‘cause you know, I’m kinda at 
a different place … you know, they gotta learn themselves, I put a lot of effort in 
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this program, and you gotta do that, I mean, if you … I just think they’re gonna 
get more out of people who’re, who’re in the same situation … I just listen [at 
meetings], sometimes I don’t stay, I just go in, get weighed, and leave. (Susan) 
Susan believed that others had to endure their share of “tribulations” in the program, and 
she did not feel obligated to offer help by sharing information in the meetings. Thus, the 
more advanced informants were in their weight loss pursuit, they seemed to become more 
competitive, which manifested in increased distancing from fellow Weight Watchers and 
group meetings, withdrawal, and their disinclination to share information in the meetings.  
Summary. The analysis of the qualitative dataset collected at Weight Watchers 
provided further validation for how the dynamics of interpersonal relationships would 
change depending on the stage of goal pursuit. Specifically, in the initial stage of goal 
pursuit, when informants have achieved equal to or less than 50% of their goal weights, 
the spirit of companionship animated weight loss experience. This was first of all seen in 
how attending Weight Watchers weekly group meetings created a sense of joint goal 
pursuit. Group meetings brought together a very diverse group of people in terms of 
demographics, values, and past attempts in weight loss. Nevertheless, informants 
perceived that they are all “in the same boat,” as everyone was seemingly trying to 
progress towards the same desired weight-loss goal. This mindset of seeking 
companionship made informants relate to each other’s dietary “trials and tribulations” 
even better than family members could. It also enhanced the perception of goal 
attainability, which was dampened by prior unsuccessful weight loss attempts. Observing 
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others in the group meetings helped to confirm that informants could indeed get to their 
goal.  
This seek of companionship was prominently manifested through the informants’ 
belief that they ought to share helpful weight loss information with their Weight 
Watchers peers. Especially for the members who were in the initial stages of weight loss, 
reliance on tips, advice, and “tricks” shared by fellow members was considered vital and 
beneficial. As comrades in misery, informants felt almost obligated to share information 
in group meetings, whether related to low-point snacks or favorite recipes. They spoke up 
voluntarily and enthusiastically in meetings, and they also seek frequent contact with 
fellow Weight Watchers by attending meetings more than once a week. These informants 
were convinced that attending meetings and being surrounded by like-minded others 
were crucial in helping carry on with challenging weight loss journeys and in arriving 
successfully at the goal. Being “in the same boat” thus fostered companionship that 
rendered fellow Weight Watchers not just comrades in misery, but “friends,” a term with 
which some of the informants designated the people in the meetings. 
 This need for companionship was replaced by competitiveness and distancing 
from meetings and fellow Weight Watchers in the advanced stage of goal pursuit. Among 
informants who have achieved more than 50% of their goal weights, the closeness to the 
goal produced heightened confidence and certainty in one’s ability to attain the goal. 
These informants thus started downplaying the importance of attending group meetings 
and congregating with fellow Weight Watchers. They believed that they could attain the 
goal entirely on their own. Such certainty of goal attainment thus led to intense progress 
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monitoring, comparison against other members, and thus competitiveness. Informants 
started to perceive other Weight Watchers as the “other” rather than someone in the same 
boat or a comrade in misery. Consequently, informants closer to the goal seek to 
minimize association with “other” Weight Watchers, withdraw from meetings and other 
members, which was observed through both the frequency and depth of participation. 
Some informants even intended to suspend being at group meetings altogether as they 
saw no further benefit.  
Competitiveness also influenced advanced-stage Weight Watchers’ information 
sharing behaviors. Some informants only came to the Weight Watchers meeting locations 
to weigh in (i.e., another demonstration of their intense progress monitoring) and did not 
stay for meetings. Even when they chose to stay for group meetings, they preferred 
keeping their weight loss “trials and tribulations” to themselves. When they experienced 
setbacks in the progress towards the goal, they remained silent during meetings and did 
not seek encouragement or advice from other Weight Watchers. Not only did these 
informants tend to keep to themselves more, but they also tended to share much less or no 
weight-loss tips at meetings. Rather than voluntarily sharing information, informants 
closer to the goal believed others had to undergo their share of weight loss errors to learn, 
thus keeping weight loss tips more to themselves. In summary, informants in the 
advanced stage of goal pursuit tended to consider fellow Weight Watchers more like foes 
than friends. 
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Chapter 21: General Discussion  
The others who are pursuing the same goal as us constitute a unique group in our 
social network; they are not our significant others or close friends, but we have one 
important thing in common – we are striving for the same individual goal. In some 
situations, this similarity could build close companionship, whereas in other situations, it 
leads to distancing and competition. In this paper we identified two factors that would 
lead to such a shift from being friends to becoming foes: the stage in goal pursuit, and 
one’s zero-sum belief.    
The results of five studies provided consistent support for the hypothesized 
dynamics. Through two longitudinal studies in academic goal-pursuit context (Studies 1a 
and 1b), we found that students treated others pursuing the same academic goal as friends 
when they were at the early-to-mid-point of the semester, but gradually pushed them 
away as they reached the end-point of the pursuit; this shift from friends to foes also 
differentiated the same-pursuit peers from other types of interpersonal relationships. In 
Study 2, we directly manipulated the stage in the pursuit, and found that people indeed 
drew others in the same pursuit closer and spent more time sharing tips with them when 
they believed that they were in the initial stage of the pursuit, but conversely became 
more distant from these same-pursuit peers and spent less time sharing tips when they 
reached the advanced stage of the pursuit. 
In Studies 3 and 4, we incorporated people’s zero-sum belief into the 
examination, and found that the hypothesized pattern only existed among those who held 
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strong zero-sum belief – for those who believed that others’ gains would lead to their 
loses, they became more distant and shared lower quality information to others when they 
reached the advanced stage of goal pursuit. Such changes in perceived closeness and 
information sharing behaviors were due to people’s different focuses in different stages 
of goal pursuit, as directly captured in Study 4. When people first began to pursue the 
goal, they seek companionship from others to confirm that the goal was indeed attainable, 
but once they have made substantial progress and goal attainability was no longer a 
concern, they became competitive against others in the pursuit and seek to reach the goal 
sooner. 
Lastly, through a large-scale qualitative dataset collected from the Weight 
Watchers (Study 5), we again found supportive evidence that members in the Weight 
Watchers program treated others in the same program as friends and were more willing to 
share weight-loss tips when they were in the early stage of the pursuit, but conversely 
treated others in the program as competition and were reluctant to share information 
when they were getting close to their goal weight. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR SELF-REGULATION THEORIES 
Central to our theorizing is the unique role that “same-pursuit peers” (i.e., others 
who are pursuing the same goal and are in the same stage of pursuit) play in consumers’ 
goal pursuit processes. We found that consumers manage this relationship differently 
(gradually shifting from friends to foes) as they make more progress in the pursuit. These 
findings have important implications for the research on interpersonal relationships in 
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self-regulation processes (e.g., Fitzsimons and Finkel 2010). Prior research in this domain 
has focused primarily on how people treat significant and close others in their existing 
social network (Shah 2003; Uchino 2004; Fitzsimons and Fishbach 2010); a limited 
number of papers that examined the impact of same-pursuit peers centered around the 
automatic processes (Aarts, Gollwitzer, and Hassin 2004; McCulloch, Fitzsimons, Chua, 
and Albarracín 2011) rather than one’s active, strategic management of the relationship – 
how one actually perceives and interacts with same-pursuit peers. Our research suggests 
that the same-pursuit peers indeed play a unique role in goal pursuit processes, comparing 
to other types of social relationships (i.e., significant others, or similar others who are 
pursuing different goals, as shown in Studies 1a and 1b), such that “being in the same 
boat” enhances one’s perceived attainability of the goal early on, but could also 
conversely induce a sense of competition at latter stages of the pursuit. 
Our work also adds to the literature of interpersonal similarity by showing that, in 
addition to sharing the same social status, attitudes and values, surname and appearances 
(Cohen and Zhou 1991; Ruef, Aldrich, and Carter 2003; Keasey and Keasey 1971; 
Guéguen, Pichot, and Dreff 2005), “working on the same goal” constitutes another 
powerful dimension of perceived similarity (even among strangers, as demonstrated in 
Studies 3 and 4). Indeed, recent research has shown that motivation could serve as a 
dimension of similarity for people’s categorization and knowledge exchange. For 
instance, the work on interpersonal regulatory fit proposes that people tend to accept 
advices from instrumental others who has the same motivation orientation as them (e.g., 
Righetti, Finkenauer, and Rusbult 2011). In addition, the literature on goal-oriented 
 149 
management of interpersonal relationships showed that others’ instrumentality to one’s 
pursuit of an important goal could constitute a dimension for categorization of one’s 
social network (Fitzsimons and Shah 2009). Our theory adds to these recent findings and 
shows that being motivated by the same goal greatly affects one’s perceived closeness 
with the person, and consequently one’s interaction and information sharing behaviors; 
the examination of such dynamics (i.e., when would one treat same-pursuit peers friendly 
versus competitively) thus further adds to the dialogue between the fields of motivation 
and perceived similarity in the social domain. 
The present work also has specific relevance for the research in the dynamics of 
self-regulation processes (Fishbach, Zhang, and Koo 2009; Koo and Fishbach 2008) and 
the findings that people have different concerns as they accumulate more progress in goal 
pursuit (Huang and Zhang 2011; Huang, Zhang, and Broniarczyk 2012). Specifically, our 
findings expand the prior research of the motivational dynamics into the social domain, 
and propose that in addition to being motivated by different types of feedback and mental 
representations as separate individuals (Huang and Zhang 2011; Huang, Zhang, and 
Broniarczyk 2012), people also interact differently with others who are pursuing the same 
end-point, as they move from one stage to another stage in the goal pursuit process. In 
addition, we identified people’s chronic zero-sum belief as a determinant of such shift of 
closeness in joint goal pursuit processes (Studies 3 and 4). These findings of the 
dynamics in the social domain are just as important as the self-regulatory dynamics at the 
individual level, because it contributes to the understanding of whether and when people 
interact with same-pursuit peers in a collaborative manner, how their commitment to 
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goal-oriented social gatherings evolves during the course of pursuit, as well as the 
changes in their information sharing behaviors, as validated in our Weight Watchers data 
in Study 5. 
FOLLOW-UP STUDY AND FUTURE RESEARCH  
To further examine the proposed mechanisms, we have several ideas for the 
follow-up study. First of all, we can measure people’s sabotaging behaviors (i.e., whether 
they share misleading information with others who are pursuing the same goal) as a 
proxy for their perceived competitiveness. Secondly, we can directly manipulate people’s 
perceived similarity with others pursuing the same goal, to investigate if an increased 
similarity with same-pursuit peers would intensify the hypothesized pattern from being 
friends in the early stage to becoming foes in the advanced stage. Lastly, we can directly 
influence people’s zero-sum belief by enhancing the communal feelings in joint goal-
pursuit processes. For instance, by creating a shared identity (Tajfel and Turner 1986; 
Fishbach, Henderson, and Koo 2011) with others who are pursuing the same goal (e.g., 
we are all “yoggies”), people may become less likely to view joint goal pursuit as a 
competition when they approach the end point of the pursuit.  
Another interesting aspect left unexplored in the present research is the 
motivational consequences of the shift in closeness and interaction with same-pursuit 
peers. In Studies 2 and 4, we found that as people reach the advanced stage of goal 
pursuit, they tend to view same-pursuit peers as “foes” and become reluctant to share 
information to help others in their pursuits. Such desire to do better and “win” the alleged 
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competition could lead to sabotaging behaviors when opportunities arise (e.g., one can 
share misleading nutrition tips to make others regress on their dieting goal). How, then, 
would this affect one’s own goal pursuit? Specifically, when one sabotages others’ 
pursuit and thus alleviates the potential threat of social comparison (Festinger 1954; 
Tesser 1988; Blanton 2001; Buunk and Gibbons 2007), does that reduce one’s own drive 
to continue working on the goal, or conversely enhance one’s motivation in the pursuit? 
In addition, is there any boundary situations, such that people remain friendly to others 
who share a diverse set of similarities with them (e.g., a classmate who is taking the same 
class and also pursuing the same dieting goal), but choose to compete against and 
sabotage others who share only one dimension of goal-related similarity with them (e.g., 
a Weight Watchers member who is pursuing the same dieting goal)? Future research 
should address these important questions. 
IMPLICATIONS FOR MARKETING PRACTITIONERS 
The present research has important implications for marketers who aim to 
enhance consumers’ involvement in joint goal pursuit processes. There are more and 
more goal pursuit programs that encourage consumers to leverage the power of like-
minded others to facilitate the attainment of a challenging goal, such as Weight Watchers, 
AA, and many quit-smoking programs. Our findings suggest that as consumers make 
more progress in their own goal pursuit, they may find the relationship with same-pursuit 
peers hostile than facilitative, and be intimidated by the pressure of having to compete 
against other members in the program. The pressure of competition may lead to 
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withdrawal from the program, and eventually failure in one’s goal attainment. Therefore, 
it may be instrumental for joint goal-pursuit programs to keep the attainability of the goal 
somewhat uncertain until one actually succeeds, so that consumers would stay in the 
group for a longer period of time, and continue interacting with other members in a 
positive manner to seek companionship. 
Furthermore, the present research also sheds important light on how marketers 
can better motivate consumers to share goal-related information with each other. It is not 
news that word-of-mouth serves as a free and powerful advertisement for marketers. For 
instance, Phelps, Lewis, and Mobilio (2004) have found that among all passed-along 
emails, 45.5% consist of information and helpful tips, and as high as 20% of the emails 
talk about companies or products in positive ways. Similarly, it has been shown that the 
volume of WOM has great explanatory power for consumption-related outcomes, such as 
box office revenue in the movie industry (Liu, 2006). Therefore, by strategically 
managing how consumers perceive and interact with others who are working on the same 
goal, marketers can effectively facilitate voluntary sharing of goal-related information 
(e.g., new dieting products and exercise programs) through emails, discussion forums, 
and social network sites. 
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CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, our research examines the dynamics in consumer motivation, 
specifically, how the determinants of consumer motivation change from the initial stage 
to the advanced stage of goal pursuit. We found that when people first begin to pursue a 
goal and the attainability of the goal is a concern, they are motivated by a fast speed of 
progressing, tend to exaggerate the progress they have made so far, and seek 
companionship from others who are pursuing the same goal, to enhance the belief that the 
goal is indeed attainable. However, once they reach the advanced stage of the pursuit and 
the attainability of the goal is relatively secured, they switch to focus on the remaining 
discrepancy and seek to reduce this gap in a timely manner; therefore, in this advanced 
stage of the pursuit they are conversely motivated by a slow speed of progressing, tend to 
downplay the progress they have made to exaggerate the remaining discrepancy that still 
needs to be completed, and such intense progress monitoring also leads to 
competitiveness against others who are pursuing the same goal as them.  
These findings are important to researchers as well as marketing practitioners 
because it suggests that the same factor that motivates consumers in early stages of the 
pursuit could conversely de-motivate them when they are approaching the end point; 
therefore, the assumption that all factors function in the same way throughout a course of 
goal pursuit is not only invalid but can also lead to failure in goal attainment. 
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FIGURES 
FIGURE 1: VOLUNTEER FREQUENCY AS A FUNCTION OF PROGRESS AND 
PERCEIVED VELOCITY (STUDY 1, SECTION 1) 
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FIGURE 2: VOLUNTEER HOURS AS A FUNCTION OF PROGRESS AND 
PERCEIVED VELOCITY (STUDY 1, SECTION 1) 
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FIGURE 3: WAIT TIME AS A FUNCTION OF PROGRESS AND PERCEIVED 
VELOCITY (STUDY 2, SECTION 1) 
 
50	  
70	  
90	  
110	  
130	  
Low	   High	  
W
ai
t	  
7
m
e	  
(s
ec
on
ds
)	  
Progress	  
Low	  
High	  
Velocity	  
 157 
FIGURE 4: MODERATED MEDIATION MODEL OF THE INFLUENCE OF 
CONCERN OF “CAN I GET THERE?” ON WAITING TIME (STUDY 2, 
SECTION 1) 
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FIGURE 5: MODERATED MEDIATION MODEL OF THE INFLUENCE OF 
CONCERN OF “WHEN WILL I GET THERE?” ON WAITING TIME 
(STUDY 2, SECTION 1) 
 
 
 159 
FIGURE 6: AVERAGE TIME SPENT ON DIFFICULT QUESTIONS AS A 
FUNCTION OF PROGRESS, PERCEIVED VELOCITY, AND TASK 
FRAMING (STUDY 3, SECTION 1) 
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FIGURE 7: TIME SPENT ON MEMORIZING WINE LABELS AS A FUNCTION OF 
PERCEIVED VELOCITY AND CONFIRMATION (STUDY 4, SECTION 
1) 
 
 
60	  
70	  
80	  
90	  
100	  
No	   Yes	   No	   Yes	   No	   Yes	  
Ti
m
e	  
on
	  m
em
or
iz
a7
on
	  (s
ec
on
ds
)	  
Conﬁrma7on	  of	  Goal	  AEainability	  
Low	  
High	  
Velocity	  
Stage	  1	   Stage	  2	   Stage	  3	  
 161 
FIGURE 8: NUMBER OF DONATED T-SHIRTS AS A FUNCTION OF STAGE IN 
THE PURSUIT AND GOAL VALUE (STUDY 1, SECTION 2) 
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FIGURE 9: MODERATED MEDIATION MODEL OF THE INFLUENCE OF 
MENTAL REPRESENTATION OF PROGRESS LEVEL ON T-SHIRT 
DONATION (STUDY 1, SECTION 2) 
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FIGURE 10: REPRESENTED PROGRESS AS A FUNCTION OF STAGE IN THE 
PURSUIT AND GOAL VALUE (STUDY 2, SECTION 2) 
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FIGURE 11: MODERATED MEDIATION MODEL OF THE INFLUENCE OF 
MENTAL REPRESENTATION OF PROGRESS LEVEL ON CHANGE 
OF EFFORT (STUDY 2, SECTION 2) 
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FIGURE 12: REPRESENTED PROGRESS AS A FUNCTION OF STAGE IN THE 
PURSUIT AND SELF-REGULATION EFFECTIVENESS (STUDY 3, 
SECTION 2) 
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FIGURE 13: MODERATED MEDIATION MODEL OF THE INFLUENCE OF 
MENTAL REPRESENTATION OF PROGRESS LEVEL ON EFFORT 
INVESTMENT (STUDY 3, SECTION 2) 
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FIGURE 14: NUMBER OF POINTS EARNED SO FAR AS A FUNCTION OF 
STAGE IN THE PURSUIT AND IMPORTANCE OF ACCURACY 
(STUDY 4, SECTION 2) 
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FIGURE 15: MODERATED MEDIATION MODEL OF THE INFLUENCE OF 
MENTAL REPRESENTATION OF PROGRESS LEVEL ON EFFORT 
INVESTMENT (STUDY 4, SECTION 2) 
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FIGURE 16: PERCEIVED CLOSENESS AS A FUNCTION OF STAGE IN THE 
PURSUIT AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIP (STUDY 1A, 
SECTION 3) 
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FIGURE 17: PERCEIVED CLOSENESS AS A FUNCTION OF STAGE IN THE 
PURSUIT AND INTERPERSONAL RELATIONSHIP (STUDY 1B, 
SECTION 3) 
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FIGURE 18: PERCEIVED CLOSENESS DIFFERENCE SCORE AS A FUNCTION 
OF STAGE IN THE PURSUIT AND FRIEND’S PURSUIT (STUDY 2, 
SECTION 3) 
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FIGURE 19: TIME SPENT ON SHARING TIPS AS A FUNCTION OF STAGE IN 
THE PURSUIT AND FRIEND’S PURSUIT (STUDY 2, SECTION 3) 
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FIGURE 20: LENGTH OF TIPS AS A FUNCTION OF STAGE IN THE PURSUIT 
AND FRIEND’S PURSUIT (STUDY 2, SECTION 3) 
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FIGURE 21: PERCEIVED CLOSENESS DIFFERENCE SCORE AS A FUNCTION 
OF STAGE IN THE PURSUIT AND ZERO-SUM BELIEF (STUDY 3, 
SECTION 3) 
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FIGURE 22: ERROR RATE AS A FUNCTION OF STAGE IN THE PURSUIT AND 
ZERO-SUM BELIEF (STUDY 4, SECTION 3) 
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APPENDICES 
APPENDIX A: INFORMANTS’ PROFILE TABLE (STUDY 5, SECTION 3) 
Pseudonym Age 
Marital 
Status Education Occupation 
Weight Watchers 
Status 
Abby 58 Married High School Day care operator Regular member 
Amy 36 Single Bachelors Graduate student Regular member 
Angela 25 Married Masters Graduate student Regular member 
Anna 53 Married Some college Secretary Regular member 
Ava 64 Married High School Bookkeeper Regular member 
Barbara 35 Married Bachelors Nurse Regular member 
Betty 53 Married Doctorate Psychotherapist Regular member 
Brenda 44 Married Bachelors Volunteer coordinator Regular member 
Carol 51 Single Bachelors Enterpreneur Regular member 
Claudia 30 Married Masters High school teacher Regular member 
Cynthia 40 Divorced Bachelors Consultant Regular member 
Debra 53 Single Some college Technician Regular member 
Donna 32 Married Some college Banker Regular member 
Doris 44 Married Bachelors Nurse Regular member 
Elizabeth 23 Single Some college Training specialist Regular member 
Ethel 54 Married Bachelors Girl Scouts coordinator Regular member 
Helen 47 Divorced Masters Research tech Regular member 
Irene 25 Single Bachelors Cafeteria manager Regular member 
Jane 52 Married Bachelors Office manager Regular member 
Janet 28 Single Bachelors State investigator Regular member 
Jennifer 45 Single Bachelors Administrative assistant Regular member 
Jessica 60 Married High School State employee Regular member 
Joyce 38 Engaged Masters Recruitment director Regular member 
Judith 30 Single Masters Graduate student Regular member 
Julie 46 Married Some college Sales associate Regular member 
Karen 26 Partnership Masters Research assistant Regular member 
Kathleen 56 Single Masters Executive director Regular member 
Kelly 50 Married Some college Store manager Regular member 
Kimberly 46 Married Masters High school teacher Lifetime member 
Leslie 60 Divorced Masters Secretary Lifetime member 
Linda 50 Married Bachelors Secretary Lifetime member 
Lorraine 49 Married Bachelors High school teacher Lifetime member 
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Mary 50 Married Bachelors Coordinator Lifetime member 
Melanie 37 Married Bachelors Paraeducator Lifetime member 
Michelle 53 Married Bachelors Social worker Lifetime member 
Nancy 50 Married Bachelors Nurse Lifetime member 
Natalie 33 Married Bachelors Adminstrative support Lifetime member 
Patricia 44 Married Bachelors Archeologist Lifetime member 
Rebecca 50 Married Bachelors State employee Lifetime member 
Ruby 33 Married Doctorate Assistant professor Lifetime member 
Ruth 24 Single Masters Graduate student Lifetime member 
Samantah 59 Widowed Some college Social worker Lifetime member 
Sandra 52 Married Masters Pubicisit Lifetime member 
Sara 46 Married Some college Unemployed Lifetime member 
Sharon 31 Single Masters Research chemist Lifetime member 
Shirley 59 Married Some college Secretary Lifetime member 
Susan 30 Single Masters High school teacher Lifetime member 
Vicki 35 Married Bachelors Stay-at-home mom Group leader 
Virginia 52 Married Associates State employee Group leader 
Wanda 45 Married Masters Manager Group leader 
Whitney 49 Married Associates Aging specialist Group leader 
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APPENDIX B: CODING SCHEME (STUDY 5, SECTION 3) 
Theme Description 
Indicators of Companionship: 
• Community of the like-minded others Perception that Weight Watchers members are similar 
to one another, united by the commonality of weight 
loss challenges and experiences. 
• Goal pursuit as a collective project Perception that individual weight loss goals are 
subsumed into a group goal. 
• Increased perception of goal 
attainability 
Perception that the presence of the group ensures 
attainability of individual weight loss goals. 
• Companionship seeking Frequency of contact with fellow Weight Watchers and 
group leaders by regular attendance of group meetings 
on a weekly or more than a weekly basis. 
• Motivation to contribute to a collective 
goal 
Desire to score a weekly weight loss not to let the 
group down. 
• Reliance on the group for emotional 
support 
Mutual seeking and sharing of verbal encouragement 
and supportive communications from fellow Weight 
Watchers, especially in times of dietary 
challenges/setbacks. 
• Reliance on the group for 
informational support 
Mutual seeking and sharing of tips, advice, and diet-
related information with fellow Weight Watchers at the 
group meetings. 
Indicators of Comparison and Competition: 
• Increased sense of individual 
distinction 
Perception that having lost weight, an individual 
member has become different from other Weight 
Watchers. 
• Goal pursuit as an individual project Desire to lose weight independently, with limited or no 
participation in Weight Watchers group meetings. 
• Absence of doubt in goal attainability Perception that an individual member can attain the 
weight loss goal without reliance on the group. 
• Companionship aversion Reducing the contact with fellow Weight Watchers by 
infrequent attendance or by skipping group meetings. 
• Distancing from a collective goal Perception that everyone has to pursue their own 
weight loss goals. 
• Limited/no need for emotional support Tendency to non-disclosure of temporary setbacks and 
limited or no seeking/sharing of verbal encouragement 
and supportive communications. 
• Information withholding/limited 
sharing 
Tendency to not seek or share diet-related information 
with fellow Weight Watchers. 
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